In the Interest of N.L. v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00387-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF N.L.

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On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 24DCFM0176

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, “Nancy.” 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s, A.L., parental rights and that termination of her parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2).2

1 To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 The trial court also terminated the unknown Father’s parental rights.

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Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (noting Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief she filed and notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief. The Court likewise notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response, the deadline for doing so, and this Court notified Mother that a copy of the appellate record was available to her upon request. Mother did not file a response with the Court or request a copy of the record.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the

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requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted).

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON

Chief Justice

Submitted on February 24, 2026 Opinion Delivered February 26, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.