in the Interest of M.M. and F.M., Children

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 11, 2019
Docket02-19-00164-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of M.M. and F.M., Children (in the Interest of M.M. and F.M., Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of M.M. and F.M., Children, (Tex. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-19-00164-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.M. AND F.M., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 393rd District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 17-9471-393

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights

to Dennis and Denise based on her voluntary-relinquishment affidavit.1 See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(K), (2), 161.103. We affirm.

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has moved to withdraw and has briefed

why Mother’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45,

87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that this court applies Anders procedures in

parental-rights-termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 02-01-00349-CV,

2003 WL 2006583, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem op.).

Counsel’s brief meets Anders’s requirements by professionally evaluating the record

and showing why Mother has no arguable grounds to put forward on appeal.

We instructed Mother to contact us if she wanted an opportunity to review the

record and to file a response, but she did not respond. After we informed the other

parties that Mother had not responded, we gave them an opportunity to file briefs

too, but like Mother, they did not.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the

ground that the appeal is frivolous and if the motion fulfills the Anders requirements,

we must independently examine the record to determine if any arguable grounds for

We use aliases to identify the children and refer to their mother simply as 1

Mother. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 appeal exist. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). When

performing this analysis, we consider the record, the Anders brief, and any pro se

response. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.

proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding no

reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit and affirm the

trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to Dennis and Denise. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d

849, 850 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2009, pet. denied).

Turning to counsel’s motion to withdraw, counsel asserts that he and Mother

disagree on whether to pursue further appellate relief and that Mother has consented

to his withdrawal, but “[m]ere dissatisfaction of counsel or client with each other is

not good cause. Nor is counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further

review from the court of appeals’ decision.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.

2016) (order), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,

138 S. Ct. 1562 (2018). Because counsel has not shown good cause independent from

his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, we deny his withdrawal motion as

premature. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Thus, counsel remains appointed in this

appeal through proceedings in the supreme court unless otherwise relieved under

Family Code Section 107.016(3)(C). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(C); In re M.D.,

3 No. 02-18-00426-CV, 2019 WL 2047813, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2019,

no pet.) (mem. op.); see P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28 (“In [the Texas Supreme] Court,

appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that

satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.”).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice

Delivered: October 11, 2019

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
In Re Schulman
252 S.W.3d 403 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Stafford v. State
813 S.W.2d 503 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Bledsoe v. State
178 S.W.3d 824 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
in the Interest of P.M., a Child
520 S.W.3d 24 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)
in the Interest of C.J., H.T., and B.T., Children
501 S.W.3d 254 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2016)
In the Interest of K.M.
98 S.W.3d 774 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
In the Interest of D.D.
279 S.W.3d 849 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Davis v. Pennsylvania
138 S. Ct. 1562 (Supreme Court, 2018)

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