In the Interest of M.R.B., a Child v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of M.R.B., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of M.R.B., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NUMBER 13-23-00435-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF M.R.B., A CHILD
On appeal from the 36th District Court of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras
Appellant W.B. 1 appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating his
parental rights with respect to minor child M.R.B. 2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001.
We affirm.
1 We refer to appellant and the child by initials in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2 The trial court’s judgment also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of M.R.B.’s biological
mother, who is not a party to this appeal. I. ANDERS BRIEF
W.B.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she has
diligently reviewed the entire record but “is unable to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for
appeal.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective
& Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no
pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination
appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file
an Anders-type brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents
a professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an
appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.
proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points
of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and
procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); see also In re N.F.M., 582
S.W.3d 539, 543–44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (discussing the
requirements of an Anders-type brief in an appeal from a final order terminating parental
rights).
Counsel has informed this Court in writing that she has: (1) notified W.B. that she
has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided W.B. with copies of both
pleadings; (3) informed W.B. of his rights to file a pro se response, 3 to review the record
preparatory to filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is
3 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response
need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
2 frivolous; and (4) supplied W.B. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate
record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. More than an adequate time has passed, and W.B.
has filed neither a motion for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have
reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error.
See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature
of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the briefs
and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically
reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1),
and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to
those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding
that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court
detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D)
or (E) of the Family Code”).
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
W.B.’s counsel has filed an amended motion to withdraw. 4 See Anders, 386 U.S.
4 Counsel further requests, should this Court identify any non-frivolous grounds for appeal, that “the
deadline to submit a brief on the merits be extended and [appellant] be appointed new counsel.” In light of our conclusion herein, counsel’s request is denied as moot.
3 at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“If an attorney believes the
appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.”). However, when
an Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed
counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of
a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for
withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id.
Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client
has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not
constitute good cause. Id.
Here, counsel’s amended motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other
than her inability to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s
amended motion to withdraw is denied. See id. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Any other pending motions are denied as
moot.
DORI CONTRERAS Chief Justice
Delivered and filed on the 22nd day of February, 2024.
5 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations
[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
In the Interest of M.R.B., a Child v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-mrb-a-child-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2024.