In the Interest of M.H. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 01-25-00380-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 26, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00380-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF M.H., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-00244J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.M.J. (Father) and M.H. (Mother) attempt to appeal from the trial court’s

“judgment or final order rendered on date May 14, 2025” in the underlying suit

affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR). We dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction. Generally, this Court has jurisdiction over appeals only from “final orders”

rendered under Title 5 of the Texas Family Code, unless a statute authorizes an

interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (“An appeal may be taken

by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”); see, e.g., Brejon

v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

In a SAPCR, the trial “court may make a temporary order, including the

modification of a prior temporary order, for the safety and welfare of the child,

including an order: (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child;” but any such

“[t]emporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory

appeal.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.001(a)(1), (e); see also In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d

327, 335 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (noting that mandamus was an appropriate

remedy in SAPCR because “trial court’s issuance of temporary orders [was] not

subject to interlocutory appeal” (citations omitted)).

Here, after reviewing the clerk’s record filed in this Court, we conclude that

there are no final decrees or appealable orders signed by the trial court. As noted

above, Father and Mother purport to appeal from the trial court’s final order rendered

on May 14, 2025. But the only order signed on May 14, 2025 was an order granting

a continuance. This is not an appealable interlocutory order. See Hughes v. Gifford,

No. 01-24-00144-CV, 2024 WL 3941018, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2 Aug. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (order granting motion for

continuance is not final judgment or appealable interlocutory order).

And the only other recent order contained in the clerk’s record is a

“Permanency Hearing Order Before Final Order,” which was signed by the trial

court on May 19, 2025. But this too is not an appealable interlocutory order. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.001(a), (e); In Interest of L.L.B., No. 01-17-00286-CV, 2017

WL 2290202, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because permanency

hearing order “is a non-appealable temporary order”).

Because the clerk’s record does not indicate that any final termination decree

has been entered with respect to Father and Mother, nor does it reflect that any other

appealable order has been rendered, we lack jurisdiction. See, e.g., In Interest of

L.L.B., 2017 WL 2290202, at *2.

On May 29, 2025, the Clerk of this Court notified Father and Mother that this

appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless they timely responded

and showed how this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(a). Father and Mother failed to timely file a response.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id.; see also

In Interest of L.L.B., 2017 WL 2290202, at *2.

3 PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.