In the Interest of M.A.-L., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: 25-0737
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0737 Filed August 20, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.-L., Minor Child,

K.L., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Scott Strait,

Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Katie E. Johnson of Katie Johnson Law, Council Bluffs, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Maura C. Goaley, Council Bluffs, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father to

a child born in 2023. Only the father appeals. He challenges the statutory grounds

authorizing termination.1

We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973

N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a three-step process to determine

if a statutory ground for termination has been established, whether termination is

in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive exceptions should be

applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021).

However, we do not address any step that is not challenged on appeal. See In re

P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). As the father only challenges the statutory

grounds, we limit our review in kind. See id.

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights on three grounds—

those set forth in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h) (2025). When the

juvenile court terminates parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, we may

affirm based on any ground supported by the record. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764,

774 (Iowa 2012). We choose to focus on section 232.116(1)(h), which permits

termination upon clear and convincing evidence that: (1) “[t]he child is three years

of age or younger”; (2) “[t]he child has been adjudicated a child in need of

assistance”; (3) “[t]he child has been removed from the physical custody of the

1 The father makes passing reference to the child’s best interests and potential

permissive exceptions to termination. But he develops no argument regarding best interests or permissive exceptions for us to review. As we cannot take on an advocacy role and develop these issues for the father, we deem them waived. See In re N.J., No. 24-1679, 2025 WL 548207, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025). 3

child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months”; and (4) “the child

cannot be returned to the custody of the [parent] . . . at the present time.”

The father only challenges the fourth element, whether the child could be

safely returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa

Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting

the statutory phrase “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination

hearing). He contends that safe reunification could have occurred because he has

demonstrated appropriate conduct during visits with the child and he has housing.

But more is required of him before safe reunification could occur.

This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services in February 2024 when it received a hotline tip that the parents

were caring for the child while under the influence of unknown substances. The

child reportedly fell to the ground while the mother was feeding the child, and

neither parent was aware because they had fallen asleep. At that time, the father

was observed to have constricted pupils and had difficulty focusing and walking

straight. He also could not hold a conversation. The child was removed from the

father’s custody.

In April, the social worker received a report that the parents appeared under

the influence of drugs during a supervised visit that occurred in the parents’ home.

When the worker investigated, the parents were slurring their words and sleepy as

she tried to communicate with them, prompting the worker to modify visitation.

Yet the father only minimally participated in services designed to access

and address his illicit substance use and improve his parenting. He consistently

failed to attend drug testing, missing thirteen of sixteen drug testing opportunities 4

over the life of this case.2 The father only completed three portions of a six-part

“Parenting 101” course and did not complete course homework. He did not

complete updated substance-use and mental-health evaluations as ordered by the

juvenile court. His last contact with the social worker occurred about six months

before the termination trial. The worker explained at the trial that she has no idea

“what is going on with him at all” because the father did not communicate with her

and had not provided her with his phone number. The father’s attorney informed

the juvenile court that he had no communication with the father between

August 2024 and the evening before the March 2025 termination trial, despite the

attorney’s attempts to contact the father through multiple phone numbers and by

email. The father also failed to attend multiple court hearings, including the

termination trial.

Given the father’s general lack of participation in services to address

legitimate concerns about his ability to parent, the State proved by clear and

convincing evidence that it was not safe to return custody of the child to the father

at the time of the termination hearing. As a result, the State established a statutory

ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(h). We affirm the juvenile court’s

decision to terminate the father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

2 Of the three testing opportunities to which the father availed himself, two tests

came back positive for methadone and one test came back negative.