in the Interest of M.C.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided March 26, 2020·No. 09-19-00436-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-19-00436-CV __________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 411th District Court San Jacinto County, Texas Trial Cause No. CV15,640 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a hearing, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship

between Mother and her son, Drew. 1 Mother appealed. But her court-appointed

appellate attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting no arguable grounds can be

advanced to support Mother’s appeal. 2

1 To protect the identity of the minor child identified in the trial court’s judgment, we use a pseudonym. We follow the same convention for the child’s mother. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (b)(2), (d) (Supp.). 2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). 1 We conclude Mother’s brief complies with the requirements applicable to

Anders briefs. The brief that counsel filed presents counsel’s professional evaluation

of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to support overturning the

judgment rendered in the court below. 3 Counsel gave Mother a copy of the brief

counsel filed on Mother’s behalf, notified Mother she could file a pro se brief, and

explained to Mother how she could review a copy of the record that is relevant to

her appeal. The record shows Mother did not respond by filing her own brief.

We have reviewed the appellate record, including the transcript of the hearing

that resulted in the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights to Drew.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude no arguable grounds exist to support

Mother’s appeal and conclude Mother’s appeal is frivolous.4 We note counsel’s duty

to represent her client extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals.

Should Mother desire to appeal further, counsel may satisfy her duty to Mother “by

filing a petition for review [with the Texas Supreme Court] that satisfies the

standards for an Anders brief.” 5 Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

3 See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). 4 See In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d at 850. 5 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27- 28 (Tex. 2016).

2 AFFIRMED.

_________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice

Submitted on February 19, 2020 Opinion Delivered March 26, 2020

Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
In the Interest of K.R.C.
346 S.W.3d 618 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
in the Interest of L.D.T., C.R.E.T. and W.G.T.
161 S.W.3d 728 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
in the Interest of P.M., a Child
520 S.W.3d 24 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)