In the Interest of R.F., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: June 5, 2024
• Docket: 24-0486
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0486 Filed June 5, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF R.F., Minor Child,

B.F., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,

Stephanie Forker Parry, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

Molly Vakulskas Joly of Vakulskas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Elizabeth Z. Stanley of Stanley Law Firm, LLC, Sioux City, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. She

contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue

the termination hearing and challenges each of the three steps in the termination

analysis under Iowa Code section 232.116 (2023). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d

703, 706 (Iowa 2010) (“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a

three-step analysis.”). Because the juvenile court acted within its discretion by

denying a continuance, clear and convincing evidence supports a ground for

termination, termination is in the child’s best interests, and termination will not harm

the child based on the strength of the parent-child bond, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The child was born in October 2021 and came to the attention of the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) because the mother tested

positive for methamphetamine two weeks before his birth. The juvenile court

adjudicated the child as a child in need of assistance (CINA) in February 2022. In

June, the court removed the child from the mother’s custody. A trial home

placement was attempted from August to October 2022. Since then, the child has

remained in a foster home that is willing to provide permanent placement.

The mother has a long history of substance use. She reports that she began

using alcohol at twelve, marijuana at fourteen, and methamphetamine at fifteen.

She was diagnosed with Stimulant Use Disorder, Severe, amphetamine-type

substance; Cannabis Use Disorder, Severe, in early or sustained remission;

Alcohol Use Disorder, Severe, in early or sustained remission; and Tobacco Use

Disorder, Moderate. The mother’s substance use resulted in CINA adjudications 3

for her three older children, beginning in 2017. From 2017 to 2020, the mother

received services to address her substance-use issues without avail. Ultimately,

the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to those children.

In a November 2023 permanency order, the juvenile court found that the

child could not be returned safely to the mother’s care within a reasonable time

despite the reasonable efforts made by the HHS. It directed the State to petition

for termination of the mother’s parental rights. On the day of the termination

hearing, the mother moved to continue the hearing because she claimed she was

very sick. The mother refused her attorney’s suggestion that she attend by video

conference, citing the importance of the hearing and her preference to attend in

person. Both the State and the guardian ad litem resisted a continuance based on

the mother’s history of delay tactics throughout the CINA proceedings, the child’s

need for permanency, and the lack of evidence verifying the mother’s illness. The

court denied the mother’s motion, agreeing that “the CINA proceeding has been

ongoing for a very long time due to the many, many, many delays requested by

the mother, firing counsel, and requesting continuances for various reasons.” The

court concluded that further delay was not in the child’s best interests. After the

hearing, it terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l).

II. Continuance.

The mother first challenges the denial of her motion to continue the

termination hearing. We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of

discretion. In re M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018). The court abuses its

discretion when it bases its decision on grounds that are clearly untenable or 4

unreasonable, like an error in applying the law, and we reverse only if the denial

results in injustice to the party requesting the continuance. Id.

“A motion for continuance shall not be granted except for good cause.” Iowa

Ct. R. 8.5. The mother argues that her illness prevented her from attending the

hearing, which was good cause for a short continuance. We disagree. Although

due process affords parents the right to participate in the termination hearing, it

does not require in-person participation. See M.D., 921 N.W.2d at 234–36

(addressing the right of incarcerated parents to participate in the entire termination

hearing by means that allow the parent to hear the testimony and arguments

presented). The mother’s attorney suggested an alternative means that would

allow the mother’s participation in the hearing, which the mother rejected because

she preferred to attend the hearing in person. That preference does not constitute

good cause for continuance. See id. at 233 (noting that while a continuance may

help a parent who cannot attend a termination hearing in person, “the delay that

accompanies such continuances may be detrimental to the best interests of

children”). The district court properly exercised its discretion by denying a

continuance.

III. Termination.

We turn then to the mother’s challenges to the termination order, which we

review de novo. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Iowa 2021). Iowa courts

use a three-step analysis to review the termination of parental rights. In re A.S.,

906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). First, we consider whether any ground for

termination has been established. Id. at 472–73. Next, we consider “whether the

best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination 5

of parental rights.” Id. at 472 (citation omitted). Finally, “we consider whether any

exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Because we may affirm if clear and convincing evidence supports one

ground for termination the juvenile court relied on, D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707, we

begin by analyzing the grounds for termination under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h). The mother does not dispute that the State proved the first

three requirements for termination under this section. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h)(1)-(3) (applying if a child is three or younger, has been adjudicated

CINA, and has been removed from the parent’s custody for six months). The

mother challenges the fourth element, which requires clear and convincing

evidence showing the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at the time

of the termination hearing without exposing the child to harm that would justify a

CINA adjudication. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 168.

The mother claims the child could be returned to her care because she has

her own residence, which her caseworker testified was appropriate for the child.

But the child requires more than adequate housing. The record establishes that

despite the receipt of more than two years of services, the same concerns that led

to the CINA adjudication and the child’s removal persist. The mother’s substance

use is chief among those concerns. It is evident from the mother’s performance

during this case, in addition to the proceedings involving her other children, that

the mother is unwilling or unable to address her substance-use issues and

maintain sobriety. Thus, the child cannot be returned to her custody. See In re

W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021) (“A long history of substance abuse, 6

repeated relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety outside a

supervised setting demonstrates the children could not have been returned to [the

mother’s] care at the time of the termination hearing.”). The ground for termination

under section 232.116(1)(h) are satisfied.

We next turn to whether termination is in the child’s best interests. When

determining best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to

the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,

and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa

Code § 232.116(2); accord In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Iowa 2019) (stating

that “we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests, consider

what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s

safety and need for a permanent home” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)).

Clear and convincing evidence shows that termination is in the child’s best

interests. The child, who is now two and one-half years old, was last removed from

the mother’s care when he turned one. The child has remained in the same foster

home placement since then. The HHS case manager testified that the child is

integrated into the home and thriving, stating, “He’s a very happy child.” The foster

home reports no behavioral concerns with the child, observing that he is not

aggressive and listens well. In contrast, the child has become more aggressive

with the mother during their visits, with workers observing the child “pulling her hair

and kicking her,” something that “occur[red] often.”

The guardian ad litem recommended terminating the mother’s parental

rights: 7

The same safety concerns and honesty issues that undersigned had at the beginning of the case are still present. Mother is still not able to account for her positive drug tests nor can she safely have minor child placed in her care. While Mother has made some positive steps throughout the case, Mother has not made enough progress in order to have the minor child placed in her care. Though Mother can continue to progress and make positive changes, there is not enough time to allow for those changes to be implemented. Minor child has been placed in foster care for all of his life and is in need of permanency.

We concur in this assessment. Considering the length of the case and the

mother’s lack of progress, clear and convincing evidence shows termination is in

the child’s best interests. See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App.

2009) (recognizing that “at some point, the rights and needs of the children rise

above the rights and needs of the parent”).

Finally, the mother also contends termination is not in the child’s best

interests because of the strong bond she shares with the child. Iowa Code

section 232.116(3)(c) states that the court need not terminate the parent-child

relationship if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would

be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child

relationship.” The mother bears the burden of showing this provision applies, see

A.S., 906 at 476, and it applies only if clear and convincing evidence shows “that,

on balance, that bond makes termination more detrimental than not.” W.M., 957

N.W.2d at 315. Although the mother and child share a bond, the record does not

support a finding that termination will harm the child. Because termination serves

the child’s best interests, we affirm.