In the Interest of M.R., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

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No. 02-25-00508-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF M.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 322nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 322-756971-24

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this ultra-accelerated appeal,1 Appellant K.L. (Mother)2 appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parent–child relationship with her daughter M.R. (Daughter).3 The trial court found that the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) had proved three conduct-based grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in Daughter’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (b)(2). The trial court awarded permanent managing conservatorship of Daughter to the Department. Mother timely appealed.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Mother’s appeal is “without merit and frivolous.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

1 See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate courts to dispose of appeals from judgments terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal is filed).

2 To protect the child’s identity, we refer to her and her mother by their familial relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Daughter’s unknown father. No appeal has been filed on the unknown father’s behalf.

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termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.

We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record and to file a pro se response, but she has not done so. The Department has declined to file a responsive brief.

III. DISCUSSION

When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18- 00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02- 18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate record.

Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the

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trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship between Mother and Daughter.

Mother’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, but the record does not show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw; counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of those duties. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27– 28; In re L.B., No. 02-25-00083-CV, 2025 WL 1909329, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

IV. CONCLUSION

We agree with Mother’s counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: January 15, 2026