In the
Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
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No. 02-26-00156-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF M.B.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-123303-24
Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Appellant M.B. appeals from a “Judgment on Motion to Modify Disposition”
and an “Order of Commitment” through which the trial court granted the motion to modify disposition1 finding that M.B. had engaged in delinquent conduct and also ordered him committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his nineteenth birthday or until duly discharged. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 51.03, 54.05(a). In two points, M.B. argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to justify his commitment to the TJJD and (2) the trial court erred by denying him the benefit of a psychological evaluation. We will hold that there is sufficient evidence to justify M.B.’s commitment to the TJJD and that he has not preserved his argument relating to the trial court’s alleged denial of a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, we will overrule M.B.’s two points, and we will affirm the trial court’s “Judgment on Motion to Modify Disposition” and “Order of Commitment.”
1 The judgment reflects that the trial court granted “the petition to revoke probation.” This appears to be a scrivener’s error because the clerk’s record does not contain a petition to revoke—rather, it contains several motions to modify disposition —and because the reporter’s record makes clear that the trial court held a “Motion to Modify Hearing.”
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II. Background
A. The Initial Offense and the Judgment of Delinquency In April 2024, the State initiated the underlying case by filing a “Petition Regarding Child Engaged in Delinquent Conduct.” Therein, the State alleged that M.B. had committed two counts of burglary. Later that month, the trial court held a probable-cause hearing, found probable cause to believe that M.B. had engaged in “delinquent conduct/conduct indicating a need for supervision,” and signed an order detaining him in the juvenile detention center.
That same month, M.B. entered into a “Stipulation of Evidence, Judicial Confession, and Disposition Agreement.” Therein, M.B. admitted that on or about March 23, 2024, in Tarrant County, Texas, he had committed two robbery offenses in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 29.02—second-degree felonies that constitute delinquent conduct as defined in Texas Family Code Section 51.03(a). See Tex. Penal Code § 29.02; Tex. Fam. Code § 51.03(a). The trial court later signed a judgment of delinquency and an order placing M.B. on probation for one year.
B. The Previous Motion to Modify Disposition In February 2025, the State filed a motion to modify disposition. In that motion, the State alleged that M.B. had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by controlling or possessing a firearm or illegal weapon on or about December 27, 2024, in Tarrant County, Texas. A month later, the State amended its motion to modify to allege two other violations of M.B.’s probation that had occurred
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on or about December 27, 2024, in Tarrant County, Texas—that he had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carried a handgun on or about his person, and that at the time of the offense, he was younger than twenty-one years of age and was not on his own premises or premises under his control; and that he recklessly discharged a firearm by accidentally pulling the trigger or otherwise engaging the trigger of the firearm causing it to discharge, inside the city limits of Arlington, Texas.
In July 2025, M.B. signed another “Stipulation of Evidence, Judicial Confession, and Disposition Agreement.” In that stipulation, M.B. agreed that he had violated his probation by controlling or possessing a firearm or illegal weapon on or about December 27, 2024, in Tarrant County, Texas. The next month, the trial court signed a judgment granting the State’s motion to modify disposition. In that judgment, the trial court extended M.B.’s probation for a period not to exceed April 3, 2027.
C. The Current Motion to Modify Disposition In December 2025, the State filed another motion to modify disposition. In six paragraphs, the State alleged that M.B. had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by:
• retaliating against a prospective witness on or about October 14, 2025, by threatening to harm the witness;
• retaliating against a prospective witness on or about October 16, 2025, by threatening to harm the witness;
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• retaliating against a prospective witness on or about November 7, 2025, by striking the witness;
• assaulting an individual on or about November 7, 2025, by striking the individual;
• assaulting an individual on or about November 20, 2025, by spitting on the individual; and
• failing to attend school on or about December 12, 2025.
In this motion, the State also requested that the trial court issue an order committing M.B. to the TJJD.
D. The Hearing on the Current Motion to Modify Disposition In February 2026, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s current motion to modify disposition. At that hearing, testimony was presented regarding M.B.’s alleged violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. We will group that testimony into the following categories: (1) testimony regarding a September 2025 fight involving M.B., (2) testimony regarding M.B.’s alleged threats to a witness of that fight, (3) testimony regarding M.B.’s later alleged assault of that witness, (4) testimony regarding M.B.’s alleged assault of another person, and (5) testimony from M.B.’s probation officer.
1. Testimony Regarding a September 2025 Fight Involving M.B.
M.B. was involved in a September 2025 fight at the Addison Park apartment complex in Arlington, Texas. Nathaniel Hunt, an individual who lived at the
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apartment complex, was a witness to the fight and helped break it up. According to Hunt, he was outside of his apartment and heard a commotion. He investigated the noise and observed M.B. and M.B.’s brother “on top of somebody” who was on the ground. Hunt then broke up the fight. After breaking up the fight, Hunt made a report to police regarding the incident. When asked about the fight at the modification hearing, M.B. admitted that Hunt had broken up a fight that he had been involved in.
2. Testimony Regarding M.B.’s Alleged Threats to Hunt in October 2025
Hunt also testified about alleged threats M.B. made to him in October 2025.
Hunt described an occasion when he was walking his dog at the apartment complex when he passed M.B. According to Hunt, M.B. made a remark about Hunt’s having called the police. Hunt said that he thought the remark was “kind of retaliatory for [his] calling the police.” Hunt also stated that on two occasions that month—on October 14 and 16—M.B. had stated that “he was going to fuck [Hunt] up.” Hunt acknowledged that M.B. did not actually touch him on those occasions. Hunt indicated that he was fearful of M.B. because of those statements. M.B. denied making any threats to Hunt.
3. Testimony Regarding M.B.’s Alleged Assault of Hunt on November 7, 2025
Hunt also described being assaulted by M.B. on November 7, 2025. Hunt stated that he had just returned to the apartment complex after traveling to North
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Carolina due to the deaths of his parents, when M.B. began taunting him about his parents’ deaths. According to Hunt, after M.B. taunted him, M.B. ran up and punched him in the face and then fled. Hunt testified that he sustained “redness and swelling on the right side of [his] face” as a result of the assault and that he “ended up having a little black eye.”2 Hunt called the police as a result of that incident.
Mercedes Lover, a patrol officer with the Arlington Police Department, was dispatched to the Addison Park apartment complex on November 7, 2025, in response to Hunt’s assault call. After arriving on the scene, Lover spoke to M.B. about the alleged assault. According to Lover, M.B. initially denied hitting Hunt, but M.B. later admitted that he had hit Hunt because Hunt had “looked like he wanted to fight.” M.B. indicated that he had struck Hunt first. Lover also spoke to Hunt on the scene; he told her that M.B. had “c[o]me up and hit him out of no[]where.” She observed that Hunt’s “right eye was swollen . . . and . . . red.” Lover stated that Hunt was a prospective witness based on his previous report to police regarding the September 2025 fight.
As to the events of November 7, 2025, M.B. testified that he and Hunt had gotten into an argument, that Hunt had started coming toward him, and that he had hit Hunt and ran away. M.B. claimed that he had hit Hunt in self-defense. M.B. admitted that he had told the police that he had struck Hunt, mentioning that Hunt
Two photographs depicting Hunt’s injuries were admitted into evidence at the 2
hearing. The photos show some redness and what appears to be swelling on Hunt’s face.
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had “looked like he wanted to fight.” M.B. acknowledged that Hunt had not struck him before he had hit Hunt; during the hearing, M.B. maintained, however, that he had hit Hunt because Hunt was coming towards him and he had “felt threatened.”
4. Testimony Regarding M.B.’s Alleged Assault of Another Person on November 20, 2025
Teagan Tucker, another resident of the apartment complex, testified about an incident that occurred on November 20, 2025, when M.B. allegedly spit on her at the complex. According to Tucker, on the day of that incident, she was walking in the complex when she saw a neighbor consoling Tucker’s son, who appeared to be hurt. The neighbor was crying, and she explained to Tucker that M.B. had attacked Tucker’s son. While Tucker was talking to the neighbor, M.B. walked up to them, and Tucker asked, “Why do you keep putting your hands on my son?” In response, M.B. “hocked up a bunch of spit,” spat in her face, and said, “I’ll hit you.” M.B. then took off running and said, “[T]ry and see if you can catch me.” Tucker indicated that she was “shocked” and “offended” when M.B. spat in her face, noting that “it was purposeful.” Tucker did not call the police to report the incident. M.B. denied spitting on Tucker. He claimed that she had come toward him with pepper spray in her hand during the incident, and he had simply backed away from her. 3
3 Tucker admitted that she was carrying pepper spray on the day of the spitting incident, although she said that it was “on [her] keys.”
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5. Testimony from M.B.’s Probation Officer Kevin Miller testified that he was a field court officer overseeing M.B.’s probation with the Tarrant County Juvenile Department. Miller described a previous violation of M.B.’s probation, in which M.B. was charged with discharging a firearm and unlawfully carrying a weapon after an incident in which M.B. accidentally shot himself while on probation. Miller stated that M.B.’s probation conditions required that he attend school in Tarrant County and that, according to school records, M.B. “had missed several days of school.” According to Miller, M.B. has “had numerous tardies” and “full-day absences” and that it had gotten to the point that the school had sent Miller to an alternative education program. Miller indicated that the alternative education program had reported that M.B. “would just come to class and sleep and not participate and do the work.” At the hearing, M.B. acknowledged that he had “some issues with [his] school attendance.” He also admitted that he had violated some of the terms and conditions of his probation, including the condition requiring that he attend school.
E. The Trial Court’s Judgment and Commitment Order At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it had found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that M.B. had violated the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged in paragraphs one through six of the State’s motion to modify. The trial court stated that it was committing M.B. to the TJJD for an indeterminate
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period of time. The trial court later signed the complained-of “Judgment on Motion to Modify Disposition” and “Order of Commitment.”
In addition to finding that M.B. had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, the trial court also found the following: that it was in M.B.’s best interest to be placed outside his home; that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for M.B.’s removal from his home and to make it possible for him to return home; that M.B., in his home, could not be provided the quality of care and level of supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of probation; and that M.B. had behavioral health or other special needs that could not be met with resources available in the community.4 The trial court ordered that M.B. be committed to the TJJD for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his nineteenth birthday. This appeal ensued.
III. Analysis
A. M.B.’s Sufficiency Complaint In his first point, M.B. argues that the evidence is insufficient to justify his commitment to the TJJD. More specifically, he argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that he violated his probation by committing the three alleged retaliation offenses and that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that he violated his probation by
4 On appeal, M.B. does not complain about any of the trial court’s findings apart from the findings that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
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committing the two alleged assault offenses and by failing to attend school.
1. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s decision to modify a juvenile disposition for an abuse of discretion. In re J.J., No. 02-26-00038-CV, 2026 WL 1839080, at *6 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth June 25, 2026, pet. filed); see In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 632–33 (Tex. 2004). In conducting that review, we are cognizant that a juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct. J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; In re R.R., Nos. 02-24-00360-CV, 02-24-00361-CV, 2025 WL 421222, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 6, 2025, no pet.). This is particularly true in proceedings to modify a juvenile’s earlier disposition. J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *3.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a juvenile court acts unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or principles. J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *3. A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion simply by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; In re C.C., No. 02-17-00216-CV, 2018 WL 1865804, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2018, no pet.). And we will not find that a juvenile court abused its discretion so long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the court’s decision. J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; C.C., 2018 WL 1865804, at *3.
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In a disposition-modification proceeding, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.05(f); In re A.K., No. 02-24- 00144-CV, 2024 WL 4705124, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 7, 2024, no pet.). Legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors in determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion. R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *4. We apply the civil standards of review for the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court’s disposition decision.5 J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *7; R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *4. In conducting our review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1) did the juvenile court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion,
5 We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
When reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge under the civil standard of review, we set aside the finding at issue only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).
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and (2) did the juvenile court err in its application of discretion? J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *7; C.C., 2018 WL 1865804, at *3.
2. Applicable Law
We have recently set forth the law applicable to a modification of a juvenile disposition:
Violating a single condition of probation is sufficient for a trial court to modify a juvenile’s prior disposition. In re J.Y., No. 02-17-00092-CV, 2017 WL 3298301, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.) . . . (citing In re S.G.V., No. 04-05-00605-CV, 2006 WL 923576, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 5, 2006, no pet.) . . . ). A trial court may commit a juvenile to the TJJD if it finds that (1) it is in the child’s best interest to be placed outside the child’s home[;] (2) reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from the child’s home and to make it possible for him to return home[;] and (3) the child, in the child’s home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision needed to meet the conditions of probation. Tex. Fam. Code . . . § 54.04(i)(1). When a child has engaged in delinquent conduct that constitutes a felony offense, the trial court may commit the child to the TJJD without a determinate sentence “if the court makes a special commitment finding that the child has behavioral health or other special needs that cannot be met with the resources available in the community.” Id. § 54.04013; see id. § 54.04(d)(2).
The trial court “is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives before sending a juvenile to the TJJD.” In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d 567, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); see In re J.R.C., 236 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (“The Texas Family Code permits a trial court to decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second chance.” (citing J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633)).[6] Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by
6 “In other parts of the Family Code, the best interests of children are often paramount, but in the Juvenile Justice Code, the best interests of children who engage in serious and repeated delinquent conduct are superseded to the extent they conflict
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committing a juvenile to the TJJD “when a delinquent juvenile has engaged in some type of violent activity that makes the juvenile potentially dangerous to the public.” K.H., 682 S.W.3d at 576; In re B.R., No. 02-19-00328-CV, 2020 WL 3969556, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, no pet.) . . . .
R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *4–5; see also J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *7–8 (quoting from R.R. for the “law applicable to a modification of a juvenile disposition”).
3. M.B.’s Argument That He is Entitled to a Separate Legal Sufficiency Review of the Three Retaliation Offenses
In his brief, M.B. complains only about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. As to those findings, M.B. acknowledges that there is a “line of cases that hold that the State’s proof of any of the alleged violations of probation is sufficient to support a revocation of probation.” But he nevertheless argues that we should reject that line of cases and conduct “a separate legal sufficiency review of the three felony retaliation charges due to their potential adverse consequences to his commitment to the [TJJD] and the implication to his future criminal history.” To support that proposition, M.B. cites a case involving the termination of parental rights, In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019).
In N.G., the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether an appellate court must independently review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of parental rights under Family Code Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) even when
with public safety.” In re R.S., No. 02-22-00165-CV, 2022 WL 17494602, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 8, 2022, no pet.) (citing J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633).
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termination could be upheld on other, unchallenged grounds. See id. at 232–37. The supreme court explained that a finding under Subsections (D) or (E) carries significant collateral consequences because it may serve as a basis for terminating a parent’s rights to other children in future proceedings under Subsection (M). Id. at 234 (discussing Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M)). Because of those collateral consequences, the supreme court held that due process requires that appellate courts review such findings when challenged, even if other predicate grounds independently support termination, to ensure that the parent receives a meaningful opportunity to contest findings that may have lasting effects beyond the present case. Id. at 235–37.
We find N.G. distinguishable. In that unique context involving the termination of parental rights, there was a specific statutory basis that allowed for serious potential adverse consequences based on a finding under Subsections (D) or (E). Here, in contrast, there is no statutory equivalent by which M.B. could suffer future adverse consequences based on the trial court’s findings that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation.7 Moreover, we remind M.B. that the trial court’s judgment modifying disposition did not actually adjudicate him guilty of the retaliation offenses. See J.K.A. v. State, 855 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (“In sum[,] we find that neither the judgment/order modifying disposition nor the order revoking probation adjudicates J.K.A. guilty of any new
7 Without citing any authority, M.B. argues, “It cannot be denied that a finding of felony retaliation under the [P]enal [C]ode is as serious, or possibly more consequential, than an endangerment finding under the Texas Family Code.”
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delinquent conduct other than violation of a reasonable and lawful court order, i.e., a breach of a rule of probation of the prior disposition order.”).
M.B. has cited no authority—other than the inapposite N.G.—for his proposition that we should conduct a separate legal sufficiency review of the trial court’s findings with respect to the retaliation offenses even though the trial court’s modification decision could have been based on his other probation violations. And we have found no authority to support that position. To the contrary, Texas courts have consistently held that the violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s order modifying a juvenile’s disposition. See, e.g., In re Q.W., Nos. 01-24-00859-CV, 01-24-00860-CV, 2026 WL 1025759, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2026, no pet.); R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *4; In re L.M.P., No. 07-23-00104-CV, 2023 WL 5663092, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.); In re W.B.G., 598 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.); In re A.S., No. 05-13-01022-CV, 2013 WL 6405489, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2013, no pet.); In re P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). We thus reject M.B.’s argument that he is entitled to a separate legal sufficiency review of the trial court’s findings with respect to the retaliation offenses.
4. The Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Findings That M.B.
Violated the Terms and Conditions of His Probation
Notwithstanding his argument that he is entitled to a separate legal sufficiency review of the trial court’s findings with respect to the retaliation offenses, M.B. also
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suggests that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the November 7, 2025 assault of Hunt, by committing the November 20, 2025 assault of Tucker, and by failing to attend school. We will analyze each of those findings in turn.
a. M.B.’s November 7, 2025 Assault of Hunt A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury; or intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a).
As to the November 7, 2025 assault, Hunt stated that after M.B. taunted him about the recent deaths of his parents, M.B. ran up to him and punched him in the face. The police officer dispatched to the scene testified that M.B. had admitted to hitting Hunt because Hunt had “looked like he wanted to fight.” At the hearing, M.B. acknowledged that he had struck Hunt first, although he maintained that he had hit Hunt in self-defense. Hunt indicated that his face was swollen and red as a result of the assault and that he “ended up having a little black eye.” The officer who responded to the scene observed that Hunt’s right eye was swollen and red, and photographs were admitted into evidence at the hearing depicting Hunt’s injuries.
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Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that M.B. violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the November 7, 2025 assault against Hunt was so weak or contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. While M.B. suggests in his brief that the evidence is factually insufficient because his “belief of a perceived threat by Mr. Hunt and his claim of self[-]defense is just a[s] logical and as fair as a deduction from the evidence presented at trial,” we are mindful that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. See J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; C.C., 2018 WL 1865804, at *3. We are also mindful that it is within the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses, and as such, it is within the trial court’s discretion to believe one witness over another. See In re K.F., No. 04-05-00606-CV, 2006 WL 1624236, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 14, 2006, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually sufficient to support trial court’s finding that juvenile had violated the terms of his probation by assaulting a public servant and noting that trial court was within its discretion to believe the testimony of the public servant rather than the juvenile).
b. M.B.’s November 20, 2025 Assault of Tucker As to the November 20, 2025 assault, Tucker testified that M.B. had “hocked up a bunch of spit” and spat in her face while she was confronting him about hitting
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her son. She maintained that she was “shocked” and “offended” by the spitting incident, stating that M.B. had done it on purpose. Such evidence is sufficient to support a finding of assault. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3); Sanders v. State, 387 S.W.3d 680, 685, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012) (treating appellant’s spitting on police officer as satisfying assault elements of harassment-of-a-public-servant offense), pet. struck, 2013 WL 458100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Whaley v. State, 530 S.W.3d 811, 818 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. dism’d) (citing Sanders for the proposition that spitting can be an assault).
Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that M.B. violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the November 20, 2025 assault against Tucker was so weak or contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. In his brief, M.B. points out that he denied spitting on Tucker, ostensibly arguing that the conflict in the evidence means that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding. But, as noted above, a trial court determines the credibility of witnesses and does not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. See J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *6; C.C., 2018 WL 1865804, at *3; K.F., 2006 WL 1624236, at *2.
c. M.B.’s Failure to Attend School As to the trial court’s finding that M.B. had violated the terms and conditions
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of his probation by failing to attend school, M.B.’s probation officer testified that M.B. “had missed several days of school,” that he “had numerous tardies” and “full- day absences,” and that he had been sent to an alternative education program because of those issues. The evidence reflects that while at the alternative education program, M.B. “would just come to class and sleep and not participate and do the work.” M.B. acknowledged that he had issues with his school attendance, and he admitted at the hearing that he had violated the condition of probation requiring that he attend school.
Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that M.B. violated the terms and conditions of his probation by failing to attend school was so weak or contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823.
d. Sufficiency Conclusion As detailed above, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that M.B. violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the November 7, 2025 assault against Hunt, by committing the November 20, 2025 assault against Tucker, and by failing to attend school. Any one of those violations is sufficient to support the trial court’s order modifying M.B.’s disposition. See, e.g., Q.W., 2026 WL 1025759, at *3; R.R., 2025 WL 421222, at *4; L.M.P., 2023 WL 5663092, at *1; W.B.G., 598 S.W.3d at 372; A.S., 2013 WL 6405489, at *4; P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d at 373. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
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committing M.B. to the TJJD. See J.J., 2026 WL 1839080, at *7; C.C., 2018 WL 1865804, at *3. And because we have rejected M.B.’s complaints as to those findings, we need not address his complaint that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings relating to the alleged retaliation offenses. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We overrule M.B.’s first point.
B. M.B.’s Complaint Regarding the Trial Court’s Alleged Denial of a Psychological Evaluation
In his second point, M.B. argues that the trial court erred by denying him the benefit of a psychological evaluation and that the trial court’s alleged denial violated his right to due process by depriving him of a fair opportunity to present his case. The State counters that M.B. has failed to preserve this complaint. We agree with the State.
1. The Law Regarding Preservation To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350–51 (Tex. 2003) (noting that because juvenile-delinquency cases are “quasi-criminal,” the criminal preservation rules apply). Further, the party must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
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While no “hyper-technical or formalistic use of words or phrases” is required for an objection to preserve error, the objecting party must still “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and . . . do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Moreover, the complaint made on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the trial court or the error is forfeited. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464. To determine whether the complaint on appeal comports to the one made at trial, we consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties’ shared understanding at that time. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464.
Due-process complaints—like the one M.B. makes here—are subject to preservation in the trial court. In re J.P., No. 02-24-00313-CV, 2025 WL 647336, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.); In re I.V., No. 07-23-00410-CV, 2024 WL 3528683, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 24, 2024, pet. denied); see In re I.N.A., No. 03-22-00206-CV, 2022 WL 4830785, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 4, 2022, no pet.) (“Due-process complaints in juvenile proceedings are subject to the general error[-]preservation rules.”). The failure to preserve a due-process complaint results in forfeiture of the complaint. J.P., 2025 WL 647336, at *3. Indeed, the “right to present a defense is subject to forfeiture.” Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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2. Preservation Analysis M.B.’s brief addresses the preservation of his second point in a single sentence:
“Since there was a request for a psychological made to the trial court[,] waiver of this claim is not an issue.” As evidence that he requested a psychological evaluation, M.B. points to certain testimony from Miller, his probation officer. At the hearing on the motion to modify, Miller testified that M.B. had never been sent to a placement facility. When asked why such a placement option was not appropriate for M.B., Miller stated, “It could have been a possibility, but [the trial court] was approached for a psychological evaluation order and it was denied.” Miller then said that a psychological evaluation was required for such placement.
While Miller’s scant testimony on the issue referenced that the trial court was “approached for a psychological evaluation” and that the trial court denied such an evaluation, the record does not contain any request or motion made by M.B. through which he sought a psychological evaluation. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d at 822. Nor does the record contain any order made by the trial court regarding such a request or a motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 223. Without seeing the substance of the request or motion seeking the psychological evaluation, we are left to guess as to what exactly was requested of the trial court and why it was requested. And without viewing the substance of the order denying same, we are further left to speculate as to what exactly was denied by the trial court and why it was denied.
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In addition, M.B. did not complain in the trial court—at the hearing on the motion to modify or otherwise—that the court’s alleged denial of his request for a psychological evaluation violated his right to due process or deprived him of a fair opportunity to present his case. Because he did not clearly raise the complaint he now makes on appeal in the trial court at the time when the court was in a position to do something about it, we hold that M.B. has failed to preserve his second point. See Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464; In re D.A., No. 02-25-00566-CV, 2026 WL 1041638, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2026, pet. denied) (holding that appellant failed to preserve her due-process complaint regarding trial court’s alleged denial of request for a psychological evaluation when, despite there being testimony from appellant’s probation officer that “a ‘psychological’ had been requested and denied,” there was nothing in the appellate record to indicate that appellant had complained to the trial court about that alleged denial).
We overrule M.B.’s second point.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled M.B.’s two points, we affirm the trial court’s “Judgment on Motion to Modify Disposition” and “Order of Commitment.”
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Delivered: August 27, 2026