Opinion issued December 18, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00461-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF M.M.H.H., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 313rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-00937J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This accelerated appeal arises from a suit brought by the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) to terminate a parent-child relationship.
After a jury trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of J.B.H. aka J.B. a/k/a J.S. (Mother) to her minor child, “Molly,”1 consistent with the jury’s findings that
Mother engaged in the endangerment grounds for termination and failed to comply
with the court-ordered family service plan requirements,2 and its finding that
termination of the parent-child relationship was in Molly’s best interest.
Mother challenges the trial court’s ruling in five issues, contending that the
trial court erred in denying her request to reopen the evidence for her witnesses’
testimony; the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s
findings supporting termination of Mother’s parental rights; and the trial court erred
in appointing DFPS as Molly’s sole managing conservator.
We affirm.
Background
Over two consecutive days in January 2024, Molly, then eleven years old,
disclosed several times at her middle school that her stepfather touched her on her
private parts and had been touching her inappropriately for years. Molly stated that
she had told Mother about it, but Mother got angry with Molly and told Molly she
was lying. Molly also disclosed that her brother would “hump” her over her clothes.
1 We use aliases for the child and Mother to protect the child’s identity . See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O).
2 After her disclosures, Molly was taken to the Seabrook Police Station. DFPS
Investigator Alicia Balfour went to investigate. Law enforcement had taken Molly
to the police station, so Balfour met with her there. Molly stated that her stepfather
touched her on her private part and that her brother would hump her over her clothes.
Molly told Balfour that Mother did not believe her and accused her of lying.
Balfour next spoke with Mother and the stepfather at the police station. The
stepfather denied the allegations. Mother told Balfour that Molly was lying and was
disabled.3
Mother agreed to take Molly to stay with a family friend, away from the
brother and stepfather, until DFPS could conduct a forensic interview with Molly to
get more information. Mother refused to let Balfour interview the other members of
the household before Mother spoke with her attorney. Mother told Balfour she would
provide the attorney contact information the next day but never did so.
Mother then left for the Washington, D.C. area to get surgery on her finger.
She did not provide any contact information for her or for Molly. Balfour eventually
located Mother in Maryland with Molly and tried to arrange for Molly’s forensic
interview with Maryland Child Protective Services, but Mother refused to cooperate
3 The jury heard testimony from a medical geneticist that Molly had a genetic disorder that put her at risk for developmental delay. In cases he had seen before with a similar genetic disorder, children typically had borderline intellectual disability. Molly seemed a little bit delayed from what he would expect for a child her age, but not significantly.
3 and did not return any of Balfour’s phone calls. Mother and Molly stayed with
Molly’s grandmother in Maryland from January until about April 2024. Balfour had
Maryland law enforcement try to conduct a welfare check on Molly at the
grandmother’s home, but no one would answer the door.
When Mother and Molly returned to Texas, they went back into the home with
the stepfather and brother. Mother did not notify DFPS when she and Molly returned
to Texas; Balfour learned they had returned from Molly’s grandmother. Mother still
refused to allow the forensic interview to proceed or otherwise cooperate with the
Department.
The Department concluded that Molly was not safe at home and filed for
custody. Balfour found Molly credible, and the various reports she received about
Molly’s disclosures at school were factually consistent. When Balfour hears that a
parent doesn’t believe a child who’s made an outcry of sexual abuse, she understands
that the parent will not protect the child.
Seabrook Police Department Detective Alberto Alarcon testified about his
efforts in locating Molly and Mother after they left Texas in January. He spoke with
the stepfather, who said that Molly and Mother were in the Washington, D.C. area.
When he reached Mother on the phone, Mother told him that she would return to
Texas but would not be bringing Molly. Alarcon described Mother as uncooperative.
The telephone call involved “a lot of screaming,” and Mother and Alarcon “pretty
4 much just yelled at each other the entire time.” Mother complained that the middle
school Molly attended had problems with drugs and sexual things. She told Alarcon
that Molly’s friends “made the story up” and Molly went along with it. According
to Alarcon, the police department had no prior indication of any criminal activity or
sexual abuse activity happening at the school.
As for Molly’s allegations of sexual abuse by the stepfather and brother,
Mother told Alarcon that Molly was autistic and asked him how he could believe
someone who is autistic.4 Mother didn’t think Molly was capable of telling the truth
because of her disability and remarked that it was ridiculous for the school and law
enforcement to take the word of a disabled child.
The stepfather was arrested for some traffic violations, which gave Alarcon
the opportunity to interview him. The stepfather seemed cooperative. Yet Mother
had remarked to Alarcon that if the stepfather ever talked to law enforcement or
provided information, there would be some repercussion.
The stepfather described his relationship with Molly as “very close.” Molly
would ride in the car with the stepfather while he worked for DoorDash, and she
would go into the restaurants to pick up orders for him.
4 The medical geneticist stated that Molly did not have any of the typical behaviors observed in a patient with autism.
5 The stepfather denied touching Molly inappropriately. He told Alarcon that
Molly made the story up so she could go to the Washington, D.C. area with Mother.
The Seabrook Police Department eventually referred a case to the District Attorney
to determine whether charges should be brought against the stepfather for indecency
with a child.
On April 9, 2024, another officer reported a terroristic threat made by Mother.
Mother was charged with interference with public duties because of her lack of
cooperation in Molly’s DFPS case. The Seabrook Police Department referred the
case against Mother to the District Attorney’s Office in January 2025.
Arianne Valdez, a forensic evaluation clinician with the Children’s
Assessment Center, interviewed Molly over five sessions. Molly disclosed that the
stepfather had been digitally penetrating her vagina, and she disclosed anal
penetration by a brother close to her age. Molly also told Valdez that Mother was
constantly yelling at her and cussing her out, which made Molly feel sad. Molly said
that after DFPS got involved, Mother bought them tickets to go to D.C. so they could
hide from DFPS.
Molly also talked to Valdez about neglect in the home. She stated that the
family would eat take-out food every day and would leave the food and trash
everywhere. Roaches and mice infested the home. Molly also said that there was no
6 hot water at home, so they would go to the YMCA to bathe. At night, Molly slept
with her Mother and the stepfather in their bed.
Valdez concluded that Molly made a credible disclosure of abuse. Molly
could identify the difference between a truth and lie, and she promised to tell the
truth. Also, Molly’s disclosure to Valdez was consistent with those Molly previously
made to a DFPS worker and to the counselors at Molly’s school. And nothing Molly
said gave any indication that someone else was influencing her.
Autumn Grayson, DFPS conservatorship worker, testified about Mother’s
compliance with her family service plan. Mother told Grayson that she “did not
trust” DFPS providers and chose her own service provider for the psychological
evaluation, but Grayson did not receive proof that Mother completed the evaluation
until a few months later. The evaluation was also missing information; it stated that
Mother was on medication but did not identify the medication. The evaluation also
contained recommendations for follow-up, including regular medication reviews.
But there was no sign that Mother had complied with those recommendations. Nor
did Mother complete the psychiatric assessment required by her family service plan.
Mother didn’t allow Grayson inside the family’s home, so Grayson could not
do a home assessment. Mother could have provided photos of the home, but she
didn’t do that either.
7 Grayson also testified about Molly’s progress in DFPS custody. When Molly
first came into care, she was hesitant and had difficulty expressing her wants and
needs, such as whether she wanted to speak to family members. Molly looked like
“a typical 12-year-old girl,” but mentally she seemed around the age of nine.
Molly’s therapist, Denise Bradley, corroborated Molly’s progress. When
Molly began individual counseling, she was “very shy, very closed off.” Over time,
Molly opened up and began talking about more things. She talked about things she
enjoyed.
Molly talked about missing her dog. But Molly never said that she missed
Mother or the stepfather or her brothers. Molly talked about her parents fighting. She
told Bradley that she doesn’t think about her parents and doesn’t want to see them.
Molly said that she was sick of people asking her about her family or telling her to
talk to her brothers or asking her what she thought about her family. Molly stated
that she did not want to return to the family home and wanted to continue living in
her current fictive kin placement “forever.”
Bradley stated that Molly described her stepfather as “tall and creepy.” Molly
mentioned during some of the therapy sessions that the stepfather sexually abused
her, that he touched her inappropriately. But Molly did not want to talk about it in
detail other than to tell Bradley that the stepfather would touch her and that it
happened at night. Bradley understood that Molly was “terrified about whatever
8 happened at home” and feared that the stepfather and brother would sexually abuse
her if she were returned.
Jasmine Moreno, who has been Molly’s “primary teacher” since Molly has
been in care, testified that she works with students who have intellectual disabilities.
She stated that Molly’s social skills were near her grade level but Molly had
challenges in academics; her reading and math comprehension was at about a
second-grade level. Molly was an enthusiastic learner and was trying out for the
school choir.
Molly’s caregiver in her fictive kin placement testified that since Molly came
into the caregiver’s home, she had made tremendous progress. She has learned to
wake up for school, dress herself, and make some decisions on her own. The
caregiver described Molly as “a thriving young girl that is plenty capable of taking
care of herself on down the road” and noted that Molly just needed “somebody to
help her get there.” And the caregiver wanted to be the person to help Molly. The
caregiver wanted to adopt Molly and believed that it would be in Molly’s best
interest to remain in her home. She expressed her wish to adopt Molly.
Mother told the jury that the way Molly’s developmental disability affected
her was that Molly told “stories” and mimicked “whatever other people are going
through.” Mother did not think Molly fully understood the difference between the
truth and a lie. And Molly likes to get attention. Mother does not believe the sexual
9 assaults that Molly alleged actually happened. Mother also denied that her house
was dirty, was a “hoarder house” or that there was any insect or vermin infestation.
Jennifer Saucer, Molly’s guardian ad litem, testified that Molly expressed her
wish to stay in the fictive kin placement. Saucer did not believe that Mother could
meet Molly’s emotional or physical needs. Saucer opined that Mother “lacke[d]
protective capacity” and recommended termination of Mothers parental rights.
Exclusion of Evidence
In her first issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in excluding two of
her witnesses. This issue misstates the procedural stance of her complaint. The
record shows that the trial court did not exclude any witnesses during Mother’s case
in chief. After she rested, Mother asked to reopen her case in chief so she could
present testimony from two witnesses who were not available earlier. The trial court
refused to do so.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 270 provides:
When it clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may permit additional evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury case no evidence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict of the jury.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 270. In deciding whether to permit additional evidence, a court
should consider whether: (1) the moving party showed due diligence in obtaining
evidence; (2) the proffered evidence is decisive; (3) the reception of such evidence
will cause undue delay; and (4) granting the motion to reopen evidence will cause
10 injustice. In re C.K.H., No. 01-22-00603-CV, 2023 WL 2026550, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 15, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Poag v. Flories, 317
S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). We review the trial
court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. See In re C.K.H., 2023 WL 2026550, at *7.
Mother, like other appellants, must comply with the preservation-of-error
requirements to be entitled to review of the issues she raises on appeal. See In re
K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005) (“[T]he rules governing error preservation
must be followed in cases involving termination of parental rights, as in other cases
in which a complaint is based on constitutional error.”); see also In re B.L.D., 113
S.W.3d 340, 350–51 (Tex. 2003) (fundamental-error doctrine does not apply to
procedural preservation rules, nor does due process require appellate review of
unpreserved complaints in parental rights termination cases). Through counsel,
Mother informed the trial court that her witnesses had become available, but she did
not say what the substance of the witnesses testimony would be or provide any other
information for the trial court to consider under the four factors. Mother, as movant,
had the burden to show that re-opening evidence to allow her witnesses to testify
was “necessary to the due administration of justice.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 270; see
Kardell v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., No. 05-01-00662-CV, 2002 WL 1809867, at *8
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 8, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.). Without such a showing, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request.
11 Mother also argues that she preserved a due process complaint to the trial
court’s refusal to reopen evidence for her witnesses because she complained to the
trial court, “[T]his is an unfair trial. It’s unfair and against the law, and it violated
the law.” But because Mother is not entitled to hybrid representation, the trial court
was not required to rule on her pro se complaint. See In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d 245,
247 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
We overrule Mother’s first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her second, third, and fourth issues, Mother asserts that the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings that she engaged in
the predicate acts set forth in Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O)
and that termination of her parental rights was in Molly’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2).
A. Standard of Review
A parent’s “right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). “A parent’s
interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental
status is, therefore, a commanding one.” Id. at 759 (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe
12 involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d
18, 20 (Tex. 1985).
At the same time, we remain mindful that “the rights of natural parents are not
absolute.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). Only “those fit to accept the
accompanying responsibilities” are entitled to assume them. Id. Recognizing that a
parent may forfeit his parental rights based on his actions or omissions—the primary
focus of a termination suit is protection of the child’s best interests. Id.
Thus, in reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s termination of parental rights, we “determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).
“[W]e look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that
the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Yet
we may not “disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in this context, we
inquire “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm
belief or conviction about the truth of the [ ] allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,
25 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a
13 reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant
that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then
the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).
Under these standards, the factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting
In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)). In a bench trial, the trial court, as
factfinder, weighs the evidence and resolves evidentiary conflicts. In re R.J., 579
S.W.3d 97, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
B. Applicable Law
Section 161.001(b) of the Family Code authorizes an “involuntary termination
of parental rights if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that a parent
engaged in one or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and that
termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 701–02
(Tex. 2022); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U), (b)(2). Generally, “[o]nly
one predicate ground and a best interest finding are necessary for termination, so ‘a
court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a
challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on
more than one ground.’” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 702 (quoting In re N.G., 577
S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019)).
14 Although only one predicate ground is necessary to support a judgment of
termination, we may not bypass challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support findings under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)—“the so-called
endangerment grounds.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748. “Those grounds bear special
significance because termination of a parent’s rights under either can serve as a
ground for termination of his rights to another child.” Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(M).
In her motion for new trial, Mother asserted that there was no evidence that
she knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her child to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endangered her child’s physical or emotional well-being or that
she endangered her child by engaging in conduct or knowingly placing her child
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child. Mother also contended that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination of the parent-child
relationship is in Molly’s best interest. We consider these challenges below.
C. Endangerment Findings
1. Section 161.001(b)(1)(D)
Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) authorizes a trial court to order
termination of a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions
15 or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child.”
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
To establish subsection (D), DFPS must prove that the parent’s conduct
caused a child to be placed or remain in an “endangering environment.” In re J.W.,
645 S.W.3d at 749; Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). The suitability of the child’s living conditions and the
conduct of parents or others in the home are relevant to this inquiry. In re J.W., 645
S.W.3d at 749.
2. Section 161.001(b)(1)(E)
Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) authorizes a trial court to order
termination of a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
To “endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a
child’s emotional or physical health. See Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727
S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312
S.W.3d 608, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). A child is
endangered if her environment creates a potential for danger that the parent
disregards. In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
16 pet. denied). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty
and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re
R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
The evidence shows that Molly told her therapist, and Mother confirmed, that
Molly slept in the same bed with Mother and the stepfather when she was living in
the family home. When Mother was told of Molly’s disclosure of sexual abuse by
the stepfather and brother, she agreed to stay with Molly at a friend’s home, away
from the stepfather and brother. After one night, though, she left with Molly for the
Washington, D.C. area.
In addition to removing Molly from the jurisdiction, Mother interfered in
other ways with the authorities’ investigation into Molly’s disclosure of sexual abuse
by the stepfather and brother. Mother insisted that Molly was lying, blaming Molly’s
purported inability to tell the truth on her disability and her eagerness to get attention.
Mother claimed that Molly fabricated the story after exposure to inappropriate social
media content and school activities. In contrast, both Valdez and Grayson, who have
expertise and experience in assessing the credibility of child victims, testified that
they found Molly’s allegations of sexual abuse to be credible.
Mother also prevented the authorities from speaking with her sons, threatened
the stepfather about discussing the alleged abuse with the authorities, and removed
Molly from the jurisdiction for months. DFPS took Molly into custody because when
17 she and Mother returned to Texas, Mother brought Molly back to the family home
where the abuse occurred, and they were living with Molly’s stepfather and her
siblings, including the brother Molly stated had sexually abused her.
While the case was pending, Mother refused to allow DFPS to inspect the
family home and did not propose any alternative to having Molly live with the
stepfather and brothers. And even in her trial testimony, she never wavered from her
opinion that Molly was lying and no abuse had occurred.
Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s
home is a part of the conditions or surroundings of the child’s home under section
161.001(1)(D). In re B.R., No. 1-13-00023-CV, 2013 WL 3243391, at (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 25 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). And placement with an
abusive parent or relative is endangerment under either subsection (D) or (E). See In
re J.M.C.A., 31 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)
(terminating parental rights of mother who allowed children to remain with abusive
father).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings, and
considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we conclude that a jury
reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in a
course of conduct that endangered Molly’s physical and emotional well-being. See
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
18 And considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and
contradicting the finding, a jury reasonably could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Molly’s
physical and emotional well-being. See id.5
D. Best Interest Finding
The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and
development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). A best-interest
determination is guided by several nonexclusive factors, including: (1) the child’s
emotional and physical needs; (2) present and future emotional and physical danger
to the child; (3) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (4) the plans
for the child by those individuals and the stability of the home; (5) the plans for the
child by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the proposed placement;
(6) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent–child
relationship is improper; and (7) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.
(the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).
We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Family Code section 263.307.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29. Proof of each
5 Because only one predicate ground is necessary to support termination, we need not consider Mother’s challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Tex. 2019).
19 of these factors is not a condition precedent to termination. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at
27. The analysis may include direct and circumstantial evidence, the totality of the
evidence, and subjective factors. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
Striking throughout this case is the consistency with which Molly, who was
12 years old at time of trial, has strongly expressed her desire not to visit or speak
with Mother. Because of this, the trial court did not require Molly to have visitation
with Mother during the time she has been in care. Molly is happy in her current
fictive kin placement and has expressed her interest in remaining there “forever.”
Molly’s caregiver and medical provider testified that Molly came into care
with certain physical symptoms that were resolved with treatment. DFPS worker
Grayson, Molly’s therapist, and Molly’s caregiver all testified that Molly had made
significant progress since she first came into care, becoming more expressive,
independent, and able to care for herself.
Mother testified that she planned to enroll Molly in a private boarding school
in the Washington, D.C. area. But Mother, still dismissive of the possibility that
Molly was telling the truth, did not address how she would protect Molly from the
stepfather and brother whom she has accused of abusing her.
Molly’s guardian ad litem testified that she believed Mother “lacke[d]
protective capacity” and could not meet Molly’s emotional or physical needs.
20 Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings, and
considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we conclude that a jury
reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in Molly’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(2). And considering the entire record, including evidence both
supporting and contradicting the finding, a jury reasonably could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Molly’s best
interest. Id.
Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the jury’s findings supporting termination of Mother’s parental rights.
We overrule Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues.
Sole Managing Conservatorship
In her fifth issue, Mother complains of the trial court’s ruling appointing the
Department as Molly’s sole managing conservator.
When the parental rights of all living parents of a child are terminated, the
trial court must appoint a “competent adult, [DFPS], or a licensed child-placing
agency as managing conservator of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.207(a); In re
J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856. We review conservatorship determinations for an abuse
of discretion. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007); In re J.D.G., 570
S.W.3d at 856.
21 An order terminating the parent-child relationship divests a parent of legal
rights and duties with respect to the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(b). Once
we overrule a parents challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial
court’s appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator is a “consequence of the
termination.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856; In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
Because Mother did not prevail on any issue she raised in her appeal that
changed the portion of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights, the order
divested Mother of her legal rights and duties related to Molly. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.206(b); In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856. As a result, Mother lacks standing to
challenge the portion of the order appointing DFPS as Molly’s conservator. See In
re S.M.M., No. 01-22-00482-CV, 2022 WL 17981669, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856.
We overrule Mother’s fifth issue.
22 Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s decree terminating the parent-child relationship
between Mother and Molly.
Clint Morgan Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.