In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00487-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.H., S.H., AND B.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 322nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 322-743622-23
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of
Appellants K.H. (Father) and J.D. (Mother) to their children M.H., S.H., and B.H.1
(children). Father and Mother both appealed.
In their respective appeals, Father’s attorney filed an Anders brief,2 and Mother
complained that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by denying her motion for
continuance and (2) erred in finding that it was in the children’s best interest to
terminate her parental rights because the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2023, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
(the Department) received a referral that Mother had given birth to a child (B.H.) who
tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother also had two other young children
(M.H. and S.H.), and Father was the parent of all three children.3
1 We refer to the children using aliases and to other family members by their relationship to the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). 3 The record is unclear of when, but sometime before the termination trial, Mother raised the issue of parentage and named a different father for M.H.; however, Father did not contest his parentage or request DNA testing.
2 Following B.H.’s birth, Mother admitted to the Department that she recently
used methamphetamine and marijuana and explained that she had a long history of
bipolar disorder, depression, and substance abuse. Based on B.H.’s positive drug test,
the Department believed that there was neglectful supervision, and it opened a
Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS) case.4 After developing a safety plan, the
Department permitted B.H. to leave the hospital with Father and Mother.5 The plan
prescribed that Mother had to complete random drug testing, an assessment with
recovery resources, and parenting classes, as well as follow any of the Department’s
other recommendations. The plan also required Father and Mother to be supervised
at all times when they were with the children.
However, later that month, the Department became concerned with Father and
Mother’s compliance with the safety plan. On one occasion, Mother left the children
inside an unattended car at the Department’s parking lot, and on another occasion,
the children were left unsupervised with Father and Mother.
“Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family 4
whose children are not in the conservatorship of the Department.” 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 700.710 (2021). 5 At the time of B.H.’s birth, Father and Mother had custody of all three children.
3 On December 1, 2023, the Department sought to temporarily remove the
children6 from Father and Mother’s care due to safety concerns and because there
were no other family members7 who could take care of the children long-term. At
removal, all three children tested positive for controlled substances.
Following the children’s removal, the Department created another service plan
for Mother which, in addition to the prior plan’s requirements, included drug and
alcohol counseling, individual counseling, and a program called FOCUS for Mothers.
A few months later, the Department again amended the plan to include relationship
counseling, a domestic-violence assessment, and a psychological assessment.
Mother completed the psychological assessment, inquired about FOCUS for
Mothers, and contacted the provider for the domestic-violence assessment; however,
she did not engage with or complete the drug assessment, individual counseling, and
domestic violence counseling, nor did she submit to any of the monthly drug tests.
Despite reporting her extensive mental-health history, Mother felt that she did not
need the individual counseling.
Mother attended ten of the thirty-sixty scheduled visits with the children.
During the pendency of the case, Mother entered drug rehabilitation three times, but
6 At removal, the children were approximately two years old (M.H.), one year old (S.H.), and one month old (B.H.). 7 The Department contacted three family members to explore whether they could care for the children, but each family member was unable, either due to foster care licensing restrictions or criminal history.
4 she always left after a few days. The first rehabilitation was intended to be a seven-
day detox, but Mother left against medical advice after only three days due to Father’s
demands. Mother left the second rehabilitation after 24 to 48 hours and again went
back to Father. The third rehabilitation began on October 2, 2024, and ended on
October 12, 2024, when Mother was reported to have left with Father.
The Department also had concerns of domestic violence between Father and
Mother. Department caseworkers noted that Mother would accuse Father of
domestic violence around scheduled court hearings or before entering rehabilitation.
Father was arrested for assaulting Mother in July 2024, and although the Department
offered resources to her, Mother still returned to Father.
Despite all of this, caseworkers reported that Mother was bonded to the
children and appeared to love and care for them. As time went on, caseworkers
spoke with Mother about the upcoming termination trial and encouraged her to
engage in services, and Mother claimed that she would go to rehabilitation and engage
in services.
Regarding Father’s compliance with the service plan, he refused the monthly
drug tests and admitted to using methamphetamine because he liked the way he felt
when he was on drugs and had no plan to stop. Father did not engage in any services,
and he attended six of the thirty-six scheduled visits with the children. Father’s
excuse for not attending the visits was that he needed to work.
5 Father and Mother both claimed to be employed, but they provided no proof
of stable employment to the Department. Additionally, neither of them had stable
housing, and they sometimes lived together in Mother’s car.
The Department ultimately determined that it was in the children’s best interest
to terminate Father and Mother’s parental rights. Mother had not displayed any
sobriety; had not exhibited any improvement through engagement with services; had
not shown that she was capable of providing a safe and stable home for the children;
had not addressed her abusive relationship with Father, which indicated to the
Department that she was not a stable and safe parent; and had not shown that she
could prioritize the children’s needs above her own.
The Department reported that it found placement for the children together in
an adoption-motivated and safe environment, that its plan was for the current
placement to adopt the children together, and that the children were thriving,
progressing, and comfortable with their foster parents.
The final trial on the merits of the original petition for protection of a child, for
conservatorship, and for termination in the suit affecting parent-child relationship
(termination trial) was set for October 15, 2024. On October 2, 2024, Mother
checked herself into a rehabilitation facility and had a projected treatment completion
date of December 2, 2024. On October 10, 2024, Mother’s attorney filed a motion
for continuance that explained Mother had voluntarily admitted herself into a
treatment facility and requested that the trial be continued so that Mother could
6 substantially complete her treatment and demonstrate sobriety. But, by October 12,
2024, Mother had checked herself out of the facility, and she was believed to be with
Father.
Three days later, Mother did not appear for the termination trial. Mother’s
attorney explained that Mother was aware of the trial date and was encouraged to
come to court. Mother’s attorney urged the trial court to grant the continuance
because Mother wanted to check herself back into the rehabilitation facility, continue
the treatment, and complete her service plan. Father’s attorney was unopposed to
Mother’s motion for continuance, but the Department and the children’s attorney ad
litem objected to the continuance. The trial court denied Mother’s continuance, and
the termination trial commenced. After hearing testimony from the Department,8 the
trial court terminated both Father and Mother’s parental rights to the children.9
Father and Mother brought this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. FATHER’S APPEAL
Father’s attorney filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds
for appeal and also filed a motion to withdraw as Father’s attorney of record. See
8 Neither Father’s attorney nor Mother’s attorney called any witnesses. 9 The trial court found that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the children was warranted under Texas Family Code Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P), and (R) and that termination was in the children’s best interest.
7 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in cases
terminating parental rights).
The brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be
advanced on appeal. Further, Father’s attorney (1) provided Father with a copy of the
Anders brief, (2) informed Father of his right to file a pro se response, and (3) advised
Father of his right to access the appellate record from our court and provided him
with instructions and a draft motion for obtaining the record. See Kelly v. State,
436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We also notified Father of his right
to file a response, but he did not do so. The Department declined to respond to the
Anders brief.
When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the record to
determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Our examination should consider the
record, briefs, and any pro se response. In re L.B., No. 02-19-00407-CV, 2020 WL
1809505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). After
careful review, we agree with Father’s attorney and hold that there are no arguable
grounds for appeal in Father’s case.
8 B. MOTHER’S APPEAL
1. Denial of a Continuance
In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying her motion for continuance. We disagree.
a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.);
In re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.);
Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, and without reference to any
guiding rules or principles. D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 647; E.L.T, 93 S.W.3d at 375. An
abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and
probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. D.W., 249 S.W.3d
at 647.
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, no continuance shall be granted
“except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by
operation of law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. When a movant fails to comply with these
requirements, it is presumed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion. E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d at 375. A trial court is not required to grant a motion
for continuance if a party is unable to be present at trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251;
Holmes v. GMAC, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
9 Section 263.401(a) establishes an automatic dismissal date for suits affecting the
parent-child relationship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). Unless the trial court
has commenced trial on the merits or granted an extension under Subsection (b) or
(b-1), the suit is automatically dismissed on the first Monday after the first anniversary
that the trial court rendered a temporary order appointing the Department as
Temporary Managing Conservator (TMC), and the trial court’s jurisdiction of the suit
is terminated. Id.
A trial court may retain the suit if the trial court finds that (1) extraordinary
circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the Department’s care and
(2) continuing the appointment of the Department as TMC is in the child’s best
interest. Id. § 263.401(b); M.G.P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-13-
00004-CV, 2013 WL 2157753, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 16, 2013, pet. denied)
(mem. op.). Circumstances that do not warrant an extension have included
incarceration, entering rehabilitation, and a parent beginning compliance with the
service plan too late to complete the requirements before trial. See In re M.S.,
602 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.); In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d
493, 501 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet. denied); In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied).
b. Analysis
The trial court rendered its temporary order appointing the Department as
TMC over the children on December 1, 2023, making the automatic dismissal date
10 December 2, 2024. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). The termination trial was
set for October 15, 2024.
On October 2, 2024, Mother admitted herself to a rehabilitation facility for
treatment, and on October 10, 2024, Mother’s attorney moved for a continuance on
that basis. However, by October 12, 2024, Mother had again left the rehabilitation
facility.
On October 15, 2024, Mother did not appear for trial. Mother’s attorney
pressed the need for a continuance and explained that Mother intended to re-admit
herself to the rehabilitation facility for continued treatment and to work on her service
plan. Mother’s attorney also explained that there was a concern that Mother could
not come to court because Father was holding her against her will. However, this
concern was resolved when Mother’s attorney spoke with Mother, who indicated that
she would come to the courtroom.10
Mother’s brief discusses the exigency of the continuance and impossibility to 10
“secure a notary and e-file the motion to protect” her rights. However, we note that at the time Mother’s attorney moved for the continuance on the day of trial, Mother was not in a rehabilitation facility. Thus, it was Mother’s own failure to appear at trial that inhibited her attorney from showing “a sufficient cause supported by affidavit.” While the continuance may still not have been granted, we are unpersuaded by her argument that obtaining an affidavit was an impossible feat. After Mother’s attorney raised the issue of Mother being “a prisoner of the father,” her attorney spoke with her and encouraged her to appear at trial. As is evident in their communication, obtaining an affidavit from Mother to support the motion, though potentially burdensome, was not impossible.
11 The Department objected to the continuance and responded that the evidence
would show that it was Mother’s third time entering and leaving rehabilitation with
Father throughout the case, the Department’s concerns of drug use and domestic
violence had not been addressed, and Mother had not made any substantial progress
on her service plan. Father’s attorney did not oppose the motion for continuance, but
the children’s ad litem joined in the Department’s objection. The trial court ultimately
denied Mother’s motion for continuance; the trial commenced, and her parental rights
to the children were terminated.
Here, Mother’s motion for continuance does not comport with Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 251—it fails to show sufficient cause supported by an affidavit, by
consent of the parties, or by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. Due to
Mother’s noncompliance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, it is presumed that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion. E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d
at 375.
Moreover, some substantive and probative evidence exists to support the trial
court’s decision. D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 647. First, the automatic dismissal date was
December 2, 2024, and Mother seemingly waited until approximately fourteen days
before the trial date to admit herself to the rehabilitation facility. The projected
completion date for her inpatient treatment was the same date as the automatic
dismissal: December 2, 2024. Mother had already twice entered—and left without
completing treatment—a rehabilitation facility during the pendency of the case. The
12 trial court could have viewed Mother’s most recent admission as a tactic to delay the
proceedings.
Second, and arguably more consequential, Mother was not in the rehabilitation
facility when the trial court denied her continuance. Mother argues that the
continuance was necessary because the trial would have interrupted her treatment.
Yet, Mother had checked herself out of the rehabilitation facility just two days after
filing the motion for continuance. Thus, Mother’s decision to leave the treatment
facility effectively negated the basis for her continuance. It was Mother’s choice to
leave the facility, not the commencement of trial, that interrupted her “latest and
longest attempt” at treatment. On the day of trial, Mother’s attorney merely
expressed that Mother desired to return to the facility—not that she was actually in
the facility receiving treatment. Therefore, the grounds for Mother’s continuance
were based on hypothetical, and not actual, circumstances.
Third, with the knowledge that Mother was inconsistent and noncommittal in
her treatment, the trial court could have determined that continuing the case to allow
Mother a fourth attempt at rehabilitation was not reasonable, especially with the
impending automatic dismissal date. Mother’s failure to begin complying with a
family service plan until shortly before trial did not constitute an extraordinary
circumstance when the requirements and expectations were known well to her in
advance of trial. See Shaw v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03–05–00682–
CV, 2006 WL 2504460, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2006, pet. denied) (mem.
13 op.). Actions that are “considered to be the parent’s fault” will generally not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance. In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting In re G.P., No. 10-13-00062-CV, 2013
WL 2639243, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
Fourth, Mother did not explain how remaining in the Department’s care, while
she attempted her fourth stent in rehabilitation, would be in the children’s best
interest. Rather, Mother broadly claimed that the children would not suffer harm or
“threat of loss of temporary placement of the children” by granting the continuance.
Based on these forgoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not act
unreasonably, arbitrarily, and without reference to any guiding rules or principles
when it denied Mother’s motion for continuance. E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d at 375.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s motion for continuance, and we overrule her first issue.
2. Best-Interest Sufficiency
In her second issue, Mother does not challenge the predicate-conduct grounds
found by the trial court; but instead, she complains that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (O)–(P), (R), (2). We disagree.
In parental termination cases, the Department must prove two elements by
clear and convincing evidence: (1) the parent’s actions satisfy a statutory ground under
14 Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). “Clear and
convincing evidence” is that “measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007. Due process demands a
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence, and thus, appellate courts will
strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parents. Z.N.,
602 S.W.3d at 545.
To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination
cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding
to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction
that the finding is true. Id. The factfinder may draw inferences, but those inferences
must be reasonable and logical. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is
contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a
reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder is
the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d
336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
In determining factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of
the parent–child relationship, we must perform “an exacting review of the entire
15 record.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them with our own. In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide
whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
Department proved the alleged termination ground and that termination of the
parent–child relationship would be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably
could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient.
C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. If the evidence is factually sufficient, then it is necessarily
legally sufficient as well. In re A.S., No. 02-16-00076-CV, 2016 WL 3364838, at *7
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the
child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest
analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,
In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Evidence probative of a child’s best
interest may be the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. In
re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1),
(2). We also consider the evidence considering nonexclusive factors that the factfinder
may apply in determining the child’s best interest:
• the child’s desires;
• the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future;
16 • the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
• the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
• the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the child’s best interest;
• the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
• the stability of the home or proposed placement;
• the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and
• the parent’s excuse, if any, for the acts or omissions.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249
(stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence,
the Holley factors”); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012).
These factors do not form an exhaustive list, and some factors may not apply
to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one
factor may suffice in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the
child’s best interest. Id.
In our best-interest sufficiency analysis, we will recount the evidence relevant to
each of the Holley factors, but we will combine them topically for ease of discussion.
(1.) The emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; Mother’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and any excuse for the acts or omissions
17 • Mother used marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine during pregnancy.
• At birth, B.H. was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and cannabinoids. Approximately one month later, when the children were removed from Mother’s care, all three of them were positive for methamphetamine and cocaine.
• During the initial visit with the Department’s investigators, Mother left the children unattended in a vehicle.
• Of the thirty-sixty scheduled visits with the children, Mother attended ten.
(2.) The Department’s plans and their stability; the children’s desires and emotional and physical needs now and in the future
• The children were thriving and progressing well at their placement, they were comfortable and bonded to their foster parents, and the children were bonded to each other and played well together.
• All three children were meeting milestones and improving with the Department’s adoption-motivated placement.
• Of the three children, only M.H. needed additional help, specifically speech therapy, which the foster parents regularly helped her to complete.
• There was no evidence of the children’s desires—they were all under four years old at the time of trial.
(3.) The stability of the home; Mother’s parental abilities; any programs available to assist Mother in promoting the children’s best interest; and Mother’s plans
18 • Mother appeared to love her children and care for them, and caseworkers had no concern with her behavior at the supervised visitations.
• Mother completed a psychological assessment pursuant to the service plan.
• Mother had a long history of bipolar disorder, methamphetamine use disorder, and depression; however, she chose to not receive treatment, counseling, or services for these concerns.
• Mother did not complete random drug testing, parenting classes, individual counseling, domestic violence counseling, or relationship counseling. The Department requested that Mother take seven drug tests over the course of seven months, but she never submitted to any testing.
• The Department worked to get Mother into various programs for domestic violence victims, but she chose to go back to Father and not return phone calls from the Department. The Department also offered Mother cab vouchers for various appointments, but she never used the vouchers.
• Mother did not have proof of stable employment.
• Mother prematurely checked herself out of a rehabilitation facility three times within twelve months.
• Mother repeatedly violated the safety plan by having unsupervised contact with the children.
• Mother did not have stable housing, and she would sometimes sleep in her car.
Considering the evidence pertinent to each of the Holley factors, we conclude
that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-
interest finding.
19 The evidence showed that Mother (1) caused her children to be born with
various controlled substances in their systems; (2) caused all three children to enter
the Department’s care with controlled substances in their systems; (3) had a history of
drug use; (4) lacked stable housing and employment; (5) decided to be with Father, an
admittedly chronic methamphetamine user with whom there was a history of
domestic violence; (6) chose to quit three separate rehabilitation programs; (7) missed
numerous visits with the children; and (8) did not utilize the Department’s programs
and resources.
In light of Mother’s acts and omissions, including her substance abuse history
and lack of a concrete plan to provide a safe and stable environment for the future,
and the children’s circumstances at the time of trial—in their adoption-motivated
placement—we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm
conviction or belief that terminating Mother’s parent–child relationship with the
children was in their best interest. See, e.g., In re T.E., No. 02-24-00271-CV, 2024 WL
4631296, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 31, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re
G.W., No. 02-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 4545568, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.
29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding, and we
overrule Mother’s second issue.
20 IV. CONCLUSION
Having held that there are no arguable grounds for Father’s appeal and having
overruled both of Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. However, we
deny the motion to withdraw filed by Father’s attorney because it does not show good
cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 10; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016); C.J.,
501 S.W.3d at 255. Thus, Father’s attorney remains appointed in his case through any
proceedings in the supreme court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Delivered: March 27, 2025