IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0700 Filed July 19, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF R.L., Minor Child,
M.O., Mother, Appellant,
C.L., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan C. Cox, District
Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro of Macro & Kozlowski, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Tod J. Beavers, of Tod J. Beavers, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Joseph P. Vogel of Vogel Law, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ. 2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the termination of their
parental rights to their child, R.L. Both parents assert termination is not in R.L.’s
best interests and Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2017) exceptions apply to
preclude the need for termination. Due to the parents’ histories of substance
abuse, and failure to engage in services and to demonstrate an ability to parent
R.L., we conclude termination is in R.L.’s best interests and no section
232.116(3) exception applies. We therefore affirm.
R.L. was born to the mother and father in December 2014. The parents
are unmarried. The family came to the attention of the department of human
services (DHS) in May 2015 when R.L. was admitted to the hospital for seizures
caused by brain injuries consistent with child abuse. The incident resulted in a
founded child-abuse assessment by DHS, noting the perpetrator was unknown.
In June 2015, the mother and father both tested positive for THC. R.L. was
removed from their care on June 29, 2015, and placed with his maternal
grandmother.
Both parents have extensive substance-abuse histories. The mother
completed treatment during the pendency of this matter, but did not participate in
aftercare and refused to submit to drug testing by patch. The father also
completed outpatient substance-abuse treatment, but only attended continuing
care for approximately one month. The father refused requested drug testing
during this case and admitted to a relapse in June or July of 2016.
The parents have a history of domestic violence. They were no longer in
a relationship at the time of the termination hearing. 3
In December 2016, the father was convicted of third-degree burglary and
second-degree theft and was given a deferred judgment. However, the father
was subsequently incarcerated due to an arrest for forgery. The father was
incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.
Both parents demonstrated inconsistent participation in DHS services.
The mother missed Family Safety, Risk and Permanency (FSRP) meetings, and
did not consistently attend individual counseling. The father did not attend all
scheduled interactions with R.L. and missed a number of FSRP meetings. The
father discontinued participation in all DHS services in June 2016, stating he
wished to voluntarily terminate his parental rights to R.L. The father
subsequently determined he would not consent to termination, but did not
demonstrate an improved participation in services.
Most significantly, neither parent demonstrated an ability to appropriately
parent R.L. The father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing
and had not adequately addressed his substance-abuse and mental-health
issues such that he could safely care for R.L. The initial concerns regarding the
mother’s ability to parent R.L. remained present throughout the pendency of this
matter. The mother was unable to control her anger and to put R.L.’s needs
above her own. R.L. was returned to the mother’s custody in June 2016 with the
condition that she continue living with the maternal grandmother. During that
time, the mother and maternal grandmother argued because the mother did not
take adequate responsibility for parenting R.L., often wanting to go out with
friends instead. The mother struggled to care for R.L. during the night and in the
morning. The arrangement ended in July 2016 when the maternal grandmother 4
asked the mother to move out based on her concerns with the mother’s lack of
parenting abilities and the mother’s inability to control her anger and react
appropriately to the maternal grandmother’s parenting suggestions. The mother
did not attend R.L.’s last two doctor’s appointments. At the time of the
termination hearing, the mother did not have a residence where she could care
for R.L. and did not have a long-term plan to provide a safe environment for R.L.
Both the mother and father admitted R.L. could not be safely returned to
their care at present.
The termination hearing was held February 23, 2017. On April 23, the
juvenile court entered an order terminating the parents’ parental rights to R.L.
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h). Both parents appeal.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
110 (Iowa 2014). Our primary concern is the child’s best interests. In re J.E.,
723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). In determining whether termination is
appropriate, we first determine if a ground for termination exists under section
232.116(1); second, we consider whether termination is in the child’s best
interests pursuant to section 232.116(2); and last, we consider if any section
232.116(3) exception applies to preclude the need for termination. In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
The parents do not contest the grounds for termination, and we find such
grounds exist under section 232.116(1)(h). At the time of the termination hearing
R.L. was under the age of three, had been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance, had been removed from the parents’ custody for the requisite time
period, and could not be returned to the parents’ care due to both parents’ failure 5
to adequately address their substance-abuse problems, obtain appropriate
housing, and demonstrate an ability to parent R.L., and both parents’ admission
R.L. could not be returned to their care.
The parents assert termination is not in R.L.’s best interests and
termination is not warranted due to the strong parent-child bond and because
R.L. is in the custody of a family member, the maternal grandmother. See Iowa
Code § 232.116(2), (3).
We conclude termination is in R.L.’s best interests. R.L. has been out of
the parents’ custody for nearly his whole life. The parents have failed to
demonstrate they are capable of addressing their substance-abuse and mental-
health issues and putting R.L.’s needs above their own. The parents have been
given ample time to provide a safe environment for R.L. and have not done so.
“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be
gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0700 Filed July 19, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF R.L., Minor Child,
M.O., Mother, Appellant,
C.L., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan C. Cox, District
Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro of Macro & Kozlowski, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Tod J. Beavers, of Tod J. Beavers, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Joseph P. Vogel of Vogel Law, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ. 2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the termination of their
parental rights to their child, R.L. Both parents assert termination is not in R.L.’s
best interests and Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2017) exceptions apply to
preclude the need for termination. Due to the parents’ histories of substance
abuse, and failure to engage in services and to demonstrate an ability to parent
R.L., we conclude termination is in R.L.’s best interests and no section
232.116(3) exception applies. We therefore affirm.
R.L. was born to the mother and father in December 2014. The parents
are unmarried. The family came to the attention of the department of human
services (DHS) in May 2015 when R.L. was admitted to the hospital for seizures
caused by brain injuries consistent with child abuse. The incident resulted in a
founded child-abuse assessment by DHS, noting the perpetrator was unknown.
In June 2015, the mother and father both tested positive for THC. R.L. was
removed from their care on June 29, 2015, and placed with his maternal
grandmother.
Both parents have extensive substance-abuse histories. The mother
completed treatment during the pendency of this matter, but did not participate in
aftercare and refused to submit to drug testing by patch. The father also
completed outpatient substance-abuse treatment, but only attended continuing
care for approximately one month. The father refused requested drug testing
during this case and admitted to a relapse in June or July of 2016.
The parents have a history of domestic violence. They were no longer in
a relationship at the time of the termination hearing. 3
In December 2016, the father was convicted of third-degree burglary and
second-degree theft and was given a deferred judgment. However, the father
was subsequently incarcerated due to an arrest for forgery. The father was
incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.
Both parents demonstrated inconsistent participation in DHS services.
The mother missed Family Safety, Risk and Permanency (FSRP) meetings, and
did not consistently attend individual counseling. The father did not attend all
scheduled interactions with R.L. and missed a number of FSRP meetings. The
father discontinued participation in all DHS services in June 2016, stating he
wished to voluntarily terminate his parental rights to R.L. The father
subsequently determined he would not consent to termination, but did not
demonstrate an improved participation in services.
Most significantly, neither parent demonstrated an ability to appropriately
parent R.L. The father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing
and had not adequately addressed his substance-abuse and mental-health
issues such that he could safely care for R.L. The initial concerns regarding the
mother’s ability to parent R.L. remained present throughout the pendency of this
matter. The mother was unable to control her anger and to put R.L.’s needs
above her own. R.L. was returned to the mother’s custody in June 2016 with the
condition that she continue living with the maternal grandmother. During that
time, the mother and maternal grandmother argued because the mother did not
take adequate responsibility for parenting R.L., often wanting to go out with
friends instead. The mother struggled to care for R.L. during the night and in the
morning. The arrangement ended in July 2016 when the maternal grandmother 4
asked the mother to move out based on her concerns with the mother’s lack of
parenting abilities and the mother’s inability to control her anger and react
appropriately to the maternal grandmother’s parenting suggestions. The mother
did not attend R.L.’s last two doctor’s appointments. At the time of the
termination hearing, the mother did not have a residence where she could care
for R.L. and did not have a long-term plan to provide a safe environment for R.L.
Both the mother and father admitted R.L. could not be safely returned to
their care at present.
The termination hearing was held February 23, 2017. On April 23, the
juvenile court entered an order terminating the parents’ parental rights to R.L.
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h). Both parents appeal.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
110 (Iowa 2014). Our primary concern is the child’s best interests. In re J.E.,
723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). In determining whether termination is
appropriate, we first determine if a ground for termination exists under section
232.116(1); second, we consider whether termination is in the child’s best
interests pursuant to section 232.116(2); and last, we consider if any section
232.116(3) exception applies to preclude the need for termination. In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
The parents do not contest the grounds for termination, and we find such
grounds exist under section 232.116(1)(h). At the time of the termination hearing
R.L. was under the age of three, had been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance, had been removed from the parents’ custody for the requisite time
period, and could not be returned to the parents’ care due to both parents’ failure 5
to adequately address their substance-abuse problems, obtain appropriate
housing, and demonstrate an ability to parent R.L., and both parents’ admission
R.L. could not be returned to their care.
The parents assert termination is not in R.L.’s best interests and
termination is not warranted due to the strong parent-child bond and because
R.L. is in the custody of a family member, the maternal grandmother. See Iowa
Code § 232.116(2), (3).
We conclude termination is in R.L.’s best interests. R.L. has been out of
the parents’ custody for nearly his whole life. The parents have failed to
demonstrate they are capable of addressing their substance-abuse and mental-
health issues and putting R.L.’s needs above their own. The parents have been
given ample time to provide a safe environment for R.L. and have not done so.
“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be
gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance
may be indicative of the quality of the future care that a parent is capable of
providing.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). R.L.
has waited long enough for permanency and stability. We find termination of the
parents’ parental rights is in R.L.’s best interests.
We also conclude no section 232.116(3) exception applies to preclude the
need for termination. Section 232.116(3)(c) provides an exception to termination
if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be
detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship.” However, it is the parents’ relationship with R.L. and their instability
that has shown to be detrimental. We find any bond the parents have with R.L. 6
does not outweigh R.L.’s need for immediate permanency. See C.B., 611
N.W.2d at 495 (“Once the limitation period lapses, termination proceedings must
be viewed with a sense of urgency.”). Additionally, section 232.116(3)(a)
provides an exception to termination when “[a] relative has legal custody of the
child.” However, the exception does not apply here because R.L. is in the legal
custody of DHS, not the maternal grandmother. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113.
We conclude there is a ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(h)
with respect to each parent, termination is in R.L.’s best interests, and no
exception applies to preclude the need for termination. We therefore affirm the
termination of the parents’ parental rights to R.L.
AFFIRMED.