IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0925 Filed August 6, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF N.W., Minor Child,
K.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her child. AFFIRMED.
Aaron H. Ginkens of Ginkens Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Sandra C. Johnson of Cunningham & Kelso, PLLC, Des Moines, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a mother and father of a
child born in 2023. Only the mother appeals. She makes four arguments: (1) the
State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination; (2) termination is not in the
child’s best interest; (3) a permissive exception to termination should be applied to
forgo termination due to the closeness of the mother-child relationship; and (4) she
should have been given additional time to work toward reunification. We address
each issue in turn.
I. Standard and Process of Review
We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973
N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). The review follows a three-step process of
determining whether a statutory ground for termination was established, whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive exception
should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa
2021). After addressing any challenges to the three-step process, we then
address any additional claims raised by the parent. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532
(Iowa Ct. App. 2025).
II. Statutory Ground
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2025), which permits termination upon clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) the child is three years of age or younger; (2) the child has been
adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the
physical custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months; and (4) the 3
child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at the present time. The
mother challenges only the fourth element.
The mother testified at the termination hearing that the child could not be
returned to her custody at that time. She confirmed this testimony in her petition
on appeal, wherein she argues the child could be returned to her care “in the near
future.” Being able to have the child returned to her custody at some future time
does not help the mother’s cause because “at the present time,” as used in
section 232.116(1)(h)(4), means “at the time of the termination hearing.” See In re
A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018). Because the mother’s testimony and
appellate briefing concede that the child could not be returned to her custody at
the time of the termination hearing, her challenge to the statutory ground
authorizing termination fails.
III. Best Interests
The mother argues that termination is not in the child’s best interest. In
assessing whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest, we
“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). The mother
contends that her consistent visitation has fostered a close bond with the child and
that this bond weighs against termination. We are not persuaded.
At the time of the termination hearing, fourteen months had passed since
the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. During that period, the mother
struggled with alcohol abuse and untreated mental-health issues. Although she 4
entered inpatient treatment nine months before the termination hearing, she left
the program after one month and began to drink again. The mother admitted to
drinking to the point of blacking out three to seven days per week—a pattern that
continued until she re-entered inpatient treatment the month before the termination
hearing.
To her credit, the mother made progress in the month leading up to the
termination hearing. She re-engaged in treatment and consistently attended
supervised visitation with the child. While we commend these efforts, we note that
this progress has come too late. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994)
(finding efforts “of very recent origin” to be an unpersuasive “eleventh hour attempt
to prevent termination”). Because of her failure to demonstrate sustained progress
throughout the case, visitation never advanced beyond fully supervised settings.
See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 170 (Iowa 2020) (“[T]here is a substantial
difference between meeting a child’s needs under the supervision and guidance
of other people and being able to independently care for a child . . . .”); In re C.N.,
No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (“[The parent]
never progressed to unsupervised visits or trial home visits. Without this
necessary progression, we cannot say the children could have returned to the
[parent]’s care.”).
In assessing the child’s best interests, we recognize that the child deserves
stability and permanency. The mother, who is in the early stages of addressing
longstanding alcohol-abuse and mental-health issues, cannot meet those needs.
After a short stint with the father after removal, the child has lived with her maternal
aunt. According to multiple witnesses, including the mother, the aunt provides a 5
safe, stable, and supportive environment in which the child is thriving. And the
aunt desires to adopt the child. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (listing as a factor
to consider in the best-interests analysis whether a foster family “is able and willing
to permanently integrate the child into the foster family”).
After our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court that
terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
IV. Permissive Exception
The mother also contends that termination should not be ordered due to the
closeness of her relationship with the child. She relies on the exception in
section 232.116(3)(c), which permits the court to forgo termination when “[t]here is
clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the
child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” But this
exception to termination is discretionary, not mandatory, and the burden rests on
the parent resisting termination to prove the applicability of an exception. A.S.,
906 N.W.2d at 475–76.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0925 Filed August 6, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF N.W., Minor Child,
K.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her child. AFFIRMED.
Aaron H. Ginkens of Ginkens Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Sandra C. Johnson of Cunningham & Kelso, PLLC, Des Moines, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a mother and father of a
child born in 2023. Only the mother appeals. She makes four arguments: (1) the
State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination; (2) termination is not in the
child’s best interest; (3) a permissive exception to termination should be applied to
forgo termination due to the closeness of the mother-child relationship; and (4) she
should have been given additional time to work toward reunification. We address
each issue in turn.
I. Standard and Process of Review
We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973
N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). The review follows a three-step process of
determining whether a statutory ground for termination was established, whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive exception
should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa
2021). After addressing any challenges to the three-step process, we then
address any additional claims raised by the parent. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532
(Iowa Ct. App. 2025).
II. Statutory Ground
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2025), which permits termination upon clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) the child is three years of age or younger; (2) the child has been
adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the
physical custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months; and (4) the 3
child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at the present time. The
mother challenges only the fourth element.
The mother testified at the termination hearing that the child could not be
returned to her custody at that time. She confirmed this testimony in her petition
on appeal, wherein she argues the child could be returned to her care “in the near
future.” Being able to have the child returned to her custody at some future time
does not help the mother’s cause because “at the present time,” as used in
section 232.116(1)(h)(4), means “at the time of the termination hearing.” See In re
A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018). Because the mother’s testimony and
appellate briefing concede that the child could not be returned to her custody at
the time of the termination hearing, her challenge to the statutory ground
authorizing termination fails.
III. Best Interests
The mother argues that termination is not in the child’s best interest. In
assessing whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest, we
“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). The mother
contends that her consistent visitation has fostered a close bond with the child and
that this bond weighs against termination. We are not persuaded.
At the time of the termination hearing, fourteen months had passed since
the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. During that period, the mother
struggled with alcohol abuse and untreated mental-health issues. Although she 4
entered inpatient treatment nine months before the termination hearing, she left
the program after one month and began to drink again. The mother admitted to
drinking to the point of blacking out three to seven days per week—a pattern that
continued until she re-entered inpatient treatment the month before the termination
hearing.
To her credit, the mother made progress in the month leading up to the
termination hearing. She re-engaged in treatment and consistently attended
supervised visitation with the child. While we commend these efforts, we note that
this progress has come too late. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994)
(finding efforts “of very recent origin” to be an unpersuasive “eleventh hour attempt
to prevent termination”). Because of her failure to demonstrate sustained progress
throughout the case, visitation never advanced beyond fully supervised settings.
See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 170 (Iowa 2020) (“[T]here is a substantial
difference between meeting a child’s needs under the supervision and guidance
of other people and being able to independently care for a child . . . .”); In re C.N.,
No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (“[The parent]
never progressed to unsupervised visits or trial home visits. Without this
necessary progression, we cannot say the children could have returned to the
[parent]’s care.”).
In assessing the child’s best interests, we recognize that the child deserves
stability and permanency. The mother, who is in the early stages of addressing
longstanding alcohol-abuse and mental-health issues, cannot meet those needs.
After a short stint with the father after removal, the child has lived with her maternal
aunt. According to multiple witnesses, including the mother, the aunt provides a 5
safe, stable, and supportive environment in which the child is thriving. And the
aunt desires to adopt the child. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (listing as a factor
to consider in the best-interests analysis whether a foster family “is able and willing
to permanently integrate the child into the foster family”).
After our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court that
terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
IV. Permissive Exception
The mother also contends that termination should not be ordered due to the
closeness of her relationship with the child. She relies on the exception in
section 232.116(3)(c), which permits the court to forgo termination when “[t]here is
clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the
child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” But this
exception to termination is discretionary, not mandatory, and the burden rests on
the parent resisting termination to prove the applicability of an exception. A.S.,
906 N.W.2d at 475–76. While the record does support the existence of a bond
between the mother and child, the mere presence of a bond is insufficient to
preclude termination. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). Instead,
the focus must be on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination and
whether that disadvantage overcomes the mother’s inability to provide for the
child’s needs. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).
The mother relies on her own testimony regarding her bond with the child
and her consistent visitation to support her claim. However, this is not persuasive
evidence of detriment to the child. The child has been out of the mother’s care for
more than a year, and the issues that led to removal remain largely unaddressed. 6
The mother has not shown how termination would be detrimental to the child in a
way that outweighs the benefits of a permanent, stable placement. We agree with
the juvenile court that no permissive exception should be applied to avoid
termination of the mother’s parental rights.
V. Request for Additional Time
In the alternative, the mother argues she should have been granted an
additional six months to work toward reunification. This is an option available to
the court. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to deny termination
and enter a permanency order under section 232.104); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b)
(providing a permanency option of giving a parent an additional six months to work
toward reunification). However, this option can be exercised “only if the need for
removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” In re
W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). We
can make no such finding.
We acknowledge the mother has re-engaged in inpatient treatment to
address her alcohol abuse and mental-health needs. She has also consistently
attended supervised visits and developed a bond with the child. However, this is
not her first attempt at treatment. After her first admission to inpatient treatment,
the mother left the program after just one month, stating that she became
overwhelmed by the possibility the child might be returned to her care. Even
assuming she successfully completes her current course of treatment, the mother
will still need to demonstrate sustained sobriety and stability over time before safe
reunification could be possible. 7
As we have frequently recognized, children do not come equipped with
pause buttons. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014). The child had been
out of the mother’s custody for fourteen months at the time of the termination
hearing. Delaying permanency in the hope the mother may maintain long-term
sobriety does not serve the child’s bests interests. The child deserves safety and
stability now—not at some uncertain point in the future. Thus, we agree with the
juvenile court’s denial of the mother’s request for a six-month extension.
VI. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the
mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.