In the Interest of: M.B. Appeal of: N.C.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.C., MOTHER No. 899 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Dated February 18, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No.: CP-51-DP-0000358-2014
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J. MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
At a dependency hearing held on February 18, 2014, the juvenile court heard testimony that established the following facts. Child lived with Mother at home in Philadelphia. At the time of the dependency hearing, Child was fifteen years old and in the ninth grade. Notes of Testimony 3, 6. Child graduated at the top of his eighth grade class and earned a scholarship to a private school. Id. at 20. Although Child has exhibited a set of specific needs, he does not have an Individualized Education Plan. Id. at 11. Mother placed Child at the Horsham Clinic in 2011 because he had been threatening people at school. Id. at 18-19
during which he was transported from home to the Clinic each day. Id. at after
Id. at 18-19.
Child had set other fires. Onc entered the kitchen, set fire to a pencil, threw the pencil in the trash, and
awoke to find the kitchen on fire. Id. at 19.
Mother told DHS social worker Aliya Williams that, discharge from Horsham, she had provider about referrals for therapy but did not receive any recommendations. Id. at 4-5. Child was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and ADHD, and was prescribed Risperdal and Concerta. Id. at 22. Child refused to attend therapy sessions and refused to take his medications after his release from Horsham. Id. at 4, 14. Mother testified that she occasionally would force Child to take his medicine. Id. at 21. Other times, he would Id. at 22. Mother said that she took Child to see his family physician every three months, and that Child was in therapy at one point but was uncooperative. Id. at 21, 24. Mother testified that she has not enrolled Child in any mental health treatment since he left Horsham in 2011. Id. at 23.
In November 2013, when Child was fourteen years old, he was involved in a disagreement with Mother and said that he was afraid to return home. According to Child, he failed to complete some chores, and believed
that Mother would discipline him severely. In order to defuse the tension between Mother and Child, Child stayed with his grandmother before Id. at 4.
DHS requested an order of protective custody for Child on February 7, 2014. DHS alleged that Child had reported on several occasions that he was afraid to go home to Mother. DHS also alleged that Mother used verbal and physical discipline when Child failed to follow her rules; that Child appeared to have untreated mental health issues; and that Mother was unable to control Child. Application for Order of Protective Custody, 2/7/2014. Social Worker Williams testified that both Mother and Child requested that Child be
relationship. N.T. at 5.
Mother explained to DHS that, although the two have not had a physical altercation, Child has made movements that Mother perceived as physically threatening. Id. at 5-6. Mother stated that Child also comes and Id. at
6. Mother testified that she fears being at home with Child, who, Mother says, will set a fire or destroy furniture in the home if he does not get his way. Id. at 17-18. Mother also testified that she does not sleep when Child is in her home. Id. at 18. February 7, 2014, and placed him in a treatment foster home. Id. at 3, 5.
The juvenile court held a hearing on the dependency petition on February 18, 2014. DHS social worker Aliya Williams and Mother testified at
the hearing. The parties agreed that Child was a dependent child and also agreed . However, there was no agreement as to the basis for the adjudication of dependency. N.T. at 3. DHS argued that Child was dependent upon the bases that Child lacked proper parental care and control and that Child was incorrigible. Id. at 16-17 ounsel argued that Child was dependent based solely upon his own incorrigibility. Id. at 26-28. The juvenile court found that Child was dependent upon both bases. Id. at 31.
The juvenile court entered its order adjudicating Child dependent and committing him to DHS on February 18, 2014. On March 19, 2014, Mother filed her notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
Mother presents the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in adjudicating the subject minor dependent under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1) and finding that said minor lacked proper parental care and control proven by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Whether the trial court erred by not specifying, as required by rules 1408 and 1409 of the PA Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, which specific averments in the petition were proved by clear and convincing evidence (Rule 1408) and by failing to include in the Order adjudicating the subject minor dependent, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1), the specific factual s decision was based (Rule 1409(C)(1)(a), (b)).
(minor modifications to citations, order of issues reversed for ease of disposition).
Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency cases as follows:
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
We note at the outset that no party has appealed the juvenile determination that Child is dependent based upon incorrigibility. However,
proper parental care and control is not moot.
As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. . . . An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect. . . . Nevertheless, this Court will decide questions that otherwise have been rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the trial court.
In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted, emphasis added). In prior cases, we have held that, because there can be collateral consequences to a finding of dependency, it is excepted from the mootness doctrine. See In re L.Z., 91 A.3d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reaching merits of challenge to finding that mother perpetrated child abuse
despit In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding case not moot even though dependency resolved during pendency of appeal because mother could suffer a detriment in future dealing with child protective agency). Here, because Mother would suffer a detriment in future dealings with DHS or in other proceedings regarding Child due to the finding of lack of proper parental care or control, the issue is not moot.
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