in the Interest of M.K. and E.K., Children

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 14, 2020
Docket10-20-00075-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of M.K. and E.K., Children (in the Interest of M.K. and E.K., Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of M.K. and E.K., Children, (Tex. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00075-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.K. AND E.K., CHILDREN

From the 272nd District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 18-002302-CV-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a jury trial, the parental rights of Appellants Joni J. (“Mother”) and Jeffery K.

(“Father”) were terminated as to their children, M.K. and E.K. The jury additionally

found that Appellant Cynthia E. (the paternal “Grandmother”) should be removed as

permanent managing conservator (“PMC”) of M.K. and E.K. All three parties have

appealed. We affirm.

Issues

The Department alleged three predicate violations against Mother and Father to

justify termination: (1) they knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to

remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well- being of the children; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); (2) they engaged in

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; id., § 161.001(b)(1)(E);

and (3) they knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in their convictions

of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the children for

not less than two years from the date of filing the petition; id., § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). The

Department also asserted that termination was in the best interest of the children.

The Department alleged that Grandmother should be removed as PMC because:

(1) the circumstances of M.K. and E.K. or of Grandmother materially and substantially

changed since she was appointed permanent managing conservator; id., § 161.004(a)(2);

and (2) the removal of Grandmother as permanent managing conservator was in the

children’s best interest. The jury found that Mother and Father committed the predicate

violations alleged by the Department, that termination was in the children’s best interest,

and that the parental rights of Mother and Father should be terminated. The jury

additionally found a material and substantial change in circumstances occurred and that

Grandmother should be removed as PMC.

Mother presents one issue: The evidence was factually insufficient to support the

jury’s best-interest finding.

Father presents the following issues:

1. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of M.K. and E.K.

In the Interest of M.K. and E.K. Page 2 2. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings of any of the predicate grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights to M.K. and E.K.

3. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Father’s parental rights to M.K. and E.K. should be terminated.

Grandmother presents the following issues:

1. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that there was a material or substantial change of circumstances since entry of the final order less than three months earlier.

2. The State failed to provide the requisite affidavit for seeking modification within one year of a final order.

3. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that modifying the recent final order was in the children’s best interest.

Standard of Review

All appellants, in whole or in part, allege that there is insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdict.

Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. In

re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b).

The quantum of proof in a conservatorship decision is by a preponderance of the

evidence. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).

In the appellate court, a jury's findings underlying a termination and a conservatorship

decision are subject to legal and factual sufficiency review. In re P.A.C., 498 S.W.3d 210,

214 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency in termination cases are well established. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual

In the Interest of M.K. and E.K. Page 3 sufficiency). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a trier of fact could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department's allegations. In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84-85 (Tex. 2005); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66. We do not, however, disregard undisputed evidence that does not support the finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. We must consider the disputed evidence and determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have resolved that evidence in favor of the finding. Id. If the disputed evidence is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.

In re W.D., No. 10-18-00339-CV, 2019 WL 1291111, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 20, 2019,

no pet.) (mem. op.).

If multiple predicate violations are found by the factfinder, we will affirm based

on any one ground because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights. In re

J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet. denied).

We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and must not substitute our

judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The

factfinder is the sole judge “of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their

testimony.” Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,

pet. denied). The factfinder may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). Although a factfinder is free to

disbelieve testimony, “in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is not

authorized to find that the opposite of the testimony is true.” In re F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d 752,

765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied, 579 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2019)).

In the Interest of M.K. and E.K. Page 4 Trial Testimony

The Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) received a

report on January 29, 2018 that M.K. and E.K. were being negligently supervised due to

the use and distribution of methamphetamine by their parents.1 E.K., who was two years

old at the time, was reported to have found a syringe in the home. Mother tested positive

for methamphetamine and amphetamine after a drug test. The allegations of neglectful

supervision were found “reason to believe,” and the children were removed from the

home and initially placed with Grandmother. After an altercation between Grandmother

and Father, after which Grandmother was arrested for outstanding tickets, the children

were placed with Father’s sister (“Sister”). Sister was able to care for the children only

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