In the Interest of M.J., C.J., S.Y., G.M., and N.M., Children v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 11, 2024
• Docket: 02-24-00107-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00107-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., C.J., S.Y., G.M., AND N.M., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231-711766-22

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial at which Mother appeared through her attorney, the trial

court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Andrew, Bryan, Carol, David, and

Emily.1 The trial court found grounds under Subsections (D) (endangering conditions

or surroundings), (E) (endangering conduct), and (O) (noncompliance with court

order). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court further

found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother appealed.2

Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief concluding

that her appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016)

(order) (approving use of Anders procedure in termination-of-parental-rights appeals

because it strikes an important balance between the parent’s constitutional right to

counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals).

1 We use aliases to identify the children, and we identify family members by their relationship to the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 In addition to terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court also terminated (1) Andrew and Bryan’s father’s parental rights to Andrew and Bryan and (2) David and Emily’s father’s parental rights to David and Emily. The trial court appointed Carol’s father as her sole managing conservator. None of the three fathers appealed.

2 Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional

evaluation of the record and showing why there are no arguable grounds to advance

on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Taylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective

& Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).

Mother’s counsel has certified that he has provided Mother with a copy of his Anders

brief and informed her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se

response.

We gave Mother until May 13, 2024, to notify us if she wished to file a pro se

response to counsel’s Anders brief. We received no response. The Department filed a

letter response in which it agreed with Mother’s counsel that Mother had no

meritorious grounds to advance on appeal.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must independently examine the record to

determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80,

109 S. Ct. 346, 350 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. Our review of the record and

counsel’s Anders brief assures us that any issue that Mother might raise would be

frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother’s counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in

the Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at

27; In re J.W., No. 02-22-00161-CV, 2022 WL 15076379, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g).

3 /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Delivered: July 11, 2024