In the Interest of N.N. and J.T., Minor Children

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 26-0764

Filed September 2, 2026

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In the Interest of N.N. and J.T., Minor Children, J.T., Father, Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, The Honorable Hunter W. Thorpe, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Sarah Dooley Rothman of Rothman Law Office, Albion, attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

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Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ.

Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A father1 appeals the termination of his parental rights as to N.N., born in 2017 and J.T., born in 2011.2 On appeal, he argues the juvenile court erred in finding (1) that the State proved the statutory grounds for termination, (2) in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests, and (3) ruling that a permissive exception to termination did not apply. Upon our review, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The family came to the attention of Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in December 2023 due to concerns about the mother’s substance use, mental health, and supervision. The juvenile court adjudicated the children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.96A(3)(b) (2024), removed the children from the mother’s custody, and placed the children in the father’s custody.

In October 2024, the children were removed from the father’s custody after he tested positive for methamphetamine through a drug patch test and his failure to complete further drug testing. Since removal, the father has continued to struggle with methamphetamine use. As a result, the State petitioned to terminate his parental rights in January 2026.

1 There are two fathers involved in this termination action: the biological father and the legal father. All references to “father” in this opinion refer to J.T., the children’s biological father.

2 The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights by a separate order before the father’s termination hearing. The termination of her parental rights is not at issue on appeal.

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The termination hearing was held in March 2026. During the time between when the children were removed from the father’s custody until the hearing, he did not arrange visits with them through HHS, although he kept in digital contact with them through texts, phone calls, and video chats. At the hearing, the father asked the court to establish a guardianship rather than terminate his parental rights, but he admitted he was currently struggling with drug use and was “probably at my lowest point in my life right now.”

Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f ) (2026). The father now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Termination proceedings are reviewed de novo.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). “We give weight to the factual findings but are not bound by them.” Id.

“We generally apply a three-step analysis to review termination of parental rights. First, we consider whether there are statutory grounds for termination. Second, we determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. Third, we consider whether we should exercise any of the permissive exceptions for termination.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory Grounds

We begin with the grounds for termination. “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

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We analyze the father’s challenge to the statutory ground for termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ). It is undisputed that the State has met the first three elements of termination under this paragraph. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(1) (the children are over four years of age), (2) (the children have been adjudicated CINA), and (3) (the children have been removed from the father’s physical custody for the requisite time period). The father only disputes the fourth element requiring “clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.” Id. § 232.116(1)(f )(4).

Upon our review, we find that the State proved this element. The father’s continued battle with drug use at the time of the termination hearing was clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to his custody. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776 (recognizing the risk of harm that children face when caretakers use drugs).

The father also argues that the State failed to make reasonable efforts “to eliminate the need for removal of the child[ren] or make it possible for the child[ren] to safely return to the [father]’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a). “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). The father concedes that HHS did not offer him visits with the children because he was not actively engaging in services or meeting with HHS. But he claims that fully supervised visits with the children would have ensured their safety and given him incentive to address his substance use.

The reasonable-efforts requirement does not give a parent free reign to demand a specific service. See In re M.P., No. 19-0995, 2019 WL 5063337,

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at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019) (“[T]he reasonable-efforts mandate does not create a menu from which discerning parents may order specific services. Rather, it is intended to provide services that facilitate reunification given the parent’s circumstances.”). “A child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable efforts.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a). Moreover, objections to services must be made early in the process or else they are waived. C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493–94 (“We have repeatedly emphasized the importance for a parent to object to services early in the process so appropriate changes can be made.”); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.”).

The record reveals that HHS offered a variety of services to the father, including supervised visitation and drug testing. The father chose not to take advantage of the services offered to him. Nor did he object to such services until this appeal. We therefore reject his claim.

II. Best Interests

The father next asserts that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Under the best-interests analysis, we “shall give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

The father argues termination of his parental rights was not in the children’s best interests and that the juvenile court should have granted a six- month extension or established a guardianship with the foster family. A six- month extension is proper if the juvenile court finds that the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the six-month period. See id.

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§ 232.104(2)(b). The record does not support a finding that the need for removal would no longer have existed had the juvenile court granted a six- month extension. We also note, and our courts have made clear, that “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). Moreover, a guardianship is not proper if the children’s best interests are served by termination. In re H.M., No. 25-1292, 2025 WL 2924721, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025) (“[W]e would have to be convinced that termination is not in the child’s best interests before we could order the establishment of a guardianship.”).

Termination of the father’s parental rights serves the children’s best interests. The record shows that the children are doing well in their placement with the foster family. The father acknowledged as much at the termination hearing. Additionally, the father’s continued struggle with drug use even after the children’s removal, and his failure to engage with HHS services before the termination hearing illustrates that termination was in the children’s best interests. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 172 (Iowa 2020) (“In determining [the children’s] best interests, ‘we look to [Dad’s] past performance because it may indicate the quality of care [he] is capable of providing in the future.’” (second and third alternations in original) (quoting In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006))).

III. Permissive Exception

Lastly, the father argues that a permissive exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) should be applied to preserve his parental rights. Once the State has proven a ground for termination, the burden shifts to the parent to prove an exception to termination. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. The father asserts that two exceptions apply.

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First, the father argues that the juvenile court should have denied termination because of the bond between him and the children. Under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), the juvenile court need not terminate parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Although it is clear from the record that the father loves his children, “our consideration must center on whether the child[ren] will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the father’s] inability to provide for [the children’s] developing needs.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). While the father has maintained digital contact with the children, he has only had a few in-person visits and provided limited financial support since removal. Nothing in the record shows that termination would be detrimental to the children.

The father also argues that the juvenile court erred because J.T.

objected to the termination. Under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(b), the juvenile court need not terminate parental rights if “[t]he child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination.” The father points out that there was testimony at the termination hearing by J.T.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) that J.T. objected to the termination of parental rights. However, a child’s objections to the termination of parental rights “do not take precedence over [their] best interests.” In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). As explained above, termination is in the children’s best interests. And despite the GAL’s testimony about J.T.’s objection at the termination hearing, the juvenile court noted in its termination order that J.T.’s position on termination has wavered. Thus, we find that the juvenile court did not err in finding that no permissive exceptions apply.

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CONCLUSION

Because we find that the ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) was proved, termination is in the children’s best interests, and the father did not prove a permissive exception should apply, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.