in the Interest of M.T., a Child

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 30, 2022
Docket02-22-00111-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of M.T., a Child (in the Interest of M.T., a Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of M.T., a Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-22-00111-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.T., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. P2021035

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION

In four issues, M.T.’s mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating their

parent–child relationship. Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to

prove that she endangered M.T. under either Subsection (D) or (E) of Family Code

Section 161.001(b)(1) and to prove that termination was in M.T.’s best interest under

Subsection (b)(2); Mother also contends that the trial court erred by denying her

motion for a monitored return as an alternative to terminating the parent–child

relationship. We affirm.

I. Applicable Law and Evidentiary Standards of Review1

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the Department must

prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions

satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that

termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)–(2);

In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).

Here, the trial court found under Subsection (b)(1) that Mother had

endangered M.T. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E). To “endanger” a

child means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional

or physical health. In re G.F., No. 02-21-00267-CV, 2022 WL 524138, at *3 (Tex.

App.––Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

1 We dispense with a preliminary discussion of the facts because we discuss them in our analysis of the issues.

2 Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D), we examine evidence about the child’s

environment to determine if the environment caused the physical or emotional

endangerment. Id. A parent’s conduct in the home—such as illegal drug use or drug-

related criminal activity—can create an environment that endangers a child’s physical

and emotional well-being. Id.

Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E), we ask whether evidence shows that the

parent’s conduct directly resulted in the child’s endangerment. Id. The behavior must

constitute a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct. Id. But that

conduct need not be directed at the child, and we may infer the specific danger to the

child’s well-being from the parental misconduct alone. Id. “As a general rule, conduct

that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and

emotional well-being of a child.” Id. (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). And evidence probative of a Subsection

(b)(1) ground may also be probative of best interest. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250

(Tex. 2013). In reviewing best-interest evidence, we consider nonexclusive factors that

the factfinder may apply:

• the child’s desires;

3 • the child’s current and future emotional and physical needs;

• the current and future emotional and physical danger to the child;

• the parenting abilities of those seeking custody and programs available to assist them;

• the parties’ plans for the child, including the stability of the proposed home or placement;

• the parent’s acts or omissions suggesting that the existing parent–child relationship is inappropriate; and

• any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

To determine whether the evidence supporting termination is legally sufficient,

we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding to

determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that

the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We assume that the

factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is

contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a

reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable

factfinder could not. See id.

In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

termination of a parent–child relationship, we must perform “an exacting review of

4 the entire record,” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014), to decide whether a

factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department

proved the applicable conduct grounds and that terminating the parent–child

relationship would be in the child’s best interest, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b);

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such

a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at

18–19.

For both types of review, we must remember that the factfinder is the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346

(Tex. 2009).

II. Evidence is Sufficient to Support Termination Over Monitored Return

A. Endangerment Finding

1. Home Environment

A CPS investigator testified that in September 2020 she began investigating

allegations that M.T.’s twelve-year-old brother––who had mental-health issues––had

been sexually abused by someone close to the family. Mother confirmed to the

investigator that he had outcried to her as well, but she did not believe him.

While investigating the sexual-abuse allegations, the investigator visited M.T.’s

home. Mother was initially reluctant to let the investigator inside. The investigator saw

“deplorable” conditions: “There was a strong odor of feces and urine. It was difficult

to see areas on the floor area. It was covered in trash.

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Related

In Re J.O.A.
283 S.W.3d 336 (Texas Supreme Court, 2009)
In the Interest of E.N.C., J.A.C., S.A.L., N.A.G. and C.G.L.
384 S.W.3d 796 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
in the Interest Of: D.W.
445 S.W.3d 913 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2014)
In the Interest of E.C.R., Child
402 S.W.3d 239 (Texas Supreme Court, 2013)
in the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children
437 S.W.3d 498 (Texas Supreme Court, 2014)
in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child
180 S.W.3d 570 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of R.R. & S.J.S.
209 S.W.3d 112 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)

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