In the Interest of M.R., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00508-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00508-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 322nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 322-756971-24

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this ultra-accelerated appeal,1 Appellant K.L. (Mother)2 appeals the trial

court’s order terminating her parent–child relationship with her daughter M.R.

(Daughter).3 The trial court found that the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) had proved three conduct-based grounds for termination

of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in Daughter’s best interest. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (b)(2). The trial court awarded

permanent managing conservatorship of Daughter to the Department. Mother timely

appealed.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Mother’s

appeal is “without merit and frivolous.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45,

87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

1 See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate courts to dispose of appeals from judgments terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal is filed). 2 To protect the child’s identity, we refer to her and her mother by their familial relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Daughter’s unknown father. No appeal has been filed on the unknown father’s behalf.

2 termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief

meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.

We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record

and to file a pro se response, but she has not done so. The Department has declined

to file a responsive brief.

III. DISCUSSION

When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also

consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-

18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate record.

Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without

merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D.,

279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the

3 trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship between Mother and

Daughter.

Mother’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, but the record does not show

good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d

254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we deny counsel’s

motion to withdraw; counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas

Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of those duties. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–

28; In re L.B., No. 02-25-00083-CV, 2025 WL 1909329, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

July 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

IV. CONCLUSION

We agree with Mother’s counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we

affirm the trial court’s termination order.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: January 15, 2026