IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1546 Filed March 19, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF N.A., N.C., N.R., and N.D., Minor Children,
B.A., Father, Appellant,
N.R., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda Fangman,
Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal termination of their parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Falls, for appellant father.
Luke C. Jenson of Jenson Law Firm, PLC, Waterloo, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Tammy L. Banning, Waterloo, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the juvenile court’s ruling terminating
their parental rights. On appeal, the mother contends that (1) one of the statutory
grounds for termination was not established; (2) termination is not in her children’s
best interests; (3) the juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to
termination; and (4) the juvenile court should have granted her a six-month
extension to work toward reunification. The father contends only that termination
was not in his child’s best interests.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Four children are the subjects of this appeal—N.A., born in 2014; N.C., born
in 2016; N.R., born in 2018; and N.D., born in 2022. All four children share the
same mother. However, B.A. is the father of N.A. D.B. is the putative father of
N.C. and N.R., and C.D. is the father of N.K. Throughout this case, B.A. has lived
in Michigan. It is believed D.B. currently lives in Michigan as well. C.D. has been
incarcerated during most of this case, but it is currently believed he lives in
Chicago, Illinois.
The children first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) in November 2022 after the mother tested positive for
marijuana during the birth of N.D. The mother later admitted to smoking marijuana
nearly every day during her pregnancy with N.D. to deal with her mental health
issues. The mother has been diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and
major depressive disorder. The mother self-reports that she has been previously
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Following N.D.’s birth, the mother agreed to 3
participate in voluntary services to address concerns over her mental health and
substance use issues. However, the mother’s participation in such services over
the next few months was minimal.
In February 2023, the mother and the children were evicted from their home.
The mother and the children lived out of a motel room following their eviction. But
the mother soon ran out of money to continue living out of the motel. In April 2023,
HHS stepped in and agreed to pay for a hotel room for the mother and the children.
However, shortly after she and the children arrived at the hotel, the mother was
arrested for operating while intoxicated in April. The mother was released from
custody early the next morning. It is unclear where or who the children stayed with
while the mother was in custody. The very next day, the police were called to the
mother’s hotel room after receiving a report of a loud domestic disturbance
between the mother and her purported boyfriend. When the police arrived, the
mother’s boyfriend jumped out of the hotel room window allegedly because he had
an active warrant for his arrest.
Later in April, the children were removed from the mother’s custody after
the State filed an application for temporary removal. The State filed a child-in-
need-of-assistance petition a few days later. On June 8, the children were
adjudicated in need of assistance and placed in the custody of HHS for purposes
of foster care placement. The mother was subsequently ordered to comply with
recommendations for substance use and mental health treatment. Additionally,
she was ordered to participate in random drug testing with HHS. B.A. was ordered
to complete mental health and substance use evaluations. He also was ordered
to participate in random drug testing. 4
Shortly after the children were removed from the mother’s custody,
information emerged that revealed the mother has a history of violent relationships
with men. N.C. told her foster mother that the children had witnessed C.D. assault
the mother while she was pregnant with N.D. According to N.C., C.D. once “beat
mommy up so bad that she was bleeding from her face.” The record also discloses
the mother was previously assaulted by B.A. in 2014. During this incident, B.A.
repeatedly struck the mother in the head while she was holding N.A. Additionally,
there was testimony at the termination hearing suggesting the mother was
subjected to domestic abuse by D.B. Due to concerns over domestic abuse, the
mother was ordered by the juvenile court to participate in domestic abuse services.
Despite participating in services, the mother made minimal progress. She
began extended outpatient treatment for substance use in May 2023. However,
during the early days of this case, she frequently failed to attend her drug test
appointments with HHS. Additionally, in June 2023 she tested positive for cocaine.
She would also test positive for cocaine a few months later. In September 2023,
she tested positive for alcohol. Beginning in the spring of 2024, the mother began
to consistently attend drug test appointments. However, this consistency did not
last long. Throughout the summer of 2024, she failed to appear for numerous drug
test appointments. In June and July, she tested positive for THC and continued to
miss testing appointments.
Even during the period when the mother consistently attended drug test
appointments and provided negative samples to HHS, there was evidence she
was still struggling with substance use. On the afternoon of April 12, 2024, N.R.
was scheduled to have dental surgery. The mother showed up to the hospital 5
visibly intoxicated one hour after N.R. went into surgery. The hospital staff
observed the mother slurring her words and staggering on her feet. At some point,
the mother fell asleep in the hospital waiting room. When someone attempted to
wake the mother up, she “fell out of her seat, hit the floor, convulsed, and then fell
asleep.” After laying on the floor of the waiting room for a while, the mother awoke
and “attempted to put her phone on her foot as if it were her shoe.” Eventually, the
hospital staff escorted the mother to the emergency room to conduct testing on
her. Testing revealed the mother was under the influence of alcohol. The mother
also provided a urine sample at the hospital, which tested positive for
cannabinoids.
The mother also struggled to adequately address concerns regarding her
history of domestically abusive relationships with men. By April 2024, the mother
had progressed to semi supervised visitation with the children. However, during
her first semi-supervised visit with the children, she broke the visitation rules by
calling C.D.1 One of the children reported the phone call to their foster mother,
despite the mother’s request to keep the phone call secret. Initially, the mother
denied making the phone call. But she later admitted it. A month later, during a
visit supervised by Catholic Charities, the mother called D.B. Visits were returned
to full supervision following these two incidents. At the time of the termination
hearing, the mother’s visitation remained fully supervised.
1 At the termination hearing, the mother testified that she kept in contact with C.D.
throughout this case. After C.D. got out of prison, the mother sent him money and provided him updates on N.D. 6
The mother was involved in several domestic altercations with C.D. in
July 2024. On the weekend following July 4, C.D. was allegedly in Iowa visiting
family. However, the record is clear that he stayed with the mother. On July 7, the
police responded to the mother’s house after receiving a call for service indicating
the mother had been assaulted. At the termination hearing, the mother confirmed
she was assaulted by C.D. Additionally, the mother called the police on July 11
and 12 to report that C.D. was harassing her and making violent threats. The
mother eventually filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse and received a
temporary protective order against C.D. Despite receiving a temporary protective
order, the mother was again assaulted by C.D. on July 30. At the termination
hearing, the mother denied being in a relationship with C.D.
As for the fathers of the children, B.A. is the only one who has participated
in this case. Because B.A. was viewed as a potential placement option for N.A., a
home study of his residence was conducted by the Michigan Department of Health
and Human Services pursuant to the interstate compact on the placement of
children (ICPC).2 The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
approved the home study, but the Iowa HHS denied it due to concerns over B.A.’s
history of domestic abuse and substance use.3
2 Of note, the residence evaluated during the home study was B.A.’s mother’s
residence. B.A. self-reports that he is disabled and cannot read or write. His mother passed away unexpectedly on August 13, 2024. We do not find these facts insignificant. 3 At a court hearing in this case, B.A. admitted to smoking marijuana. The home
study also revealed B.A. allegedly struck the mother of one of his other children in January 2024. 7
But beyond participating in the home study, B.A.’s participation in this case
has been minimal. Despite being court-ordered to obtain substance use and
mental health evaluations, B.A. obtained neither. Nor did he provide any
documentation that he complied with court-ordered drug testing requirements. At
the termination hearing, B.A. testified that he drug tested consistently at the Family
Health Center in Michigan. However, when Alex Lichty—assigned HHS case
manager—attempted to follow up with the Family Health Center, they disclosed
they had not seen B.A. as a patient at the facility. Further, B.A. did not undergo
paternity testing even though he was ordered by the juvenile court to do so. During
the termination hearing, B.A. blamed his failure to undergo paternity testing on a
lack of communication from HHS. However, Lichty testified that she provided B.A.
information concerning paternity testing numerous times.4
Due to the mother’s failure to make progress throughout this case and the
fathers’ minimal participation, the State filed a petition to terminate each parent’s
parental rights. A termination hearing was initially held on July 15, 2024, during
which the court heard testimony from B.A., Lichty, and Christi Boswood—a court-
appointed special advocate. The mother appeared at the hearing and initially
consented to the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(a) (2024). After brief questioning by her attorney to ensure her
consent to termination was made voluntarily and intelligently, the mother was
excused from the hearing and left the court room. However, near the end of the
hearing, the mother reentered the court room and informed her attorney she
4 Despite being listed on N.A.’s birth certificate, the mother asserted B.A. was not
the father of N.A. 8
wished to withdraw her consent to termination. The juvenile court stated it would
not allow the mother to withdraw her consent to termination.
The next day, mother filed a motion to reopen the record, seeking to contest
termination. The juvenile court granted this motion and set a hearing for August
14, 2024, during which the mother would be allowed to present evidence. At this
hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from the mother and Mallory Pech—a
family support specialist at Mid-Iowa Family Therapy Clinic who worked closely
with the mother and children during this case. Following the hearing, the juvenile
court issued its ruling terminating each parent’s parental rights. The mother’s
parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a), (f),
(h), and (l). B.A.’s parental rights for N.A. were terminated pursuant
section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). D.B.’s parental rights for N.C. and N.R. were
terminated pursuant to paragraphs (b), (e), and (f). Lastly, C.D.’s parental rights
for N.D. were terminated pursuant to paragraphs (b), (e), and (h).5
The mother and B.A. now appeal separately.
II. Standard of Review
“We review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo.” In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). “We are not bound by the
juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing
the credibility of witnesses.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).
5 D.B. and C.D. do not appeal the termination of their parental rights. 9
III. Analysis
The analysis for reviewing the termination of parental rights is a three-step
process. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). First, we determine
whether any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219
(Iowa 2016). If a ground for termination has been established, we then consider
“whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the
termination of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20. If we conclude termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of a child, we then consider “whether any
exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination.” Id. at 220.
“However, if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not
address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020).
We now address the mother and B.A.’s arguments separately.
A. Mother’s Appeal
1. Statutory Grounds
On appeal, the mother only challenges termination under
section 232.116(1)(a). However, her parental rights to the children were also
terminated pursuant to paragraphs (f), (h), and (l). “When the juvenile court
terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the
order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re K.K., No. 16-0151,
2016 WL 1129330, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016). Because the mother does
not challenge termination under paragraphs (f), (h), and (l), we find she has waived
any claim of error on these grounds. See In re N.N., No. 21-1978, 2022 10
WL 610318, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022) (concluding a mother waived any
claim of error related to statutory grounds for termination not challenged in her
petition). Thus, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision that termination was
appropriate under paragraphs (f), (h), and (l).
2. Best Interests
In considering whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best
interest, we give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement
for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).
The defining elements of the best-interest analysis are the children’s safety and
the need for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).
In arguing that termination of her parental rights was not in the best interests
of the children, the mother points to her behavior at supervised visits. She
contends the evidence shows the specialist supervising her visits with the children
“had minimal concerns about the children’s safety in the home.” She also claims
the evidence shows she was “attentive to the children during visits and provided
for all of their needs during visits.” She also asserts the strong bond between
herself and the children counsels against concluding termination is in the children’s
best interests. We disagree and conclude termination of the mother’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interests for several reasons.
First, we commend the mother for being attentive to her children’s needs
during her supervised visits with them. However, this fact does not convince us
that termination is not in the children’s best interests. As our supreme court has
explained, “there is a substantial difference between meeting a child’s needs under 11
the supervision and guidance of other people and being able to independently care
for a child.” In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 170 (Iowa 2020). And we have previously
explained that a parent’s visits with their children cannot be viewed in isolation to
assess the parent’s ability to adequately care for the children. See In re M.B., 553
N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“Visitation, however, cannot be considered
in a vacuum. It is only one element in what is often a comprehensive,
interdependent approach to reunification.”).
Second, two of the primary concerns regarding the mother—her history of
substance use and violent relationships with men—remain prevalent. The mother
has not been able to achieve sobriety despite being afforded nearly two years to
do so. She tested positive for marijuana a mere thirteen days prior to the beginning
of the termination hearing. To make matters worse, after testing positive for
marijuana thirteen days before the termination hearing, the mother subsequently
failed to appear for two drug test appointments with HHS. This leads us to
conclude termination is in the children’s best interests. See In re M.D., No. 21-
1784, 2022 WL 468961, at *4 (Iowa Ct. Feb. 16, 2022) (concluding termination
was in the children’s best interest due to the mother’s ongoing substance use).
Further, the mother has not freed herself from the abusive relationships of
her past. The mother maintained contact with D.B. and C.D. throughout the case,
even though these two men previously subjected her to domestic abuse. Most
concerning, the mother allowed C.D. into her home less than ten days before the
start of the termination hearing and was subsequently assaulted by him. See In
re N.Y., No. 18-1042, 2018 WL 4361076, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2018) 12
(finding termination was in the child’s best interest due to the mother’s continuing
contact with her domestic abuser).
Third, while we may consider the parent-child bond in conducting the best-
interest analysis, see In re B.S., No. 20-1463, 2021 WL 609093, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 17, 2021), we do not believe the bond between the mother and the
children counsels against finding termination is in their best interests. Despite a
close bond between the mother and the children, the children have been removed
from her care for a significant period of time. And the children have thrived in their
placements, where their needs are being fully met. Terminating the mother’s
parental rights will give the children the best opportunity to achieve much needed
permanency. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (finding
termination was in the child’s best interests because it would enable the child to
achieve permanency).
Accordingly, we conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in
the children’s best interest.
3. Permissive Exception
The exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3) are permissive and
not mandatory. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3). “And for permissive exceptions, the
parent claiming the exception has the burden to prove it should apply.” In re L.E.,
No. 24-1263, 2024 WL 4762849, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2024).
Section 232.116(3)(c) provides that the juvenile court may decline to terminate
parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination
would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-
child relationship.” 13
The mother contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the permissive
exception under section 232.116(3)(c) because the evidence shows there was a
close bond between her and the children. While we acknowledge there is a close
bond between the mother and the children, a close bond is not enough to show
application of section 232.116(3)(c)’s permissive exception is warranted. For the
exception to be applied, the parent seeking its application must also show
termination would be detrimental to the children because of the closeness of the
parent-child bond. See In re R.P., No. 23-0419, 2023 WL 3612412, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 24, 2023) (noting “the existence of a bond is not enough” and that a
parent must show termination would be detrimental to the child due to that bond).
There is no evidence in this record that suggests termination would be detrimental
to the children due to the closeness of the children’s bond with the mother. And
the mother does not point us to such evidence in her petition.
Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by declining to apply
this permissive exception.
4. Six-Month Extension
Finally, the mother contends the juvenile court should have granted her
request for six-month extension to work toward reunification. The juvenile court
may grant a six-month extension to work toward reunification if it can “enumerate
the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise
the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s
home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(b). After carefully reviewing the record, we believe no such showing
can be made by the mother. The mother has made little progress on her sobriety 14
and has failed to adequately address concerns regarding her history of
domestically abusive relationships with men. Additionally, we note that Lichty and
Pech—two social workers who worked closely with the mother during this case—
opined that it was unlikely the children could be safely returned to the mother’s
custody at the end of an additional six-month period. We believe this is strong
evidence that a six-month extension was not warranted. See In re A.H., No. 23-
0328, 2023 WL 3335425, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (concluding a six-
month extension was not warranted where the mother did not achieve sobriety or
address concerns of domestic abuse, and the mother’s therapist and an HHS
caseworker testified the mother was unlikely to make sufficient progress with an
additional six months).
Like the juvenile court, we decline to grant the mother a six-month
extension.
B. Father’s Appeal
1. Best Interest
On appeal, B.A. only contends that termination of his parental rights is not
in N.A.’s best interest. He claims the juvenile court “erred in determining
placement could not happen with the father due to his shortcomings with the case
plan because there was no evidence to substantiate any concern.” Additionally,
he claims the only evidence HHS presented was “based upon needless
speculation, not any actual, identified concern.” We disagree and conclude
termination of B.A.’s parental rights is in N.A.’s best interest.
As mentioned previously, in considering the best interest of a child, we give
“primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the 15
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The
defining elements of the best-interest analysis are the children’s safety and the
need for a permanent home. H.S., 805 N.W.2d at 748.
Here, there was evidence B.A. actively smokes marijuana. He admitted as
much to the juvenile court during a court hearing in this case. While he tries to
minimize this fact by pointing out that marijuana is legal in Michigan, the fact that
recreational marijuana is legal in Michigan does not mean B.A. can safely parent
B.A. while still actively smoking marijuana.6 And there is no evidence in this record
showing B.A. did anything to address concerns over his substance use. See In re
A.C., No. 20-0736, 2020 WL 4516075, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020)
(concluding termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interest “because the father’s lack of meaningful participation in services showed
an unwillingness to make the changes necessary to have the child placed in his
care”).
Additionally, the evidence in the record shows that B.A. has a history of
domestic abuse. B.A. does not dispute that he assaulted the mother in 2014 while
she was holding N.A. Further, there are allegations contained in the Michigan
home study that B.A. assaulted the mother of one of his other children in
January 2024. B.A. has not presented any evidence that he completed any
programming to alleviate concerns over his history of domestic abuse. See In re
S.W., No. 02-2091, 2003 WL 1055171, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2003)
6 The father reported he discontinued using marijuana, but he presented no evidence to verify such a claim. 16
(concluding termination of a father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest
due, in part, to the father’s history of physical abuse).7
And while B.A. makes much of the fact that he was approved by the
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services as placement option, that
home study was completed while B.A. was living at his mother’s residence. As the
juvenile court pointed out in its thorough ruling, his mother has since passed away.
Thus, it is unclear if B.A. would even have stable housing for N.A. In re C.S.,
No. 08-1665, 2008 WL 5235655, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2008) (concluding
termination was in the child’s best interest due, in part, to the mother’s unstable
housing).
Accordingly, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of B.A.’s
parental rights is in N.A.’s best interest.8
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling terminating both appellants’
parental rights.
7 We note B.A. did offer one exhibit at the termination hearing which he claims is
a certificate for a domestic violence program he completed. The exhibit was admitted, but the exhibit is blurred and is not legible. From the record, it does not appear the juvenile court ever received a physical copy of the certificate. 8 In the alternative, the father asks that he be granted a six-month extension to
work toward reunification. However, the juvenile court never ruled on a six-month extension for B.A. Thus, we conclude he has not preserved error on this argument. See In re Est. of Laube, No. 20-1399, 2022 WL 108937, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (per curiam) (“Error preservation generally involves two steps: (1) properly raising the issue before the district court and (2) obtaining a ruling.”).