In the Interest of M.J., a Child v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 25, 2023
Docket02-23-00026-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of M.J., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of M.J., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of M.J., a Child v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-23-00026-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 360-674500-19

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal from a judgment terminating a parent–child relationship between

a father and child (Janie),1 we must determine whether the judgment should be

reversed because Father’s appointed trial counsel was ineffective by failing to preserve

legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges to the jury’s finding that terminating the

parent–child relationship was in Janie’s best interest. Because we determine that the

evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s best-interest

finding––and therefore that any deficient performance did not prejudice the case’s

outcome––we affirm.

Procedural Background

Father appeals from a judgment terminating his parent–child relationship with

Janie2 based on jury findings (1) that he endangered her, knowingly allowed her to

remain in endangering conditions or surroundings, failed to comply with a court-

ordered service plan to obtain her return, and constructively abandoned her, and

(2) that termination was in her best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (N)–(O), (b)(2). The trial court’s judgment expressly

1 We use an alias to refer to the child, and we do not include any factual details from which she might be identified. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 Mother executed an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment. She has not appealed.

2 provided that Father’s appointed trial counsel would “continue in that capacity until

all appeals [were] exhausted or waived.”

Nine days after the trial court signed the termination judgment, Father’s

appointed trial counsel 3 filed a notice of appeal on his behalf but did not file a

motion for new trial.4 Three weeks after filing the notice of appeal, trial counsel filed

a motion to withdraw––despite the trial court’s prior finding that she should remain

appointed until appeals were exhausted––alleging that good cause existed for her

withdrawal because (1) she had been appointed trial counsel because Father did not

have the means to hire his own attorney; (2) Father had requested the appointment of

appellate counsel; and (3) she was filing the motion so that appellate counsel could file

an appeal.5

Despite the fact that counsel’s withdrawal motion did not expressly state good

cause for withdrawal, see id. § 107.016; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016)

(order), the trial court granted the motion––finding that “good cause exist[ed] for

[counsel’s] withdrawal”––and appointed substitute counsel. The withdrawal and

3 Father was represented by two attorneys at trial, but the record does not contain an appointment order for one of them; that attorney did not file a withdrawal motion. 4 Additionally, at trial, she had not moved for a directed verdict or objected on the record to the jury charge. 5 We can only assume that trial counsel was trying to convey that she was not qualified to serve as appellate counsel.

3 appointment order is dated March 1, 2023, after the time for filing a motion for new

trial had passed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).

Father’s newly appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising a single issue:

that Father’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for new trial

because, by failing to do so, she failed to preserve any appellate complaint about the

sufficiency of the evidence to prove the jury’s best-interest finding.

Appointed Counsel in Termination Cases

In Texas, an indigent parent against whom the State has initiated a proceeding

to terminate the parent–child relationship is entitled to effective appointed counsel.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013(a)(1); In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex. 2021);

In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003). We review ineffective-assistance claims

in such proceedings by the familiar United States Supreme Court test applicable to

criminal cases, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.W.3d 2052, 2064

(1984). M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545. The parent must show not only that counsel’s

performance was deficient, but also that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense, i.e., that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 545,

549–50.

Unlike criminal-case defendants, parents in termination cases have no separate

procedural vehicle (such as a postconviction habeas proceeding) at which to make a

record to support ineffective-assistance claims. In re A.L., No. 04-17-00620-CV, 2018

4 WL 987484, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Thus, the record from the termination trial itself––whether supplemented by new-trial

testimony or not––is the sole source of facts to support an ineffective-assistance-at-

trial claim.6

Here, Father’s counsel failed to preserve legal-sufficiency challenges to the

jury’s best-interest finding by failing to seek a directed verdict, object to the inclusion

of questions in the charge, or both. See In re A.H., No. 02-22-00019-CV, 2022 WL

1573408, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 19, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). She

failed to preserve a factual-sufficiency challenge to the jury finding by failing to file a

motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(a)–(b); A.H., 2022 WL 1573408, at *3.

Thus, whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s best-

“To remedy this inequity, some appellate courts have held that the appropriate 6

remedy is to abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing at which a parent may develop a record.” See In re D.H.G., No. 04-21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 5088738, at *3 (Tex. App.––San Antonio Nov. 3, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re M.E.–M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). But “[w]hether abatement is appropriate will depend on the facts of each termination case and the specific allegation of ineffective assistance.” D.H.G., 2021 WL 5088738, at *3 (quoting In re K.K., 180 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. App.––Waco 2005, no pet.) (per curiam) (order)).

Here, we need not abate because Father has not satisfied the second Strickland prong: that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s asserted deficiencies, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at *4; A.L., 2018 WL 987484 at *9.

5 interest finding informs our determination of the second Strickland prong. 7 See

D.H.G., 2021 WL 5088738, at *5–6.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
In Re J.O.A.
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In the Interest of E.C.R., Child
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in the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children
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in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child
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in the Interest of K.K., L.M., M.M., and T.K., Children
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in the Interest of M.E.-M.N, Minor Child
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in the Interest of P.M., a Child
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In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of M.S.
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In the Interest of R.R. & S.J.S.
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