IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1364 Filed December 3, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF M.A., Minor Child,
S.A., Father, Appellant,
M.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant father.
Cole J. Mayer of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Emily Drenkow Carr of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and
Ahlers, JJ. 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
A mother and father each appeal from the order terminating their parental
rights to M.A., born in 2017. On her end, the mother, M.M., does not contest that
the State proved the grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f) (2025).1 Instead, she argues the child would be best served
if the juvenile court allowed the mother an additional six months to prepare for the
child’s return to the mother, or, as an alternative, that a guardianship be put in
place.2 She also urges that it is not in the child’s best interests to terminate her
parental rights.
The father, S.A., who lives out of state and has never met the child in
person, appeals asserting the State did not prove the fourth element under
section 232.116(1)(f)—that the child could not be placed in the custody of the
father at the time of the termination hearing. He also contends that a six-month
1 Under this section, the State must prove that all of these four grounds have
occurred: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. 2 The mother mentions a guardianship option in her appellate brief but did not
request that option in the proceedings below, and she failed to develop any argument about that option in her appellate brief, including who would be the guardian. We do not address her guardianship argument because that claim was neither raised nor decided in the juvenile court proceedings. See In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (noting issues must be presented to and ruled upon by the court to preserve error for appeal.). 3
extension would have provided “time to rectify any potential concerns.” Finally, he
argues it is not in the child’s best interests to terminate his rights. Both parents
appeal.
On our de novo review, we find that the State met its burden to show the
grounds for termination of parental rights for both the mother and the father and
that neither parent met the burden to prove an exception to termination. We also
find it is in the child’s best interests to terminate her parents’ rights and move
toward permanency. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In March 2024, the family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) when concerns arose over the child’s
allegations that she had been sexually abused by her older brother and that the
mother was not addressing the child’s resulting issues. Although the abuse had
been going on for years and the mother knew about it, she did nothing to stop it
and, even worse, allowed the older brother to continue as a caretaker of the child.3
Finally, as others became aware, she took the child to the hospital and child
protective services became involved. HHS sought removal of the child from
parental custody to a foster family, which was accomplished through a temporary
order on May 2, 2024. The child was placed in the temporary legal custody of HHS
in June. The child has remained in foster care since that time.
3 The juvenile court found in the termination order that there was clear and convincing evidence that the child was sexually abused multiple times by her brother. 4
Once involved with the family, HHS also became concerned about the
mother’s failure to support the child’s mental-health needs and the mother locking
the child in her bedroom from the outside of the door. When raising these
behaviors, the mother became defiant with HHS; discounting the actions and the
child’s allegations. Two founded child abuse reports related to the mother cited
denial of critical care and failure to provide adequate supervision by the mother
and a safety plan was put in place. The child was adjudicated a child in need of
assistance (CINA) on June 28.
The mother was offered services and ordered to provide a psychosocial
evaluation, including an intellectual assessment. HHS noted she had struggled
with caring for the child even before HHS’s involvement, so HHS offered a parent
partner referral and various classes. And although the mother believed the child
suffered from a number of psychological and other disorders,4 in February 2021,
after the three-year-old child was evaluated by a psychologist, the report noted
that the mother was “invested” in the child being disabled and the child did not
have the conditions the mother had described. The only confirmed diagnoses for
the child were ADHD and prenatal drug exposure. Yet, before and during the case
proceedings, the mother did not engage in any disability and developmental
services for the child, and she stopped the child’s medications without medical
guidance.
The mother also reported that the child was aggressive and would try to
wander away from the home, so she installed locks on the outside of the child’s
4 The mother reported that the child had been diagnosed with ADHD, autism,
bipolar disorder, and may be schizophrenic when she gets older. 5
bedroom door. The child reported that she would be locked in her room until her
mother and her boyfriend woke up. Apparently, this had been going on as early
as 2021.
The mother was diagnosed with many disorders, including depression,
panic attacks, and post-traumatic stress disorder, but she had stopped taking her
prescribed medications years before the proceedings here. To her credit, she had
attended therapy since 2022, but she was discharged from seeing that particular
therapist in June 2024 for missing appointments. In August, the mother was
evaluated, and it was recommended that she engage in therapy and other services
to address anxiety, self-esteem, healthy relationships, and parenting skill
development. Therapy did not resume until end of January 2025. The mother
began seeing a new therapist in May, but the mother had only four appointments
with that therapist before the termination hearing.
Turning to the father, he has been twice imprisoned since the child was born
and currently is on parole.5 At the time of the termination trial, the father had been
unemployed for less than a week and was living in Arkansas with his girlfriend. He
started contact with the child after the child was removed to foster care in May
2024 and has maintained regular phone and video contact. The father blamed the
mother for his lack of contact before HHS involvement, but as noted, he has never
been with the child in person and never acted as a caretaker. When proceedings
began, the father was living in a place with conditions described as deplorable, but
5 The father testified that he has been in prison two different times; the last imprisonment was for nine months, but because of his stated memory problems, he was not clear about the specific dates. 6
he claimed to have secured a two-bedroom RV. The father had no driver’s license
and was not able to utilize the fuel card HHS provided to come to Iowa for any in
person visitation with the child.
The State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights, and the juvenile court
ultimately held a termination trial over three days in July. The juvenile court
terminated both the mother’s and father’s parental rights, and they separately
appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
“We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839,
843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). “We will uphold an order terminating parental
rights where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for
termination.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). “Evidence is
clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. “Our primary
concern is the best interests of the child.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798
(Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
We apply a three-step analysis when reviewing the juvenile court’s decision
to terminate parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for termination
is satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by termination, and (3) a
permissive exception applies and should be exercised to preclude termination.
See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)–(3). We address each parent’s appeal separately. 7
A. Mother’s Appeal. The mother concedes that the State proved the
grounds required to terminate her parental rights. See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854
N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party has failed to present any
substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been waived.”).
Instead, she emphasizes the efforts she has made over the course of these
proceedings to improve her parenting deficiencies and requests additional time to
show she can “implement what she has learned to be reunified.” The mother
contends that HHS was seeking perfection from her, not minimal adequacy. She
asserts the child’s best interests would be served by a six-month extension so she
can reunite with the child. She also points to her strong bond with the child as a
compelling reason to apply a permissive exception under section 232.116(3).
1. Best interests. We take up the mother’s argument that it was not in the
best interests of the child to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2); see also In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)
(“Even if a statutory ground for termination is met, a decision to terminate must still
be in the best interests of a child after a review of section 232.116(2).”). We “give
primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). This
question would be made easier if there were a clear path toward a permanent
home for this child.6 See id. § 232.116(2)(b) (allowing the court to consider
“whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into
6 The current foster family is not an adoption option, but HHS was exploring another family who knew the child. 8
the foster family” when considering best interests). Here, HHS has not yet
identified a family willing to adopt. Even so, we are required to address the
section 232.116(2) factors to address what is in the child’s best interests as it
relates to this mother-child relationship. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40–41
(Iowa 2010).
“We hold no crystal ball, and to some extent, the [best-interests]
determination must be made based upon past conduct.” In re M.M., No. 16-1685,
2016 WL 7395788, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). Turning to considerations
involving the child’s long-term needs, several concerns impact our decision. First,
the mother looked the other way while the young child was being sexually abused
by an older sibling over a period of years. As noted in the HHS termination report
to the juvenile court:
Family preservation services were put in place from 4/4/24 until 5/2/24. Multiple concerns were reported during family preservation on [the mother’s] parenting and accountability. Often, [the mother] would appear to defend [the older brother] and state he needs help and an attorney. [The mother] did not believe the sex abuse happened until after the investigation was complete. [The mother] reported to [Family Centered Services] that she informed neighbors and other strangers that her daughter had been sexually abused by her brother.
Yet, despite these findings, the mother had not pursued any treatment or therapy
for the child and had not during the proceedings addressed her own lack of
engagement. And although the child had been in therapy during these
proceedings, it was not until late in the process that the mother even reached out
to the child’s therapist for an update.
Even shortly before the termination trial in July, the mother’s new therapist
reported to the HHS social worker that “[the mother] mentioned the concerns 9
related to this case, but she feels very justified in her actions and there has been
little progress addressing the concerns” as she primarily wanted to discuss the
remodel of her trailer. And as to her insight, at the termination trial, the mother
failed to understand the reasons for the proceedings, testifying that the only reason
was the locking of the child in the bedroom. As for the sexual abuse, the mother
minimized the abuse by justifying her lack of response as “brothers and sisters . . .
play[ing] around” and that the child had only told her that the siblings had “kissed.”
Second, as for the safety issue involving the bedroom, HHS summarized in
its termination report, the following:
The Department is concerned with [the mother’s] parenting capabilities. [The mother] locked [the child] in her bedroom. [The child] was unable to get out. Prior to removal, [the mother] had a makeshift toilet in [the child’s] bedroom and stated this was due to [the child] not being able to make it to the bathroom on time. [The child’s] bedroom was directly next to the bathroom. [The mother] had been redirected on multiple occasions she was asked to remove the lock on the door and toilet and did not. [The mother] eventually removed the lock but not the toilet. [The child’s] bedroom had writing all over the walls, had minimal items in it, and often the bed would be flipped over or missing sheets and blankets.
Third, the juvenile court also noted various examples where the mother’s
conversations were inappropriate and caused the child stress: (1) saying that the
mother was dying of cancer, although not true; (2) saying the father killed someone
in Arkansas, although not proven; and (3) saying that children in the area were all
dying from a virus, again not true. The foster parents reported that these
conversations caused the child to be stressed and, in some cases, to act out.
In sum, the evidence does not show that the mother has the insight to
recognize her parenting deficiencies and has not acted on the services that HHS
offered to develop that insight. Once the child was placed in foster care, her school 10
teacher reported that she saw an immediate change for the better in the child. The
child has since been enrolled in special education with additional educational aid
to address her educational delays. All of which went to the concern that the mother
was not able to understand or take action to meet the child’s needs. Likewise, the
child has now been able to participate in therapy and has been safe and secure
with the foster family.
Given that history, we find that termination of the mother’s rights is in the
child’s best interests.
2. Six-month extension. Because the foster family is not available to adopt,
the mother argues that the six-month extension will be unintrusive for the child
especially because the mother has shown “substantial growth” and “insight.” The
mother emphasizes that it is important that she has acknowledged that her
previous actions were harmful to the child. She points to her participation in the
services offered, including counseling. On top of that, the mother emphasizes how
hard she has worked on improving the trailer she purchased so the child can have
appropriate living conditions. We applaud the work the mother has done, but we
also must look at what still needs to be accomplished to provide a safe, stable, and
permanent home. And, as noted above, the mother overstates her progress.
Examining the mother’s late efforts to engage in services, the juvenile court noted
that there was “no way to know how much change [the mother] is able and willing
to make.”
To extend the statutory time guidelines, the court must “enumerate the
specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the
basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child . . . will no longer 11
exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).
On this request, the juvenile court was “unable to conclude that change could be
made within the next six months that would allow for [the child] to return to the
custody of [the mother].” We agree.
3. Exception to termination under section 232.116(3). On the mother’s final
challenge, we note that the case worker testified that the child and mother “have a
good bond.” Yet, the child’s therapist opined that the child’s “level of attachment
to anyone in general is difficult to discern, but certainly a termination of rights would
be difficult for [the child].” So, the mother asserts that she has established “that
there is clear and convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” “The factors weighing
against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory, and the
court may use its discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and
the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save
the parent-child relationship.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014)
(cleaned up).
“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an
exception to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). While the
mother and child have a good relationship, we must look at the amount of time that
the child has spent out of the mother’s care and how much growth and stability the
child has gained outside of that relationship. That weighs against the strength-of-
the-bond argument. And in other cases, we rejected an extension of time “in part
because of all the uncertainty caused by [the parent’s] only recent progress and
the court’s inability to confirm her progress.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa 12
Ct. App. 2005). While the child has a good relationship and looks forward to seeing
the mother, there have been occasions where the child’s behavior deteriorated
because of the mother’s actions and statements. Thus, the mother has not met
her burden to prove that a permissive exception to the termination of her rights
should be applied.
B. Father’s Appeal. The father argues that “the only concern” of HHS was
his living situation and that because he has corrected that issue and has a suitable,
stable, and safe home, his parental rights should not have been terminated. He
points to the testimony of the HHS social worker that there were no concerns with
the interaction between him and the child on the video calls. He contends the
mother’s actions are what placed this situation under the eye of HHS.
1. Statutory grounds for termination. The father asserts that the State failed
to prove termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) by clear and
convincing evidence. Pursuant to this section a juvenile court may terminate
parental rights when the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at
the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4). “It is well-
settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved
a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.M., 843
N.W.2d at 112 (citation omitted). At the time of the termination hearing, although
the father had shown commitment to maintaining contact with the child once the
foster care placement was made, he had never met the child in person, let alone
assumed any parental responsibilities. He was offered fuel cards to make the trip
from Arkansas to Iowa, but he did not have a driver’s license and claimed not to 13
know anyone with a reliable vehicle who could drive him. Thus, he had no proven
record that he was in a place or had the skills to have a child he had never met in
person transition to his care. While video calls are essential to stay in contact, the
skills associated with good parenting involve more than talking over the phone or
computer. “[P]arental responsibilities include more than subjectively maintaining
an interest in a child. The concept requires affirmative parenting to the extent it is
practical and feasible in the circumstances.” In re Goettsche, 311 N.W.2d 104,
106 (Iowa 1981). The father has not shown that level of involvement from the
child’s birth forward.
Yet, the father complains his home state failed to complete an Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study, after he corrected
some of the previous deficiencies centered around his housing. He asserts that
he was ready and able to provide care for the child, which the home study results
should have supported. But the ICPC home study is done to assure the juvenile
court that the out-of-state parent has adequate parenting skills along with stable
and safe housing for the family. Here, the father submitted to three ICPC home
studies in Arkansas and was rejected three times. An early ICPC report reflected
“deplorable conditions” with the father’s living arrangement, and that the child could
not live there. His probation officer told the ICPC coordinator that he felt “strongly”
that the father could not care for the child for a number of reasons. He told the
HHS social worker that the father had “hygiene” issues as well and that the father
was “constantly having law enforcement come out for fights with his neighbors.”
A third attempt to obtain a passing home study was initiated in early
June 2025. Because the father maintained he alleviated the housing concerns, 14
the coordinator did conduct a home inspection of the RV where the father now
lived, noting he now had “working electric and running water.” But, that same
month, the coordinator could not reach the father for an interview, even though the
coordinator contacted the father’s girlfriend by email, who confirmed she would
have the father contact the coordinator. After the father made no effort to contact
the ICPC coordinator, on July 14, 2025, the coordinator reported that “due to failure
to comply, this request [for a home study] has been denied.”
On our de novo review, we find that the State presented clear and
convincing evidence to show that the child could not, for the first time, be
transferred to the custody of the father at the time of the termination trial.
2. Best interests. Next, the father argues the juvenile court failed to give
reasons why termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (“Even after we have determined that
statutory grounds for termination exist, we must still determine whether termination
is in the children’s best interests.”). After a termination trial, the juvenile court may
decide not to terminate parental rights if it finds there is clear and convincing
evidence that CINA proceedings should continue. It can then enter an order to
extend the time for reunification in accordance with Iowa Code
sections 232.104(2)(b) and 232.117(5).
The father argues that although he has not been present in person with the
child, the online visits go well and he has established a “true bond” with the child.
The relationship has only recently been developed. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41
(“We do not find a closeness of the parent-child relationship. Father and daughter
were just getting to know each other.”). Arguing he lives out of state, he claims he 15
was never given an opportunity to serve in a caretaker role with the child. But as
the juvenile court noted, there is no evidence that the father can meet the factors
that frame our best-interests decision: protecting the child’s safety and meeting the
physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child. “In deciding whether to
terminate parental rights based on a particular ground, we must give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering the long-term
nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and emotional condition
and needs of the child.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned
up). Here, the best interests of the child require a placement that can be safe,
stable, and permanent. The father has not established the track record for that
role given his limited contact with the child and inability to get past a home study.
3. Additional time. As a final contention, the father argues he should be
given additional time to reunite with the child. After a termination trial, the juvenile
court may decide not to terminate parental rights if it finds there is clear and
convincing evidence that CINA proceedings should continue. It can then enter an
order to extend the time for reunification in accordance with section 232.104(2)(b).
The court may continue the proceedings for an additional six months if it finds “the
need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month
period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). On this record, we have no assurance that
circumstances will be any different after a six-month extension and so we deny the
father’s request for more time. 16
IV. Conclusion.
For all the reasons set out above, we affirm the juvenile court’s decisions
terminating the mother’s and father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.