In the Interest of N.F., E.M., H.M., K.M., and L.T., Minor Children

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 24-1328
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1328 Filed October 30, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF N.F., E.M., H.M., K.M., and L.T., Minor Children,

K.J., Mother, Appellant,

C.T., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Richelle

Mahaffey, Judge.

A mother and father each appeal the termination of their parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Jonathan Willier, Centerville, for appellant mother.

Lynnette M. Lindgren of Broerman, Lindgren & Denny, Ottumwa, for

appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Debra A. George of Griffing & George Law Firm, P.L.C., Centerville,

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her five children

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2024). A father separately appeals the

termination of his rights to the youngest child—both parties’ son. The mother and

father each argue that the State did not prove any ground for termination. The

mother also argues that a guardianship was not properly considered as an

alternative permanency option. And the father argues that termination was not in

the best interest of his son.

We agree with the juvenile court that clear and convincing evidence

supports terminating the mother and father’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(e) because both parents failed to maintain significant and

meaningful contact with the children. Termination of the father’s parental rights is

in the son’s best interest given the father’s failure to obtain substance-use or

mental-health treatment, the need for permanency in the son’s life, and the son’s

positive foster-home environment. And we agree that guardianship is not a viable

option here, especially since the mother did not propose any concrete plan for

guardianship. We thus affirm on both appeals.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings

In September 2021, a family with four daughters—ages five, three, two, and

two months—came to the attention of the Department of Health and Human

Services (“HHS”) with a report that the mother was using methamphetamine. The

mother admitted to using—and tested positive for—methamphetamine. After

receiving the test results, HHS developed a safety plan for the children to stay with

the mother—she agreed to live with her aunt, have all interactions with her children 3

supervised by her aunt or her mother, and obtain a substance-use evaluation. At

the time, the mother was romantically involved with the father in this appeal—but

he is not the father to these four girls.1

Things did not go well with the safety plan. So a child-in-need-of-assistance

petition was filed on April 29, 2022. In July 2022, the four girls were removed from

their mother’s custody. But around a month later, a disposition hearing was held,

and the girls were returned to their mother’s custody. In March 2023, HHS became

aware that the mother had stopped substance-use treatment and that she was

pregnant with the father’s child. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine

in June 2023 while she was pregnant. So the court again removed the girls from

their mother’s care in July 2023.

In late November 2023, the mother and father’s son was born, and he tested

positive for methamphetamine a few weeks later. Both parents also tested positive

for methamphetamine around the same time. In January 2024, the son was placed

in foster care. A month later, a permanency hearing was held for the four girls,

and the mother was granted a six-month extension to work toward reunification.

Still, given the continued concerns, the State petitioned to terminate the mother’s

parental rights to all five children and the father’s rights to their son in July 2024.

Throughout this three-year period, the mother and father’s substance use

has continued to be an issue. While neither has tested positive for

methamphetamine since December 2023, the mother has relapsed multiple times

over the three years and the father has refused to test in the past. The mother has

1 These four girls’ father—whose parental rights were also terminated—did not

participate in the proceeding and did not appeal. So we do not discuss him further. 4

attended extended outpatient treatment four times but has been unsuccessfully

discharged each time. And her longest period of substance-use treatment was

around four months. The father has, for much of the time, refused to comply with

substance-use treatment and drug screens, other than a span from November

2023 to March 2024.

Both parents have turned to other substances when not using

methamphetamine—the mother using alcohol and the father using marijuana and

alcohol. HHS found that it is unclear whether the mother has “ever maintained

total sobriety from all substances” as she has “demonstrated a behavioral pattern

of replacing one substance for another” and then “resum[ing] use of

methamphetamine.” The father told HHS that he “uses marijuana every day all

day” and has made clear to HHS that “he wants to continue engaging in the use of

marijuana and not pursue [treatment] with other resources or entities that might be

beneficial for him instead of use of marijuana.” The father’s marijuana use has

caused safety and financial problems too—drug paraphernalia and marijuana wax

containers were found around the home the children reside in, and he spends

roughly $200 per week on marijuana.

Neither parent has fully used and cooperated with HHS services over the

three years. There have been seven different safety plans, which both parents

have failed to follow. Both parents have failed to fully use mental health services,

even though they have both acknowledged struggling with mental health in the

past. Indeed, the mother told HHS that her mental health is what causes her to

relapse. But despite obtaining three mental health evaluations, the mother has

followed through with recommended treatment only once from January 2024 to 5

March 2024. And the father obtained one mental health evaluation in March 2024,

but he never followed through with the recommended treatment.

Both parents have struggled with being truthful with HHS. The father told

HHS after his first mental health evaluation that the provider did not recommend

any treatment, which was false. In fact, the provider recommended that he

participate in therapy weekly or at a minimum every other week. The mother told

HHS that she had reported alcohol use to her substance-use-treatment provider,

which was also false. Her provider told HHS, “[d]rinking was not even spoken

about during any of our sessions . . . . I believe [the mother and father] are being

very manipulative and dishonest.” In April 2024, both parents reported to HHS that

they were attending all their scheduled substance-use-treatment appointments,

which was false—the provider had put them as a “sit and wait status” for lack of

attendance. And the children reported that their mother told them that they should

not tell HHS that the father had been staying with them, that the only reason that

they could not come home was that HHS and “the cops” want to keep them away

from her, and that they should not talk to those “dangerous people.”

The four older girls are now living with their aunt and her husband and are

doing well in their care. HHS found “[t]he children are on track developmental[ly],

their behaviors have decrease[d] and all of them have done well in school without

behaviors.” The aunt has expressed that they are willing to adopt the girls if that

option becomes available. The son is also residing with a foster family who is

willing to adopt him if that becomes possible. Both HHS and the guardian ad litem

recommended that the court terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights. 6

In August 2024, the juvenile court held a combined permanency hearing for

the then-eighth-month-old son and a termination hearing for the son and the four

older girls, who were then eight, six, five, and three. As for the permanency

hearing, the court found that returning the son to the custody of his parents was

not appropriate. It explained “neither parent has made enough progress to place

themselves in a position to have [their son] returned to their care. The evidence

also does not support that [their son] could be returned to either parent in the

foreseeable future.” The court acknowledged that guardianship was one

permanency option under the statute and that “[t]ermination and adoption are the

preferred methods of obtaining permanency for a child who cannot be returned to

a parental home.” And it reasoned that “[t]he record here shows termination and

adoption are the only permanency options available [and] appropriate” to give their

son “the sort of permanent, safe and nurturing home the child needs and

deserves.”

The court also found that the State proved grounds for termination under

paragraphs “d,” “e,” “h,” and “l” of section 232.116(1) for both parents’ rights to the

son and for the mother’s rights to the youngest girl, and under paragraphs “d,” “e,”

and “l” for the mother’s rights to the three oldest children. The court also found

that it was in the best interest of all of the children for the parents’ parental rights

to be terminated. The court explained that based on the record “[n]one of the

children can be safely returned to any parent today, or in the foreseeable future.”

And “[t]he children are thriving in their current respective placements.” Finally, the

court found no exception to termination of parental rights under Iowa Code section

232.116(3) applied. The mother and father now separately appeal. 7

II. Grounds for Termination under Section 232.116(1)(e)

Terminating parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step process.

In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). The State must first prove by clear

and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists. Id. Next,

the State must similarly show that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id.

And third, the parent has the burden to show whether a permissive exception

precludes termination. Id. We review each of these steps de novo, giving

appropriate weight to the juvenile court’s preferred fact-finding position, particularly

giving “respectful consideration” to its “credibility determinations.” In re A.B., 957

N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021).

The mother and father both argue that the State did not meet its first-step

burden to prove a statutory ground that supports terminating their parental rights.

The juvenile court, in a thoughtful opinion, found that multiple grounds supported

terminating the parents’ rights to the children. When a juvenile court terminates

parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, we only need to find that one of them

supports termination. See In re L.H., 949 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Iowa Ct. App 2020).

So we will consider whether the evidence meets the requirements of section

232.116(1)(e) because the court found that this ground applies to all the children.

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) has three requirements. First, the child

must be “adjudicated a child in need of assistance.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(1).

Next, the child must have “been removed from the physical custody of the child’s

parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.” Id. § 232.116(1)(e)(2).

And third, there must be “clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not

maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous 8

six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of

the child despite being given the opportunity to do so.” Id. § 232.116(1)(e)(3); see

also In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 437 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (noting that

subparagraph three has two requirements: significant and meaningful contact and

reasonable efforts). The statute defines “significant and meaningful contact” as

“the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role

of being a parent.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3). This duty includes, but is not

limited to, “financial obligations, . . . continued interest in the child, a genuine effort

to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine

effort to maintain communication with the child, and . . . establish[ing] and

maintain[ing] a place of importance in the child’s life.” Id. The contact and efforts

elements are “separately required, but they are considered closely

interconnected.” T.S., 868 N.W.2d at 437.

Neither the father nor the mother disputes that at the time of the termination

hearing, the children had been adjudicated in need of assistance and had been

removed from their physical custody for a period of six consecutive months. But

both challenge the third prong of section 232.116(e), disputing whether the State

proved by clear and convincing evidence that they failed to maintain significant

and meaningful contact with the children. The father argues he has “been having

regular visits with the [son]” and reports that he has been “extremely attentive and

actively participating” in the caretaking of the son. The mother argues that she too

was “having regular visits with the children” and the visits were going “well.” Both

parents also assert they were not given the chance to resume care of the children. 9

As for visitation, both the mother and father have been mostly attending

their scheduled supervised visits, with more consistency since February 2024.

There was testimony that these visits were “going better” and that they each

interact with the children during the visits. But besides the scheduled visits, there

does not seem to be any other effort to communicate with the children or spend

time with the children. The aunt who currently has the four girls has encouraged

the mother to call whenever, but the mother has only done so thirteen times

between October 2023 and August 2024—about once a month. And the aunt has

also offered for the mother to visit the girls any time she would like. But the mother

has only twice pursued an unscheduled visit, mainly because the aunt has said

that the father is not allowed to come with her. And the mother recently declined

to stay with the aunt and girls for a multi-day visit to celebrate one of the girl’s

birthdays during an unscheduled time. This all would have been valuable time for

the parents to interact with the children, but they prioritized their relationship with

each other and their drug use over the children.

While attending regular visits does lend support for a finding of significant

and meaningful contact, this is not the only factor. See T.S., 868 N.W.2d at 437

(explaining evidence of attending visits cannot be the end of the significant-and-

meaningful-contacts analysis). There also must be evidence of the “affirmative

assumption” of the duties that go with being a parent. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(e)(3). And that evidence is not in this record. The parents have not

financially provided for the children, and the record indicates that providing

financially could be a struggle for them moving forward. And, significantly, the

parents have not made “a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed 10

in the case permanency plan.” Id. There have been many services offered to the

parents and they have failed to fully use them, especially mental health services.

See In re D.H., No. 18-1552, 2019 WL 156668, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2019)

(collecting cases finding failure to seek treatment for one’s mental health

conditions supports termination of parental rights). Here, that is particularly

concerning because their mental-health needs are linked to their substance use,

yet continue to go unaddressed.

As to the mother and father’s argument that they were not given the chance

to “resume care” as required under Iowa Code Section 232.116(1)(e)(3), this

subparagraph focuses on reasonable efforts to resume care—it does not require

that the children be placed back in the physical care of the parents. “Any single

act which might constitute a reasonable effort does not necessarily avoid

termination.” In re D.W., No. 17-0281, 2017 WL 1735934, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 3, 2017) (cleaned up). And we must look at the substance of the parent’s

conduct, not just the form. Id. The evidence of not following their case plans, not

utilizing unscheduled visits, and continuing to use impairing substances does not

show reasonable efforts to resume care of the children. Thus, we agree that the

mother and father did not maintain significant and meaningful contact with the

children and have made insufficient efforts to resume care despite being given

chances to do so.

True, both parents have made some positive steps in the last few months.

But those steps “do not eliminate [their] past.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494

(Iowa 2000) (en banc). The problems that led to the children’s removal are

significant and, after three years, largely still unresolved. Id. “[T]he crucial days 11

of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up

to their own problems.” Id. (cleaned up). As the juvenile court found, “[t]he record

is replete with evidence that offering more time and services to the parents is

unlikely to lead to substantive change.” We thus agree with the juvenile court that

there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is

appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e).

III. Best Interest Challenge by the Father

The father challenges the second step—whether it is in the best interest of

the son to terminate the father’s parental rights. The State argues that the father

failed to preserve error on this issue because the father did not testify or call any

witnesses at the termination hearing and his closing argument did not mention the

son’s best interest. It is questionable whether the father preserved this issue for

appellate review. Compare In re M.F., No. 18-0289, 2018 WL 3057772, at *1 & n.2

(Iowa Ct. App. June 20, 2018) (holding that the parent waived or did not preserve

error by only cross-examining the State’s witness and not introducing her own

evidence or objecting to the any of the State’s exhibits), with In re A.R., 316 N.W.2d

887, 888–89 (Iowa 1982) (holding parent may challenge sufficiency of the

evidence for statutory ground of termination on appeal when issue was not raised

in the district court). But even if generally resisting termination at the hearing was

enough to obtain appellate review, we agree that terminating the father’s parental

rights is in the son’s best interest.

The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination

proceeding.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the son’s long-

range and immediate best interests. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 12

1997). And we must “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2).

The father argues that there was “no evidence provided by the state that

maintaining contact with [his son] would be detrimental to the [son’s] mental health

or safety,” and “[t]here was no evidence to suggest that [the son was] not closely

bonded with his father.” And the father contends that he has “made significant

progress” and he “should be allowed to maintain his parental rights in order to

maintain that bond.” But none of these arguments overcomes the weight of

evidence showing that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best

interest of the son.

The father has failed to consistently participate in substance-use or mental-

health treatment or any of the other services offered to him by HHS. Rather, he

has continued to use illegal marijuana to cope with his mental health problems.

Marijuana still impairs a person’s judgment. As the HHS worker testified,

marijuana “blocks his ability to parent his [son].” And just because a person has

stopped using methamphetamine, it does not mean that their “severe, chronic

substance abuse problem” is cured when they are still using alcohol and

marijuana. See In re K.A., No. 02-1925, 2003 WL 183994, at * 2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 29, 2003). We cannot conclude that because the father has recently stopped

using methamphetamine, that now it is in his son’s best interest for him to be

around marijuana and alcohol. As the juvenile court reasoned, we have “nearly 13

three years of [the father’s] past performance to consider when attempting to

predict [his] future abilities to be [a] safe and sober caregiver[].”

While it is commendable that the father has maintained more stable

employment and stopped using methamphetamine, that is not enough to grant his

request “for a chance to continue to be his child’s father.” He was given many

chances to put his son’s safety first, but he failed to take them. Meanwhile, the

son is doing well in a stable foster-home interested in giving him permanency

through adoption. It is in the son’s best interest for the father’s parental rights to

be terminated.

IV. Guardianship Challenge by the Mother

The mother challenges whether the juvenile court properly considered

guardianship as an alternative permanency option. In making her argument, the

mother only asserts that the State and the juvenile court “did not look beyond the

children’s ages at the individual circumstances of the case in ruling out

guardianship.” But the juvenile court’s order does not state that it relied on only

the children’s ages. What’s more, the mother points to no other evidence that

would make guardianship the better permanency alternative.

“[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up). This is because over the life

of the guardianship—potentially until the children turn eighteen—the court could

terminate the guardianship or change the guardian at the mother’s request or on

its own motion. See id. at 477–78. It sets up potential conflict between the

guardian and the mother. So it often does not “achieve permanency” and stability.

Id. at 478 (cleaned up). Iowa Code section 232.104 does allow for guardianship 14

as a permanency option, but it requires “a judicial determination that [such a]

planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency plan for the child.”

Iowa Code § 232.104(3)(a).

“Determining the best permanency plan for a child is a best-interests

assessment.” In re A.M., No. 20-1008, 2020 WL 7021576, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 30, 2020). At the hearing, the HHS worker testified that they determined

guardianship was not suitable “given the history of this case and the kids’ ages.”

And the mother presented no concrete plans for potential guardians for the

children.

We do not doubt that the mother and children love each other. But these

children deserve permanency, and they have waited too long to receive it. The

history of short-term sobriety then relapse, failure to take advantage of the services

offered, and the lack of honesty with HHS weighs against the mother’s visitation

and seven-month sobriety from methamphetamine. It is in the children’s physical,

mental, and emotional best interest to terminate parental rights rather than place

the children in a guardianship.