In the Interest of M.A. Jr and N.A., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion filed August 13, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-26-00054-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF M.A. JR. AND N.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11684-CX

OPINION

It has been said that because the termination of one’s parental rights permanently extinguishes fundamental rights of a constitutional dimension, it is thus akin to the “‘death penalty’ of civil cases.” See In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d 370, 373, 381 (Tex. 2023) (quoting In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex. 2021)). In this accelerated appeal, the mother and the father of M.A. Jr. and N.A,1 challenge the trial court’s order that terminated their rights to them.

1 To protect the identities of the children and the children’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).

In two issues, the mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest; and (2) a continuing danger exists that prevents the return of the children to her, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to return the children to her prior to the commencement of the final hearing; she further raises a challenge to the specificity of the trial court’s order regarding those efforts. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2), (f), (g) (West Supp. 2025).

The father presents three issues in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to him prior to the commencement of the final hearing; and like the mother, he also raises a challenge to the specificity of the trial court’s order regarding those efforts; (2) he endangered the children under subsections (D) and (E) of the Family Code; and (3) termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2), (f).

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, and we reverse and remand in part.

I. Termination Findings and Standards As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated, “[s]undering ties between parent and child ‘can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.’” In re J.Z.A., No. 25-0787, 2026 WL 1838580, at *1 (Tex. June 26, 2026) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). Because of this, to terminate one’s parental rights, the Department must “clear[] a high bar.” In re K.N., No. 24- 0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24- 0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (re-emphasizing that terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be exercised only in the absence of other

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legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))).

The controlling standard requires that, to support termination, the Department present clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). This heightened standard “is unforgiving” and “the government may not sever the legal ties between parents and children without clearing [this] high bar.” K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *6–7. In that regard, “[a] lack of evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence.” See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 2012); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).

In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that each parent: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial court further found that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a

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reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding,’” and that the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (first quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); and then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.

In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied).

With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). Nevertheless, courts may use and rely on the nonexhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by

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these individuals or by the agency or person seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse offered for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.

To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *9 (Although the heightened standard of appellate review applies to both the grounds for termination and the best interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [subsection] (b)(2).”).

The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).

In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384

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(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

II. Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial The Department initiated contact with the mother and father in August 2024 because of the father’s reported drug use and the mother’s mental health issues— specifically, that the mother had attempted suicide the previous month and told the father that she and the children were going to die. The parents had separated because, according to the mother, the father “was leaving [her] for [her] friend.” At that time, M.A. Jr. was almost nine, and N.A. was almost seven.

When the Department Investigator, Christina Burrow, spoke to the father, “[h]e did not feel [the mother] was safe at the time due to her mental health,” but he suggested that the mother’s text messages “were taken out of context.” The father clarified that the mother said, “she and the children may die because there wasn’t food in the home, but he believed there to be food in the home.” The father also disclosed that he used cocaine in July 2024. Burrow then contacted the mother, who confirmed that she had attempted suicide, continued to experience suicidal ideations, and used marihuana daily.

Both parents refused to sign a safety plan. Nevertheless, the Department placed the children with the father based on his assurance that he would prohibit the

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children’s unsupervised contact with the mother. The mother successfully completed the inpatient mental health program at Oceans Behavioral Hospital in Abilene and was discharged on September 13, 2024. According to Burrow, the mother was taking her prescribed medications, and her mental health appeared to be more stable. The mother began living at the Noah Project, a shelter for victims of family violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking, which Burrow believed to be a safe and stable environment. Burrow learned on September 16 that the children were staying with the mother at the Noah Project—evidently, the father had relinquished them to her care because he was using methamphetamine.

Burrow then petitioned the trial court to order the mother and father to participate in family-based safety services 2 to avoid the children’s removal, which included drug testing. In November 2024, the children tested negative for all illegal substances, but the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marihuana. The father’s urinalysis (UA) was negative for illegal substances, but his hair follicle drug test was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. When the Department again attempted to implement a safety plan, the parents could not provide the name of an approved adult to serve as a safety monitor or Parental Child Safety Placement. See FAM. §§ 264.901(2), .902. On November 19, 2024, five days before N.A.’s seventh birthday, the Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children. The children spent two days in a shelter before moving to a kinship placement.

The Department created family plans of service for each parent, which the trial court amended and adopted as orders of the court on March 19, 2025. Both

2 “Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family whose children are not in the conservatorship of the Department.” 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE pt. 19 ch. 700 subch. G div. 2 § 710 (2021). The Department’s Child Protective Services Division provides family-based safety services to families and children “to: (1) protect the children from abuse and neglect; (2) help the family reduce the risk of future abuse or neglect; and (3) prevent the removal of the children from their home.” Id.; see also FAM. §§ 262.402–.410 (authorizing and implementing the Family Preservation Services Pilot Program).

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parents engaged in counseling and submitted to drug testing. The father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in January and February 2025. However, in March and April 2025, he submitted UAs that were negative for all illegal substances. The mother tested positive for marihuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and alcohol in March 2025, and positive for benzodiazepines and marihuana in May 2025.

The Department sent a referral for the father’s first substance abuse assessment in April 2025, which he attended on May 1. The following week, he began participating in outpatient substance abuse treatment. The father relapsed following this treatment and tested positive for cocaine in June and August 2025. In July, recognizing that he needed a higher level of care, the father contacted the newly assigned Department caseworker, Ryan Riggs, to request inpatient treatment.

Riggs did not send a substance abuse assessment referral for the father for almost two weeks. Then, because of scheduling difficulties not caused by the father, Riggs had to send another referral for the father, who was ultimately assessed in September. On November 1, after spending months on a waitlist, the father began a forty-three-day residential treatment program, which he successfully completed on December 9, 2025. Although the father’s January 2026 hair follicle drug test was positive for cocaine, his UAs were negative in December 2025, and January and February 2026. The father contacted Riggs within a week of his discharge to resume parent-child visitations, but his first scheduled visit after the completion of his inpatient treatment did not occur until mid-January, a month after he had asked to see his children.

Meanwhile, the mother successfully completed her parenting course and inpatient substance abuse treatment in July 2025 at Serenity House in Abilene. She attended weekly supervised parent-child visitation and counseling with Stacy Reynolds, a licensed chemical dependency counselor whom the mother contacted as

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“a self-referral,” without assistance from the Department. Since her discharge from Serenity House, the mother also met “[a]t least once or twice a week” with Allison Vasquez, her case manager and mental health professional at Betty Hardwick, to monitor her mental health and manage her medications.

After completing residential treatment, the mother’s UAs in July, August, September, and November 2025 were negative for all illegal substances, and the levels of illegal substances from her hair follicle drug tests consistently decreased. Her hair follicle drug test in August was still positive for methamphetamine and marihuana, and, by September, was positive for 0.1 picograms per milligram (pg/mg) of marihuana metabolite.

The trial court held the final termination hearing on three nonconsecutive days—November 12, January 28, and February 9—and Riggs testified at each setting. By the conclusion of the final hearing, M.A. Jr. was ten, and N.A. was eight and they had been living with their relative, A.L., since August 2025. Riggs testified that the children had a good relationship with A.L. and, though the transition was difficult, “they seem[ed] to be doing well in school, and [Riggs] believe[d] that they [were] happy.” A.L. was also willing to adopt the children if the parents’ rights were terminated.

The Department sought to terminate each parent’s parental rights because its ultimate goal was adoption, and “what [the children] want[ed] and need[ed] most of all [was] stability and a home that they [didn’t] have to fear being taken out of again.” A.L. testified that she believed it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the parents’ parental rights “[t]o know that they have a stable home [and] are provided safety, food, shelter, and . . . [were] not bouncing around from home to home.” A.L. discussed the children’s routine, extracurricular activities, and, without further explanation, mentioned that they attend weekly counseling sessions.

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The mother testified during the November hearing, and the father testified during the January 2026 hearing after he had completed residential treatment. Both parents recounted their struggles with addiction—the father’s began in 2019 with weekend cocaine use, and the mother resumed using methamphetamine in January 2024 after seventeen years of sobriety.

Riggs testified that the Department’s “continuing concerns [were] the [mother’s] use of mari[h]uana, the lack of stable income, the -- the non-compliance with parts of her Service Plan and counseling and rehab.” The mother was employed cleaning homes and provided Riggs with a screenshot of a payment she received. Riggs testified that he “wouldn’t consider that to be proof of income or employment,” but he never requested additional verification from the mother, nor did he apprise her of her alleged non-compliance. The father worked, Riggs believed, “for an auto shop and [was] paid in cash but [hadn’t] been able to provide . . . any record of that.”

Reynolds and Vasquez opined that the mother had progressed and would continue to do so. Reynolds observed that the mother was “working through some traumas,” was “able to emotionally regulate,” and was “doing very well.” The mother had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from domestic violence and sexual trauma but had been successful in counseling. Reynolds and the mother intended to continue counseling after the Department’s case was closed. Vasquez had no concerns about the mother’s mental health, and Reynolds reiterated that the mother loved her children, was “[a]bsolutely” committed to maintaining lifelong sobriety, and that her children had been a motivating factor.

Reynolds and Vasquez confirmed that the mother applied for a housing voucher through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and was still on the waitlist at the time of the final hearing. Vasquez explained, “[I]t is a slow process right now because of HUD. . . . [N]ot many places

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are available at the moment, but we are definitely trying to figure that out.” The mother also applied for disability benefits and was employed at Little Caesars in addition to cleaning homes.

The mother tested positive for marihuana in December 2025. In November 2025, the mother was prescribed low-THC cannabis under the Compassionate Use Act to treat her PTSD, chronic pain, and a traumatic brain injury. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 487.001–.256 (West 2017 & Supp. 2025) (Texas Compassionate-Use Act); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 169.001–.006 (West 2022 & Supp. 2025) (Authority to Prescribe Low-THC Cannabis to Certain Patients for Compassionate Use); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE pt. 1 ch. 12 §§ 12.1–.61 (Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Compassionate-Use/Low-THC Cannabis Program). She presented a receipt for cannabis that she purchased on the same website that she accessed to register for the program, which was shipped directly to her at the Noah Project.

Although using prescribed low-THC cannabis is generally prohibited, neither Riggs nor the mother understood this illegality when they discussed her enrollment in the Compassionate-Use Program. See OCC. § 169.001(3), (4). Riggs never told the mother that her legal use of cannabis would be considered a continuing danger, nor that she was prohibited from using it “because [he] didn’t know at the time that that was the law.” On February 3, 2026, the mother was “exited” from the Noah Project after an employee found “paraphernalia” in the mother’s belongings during a random room check. The employee described the “paraphernalia” as an empty container with residue that smelled like marihuana. According to Reynolds, by then the mother had decided that “she was over it” and that she would not continue using her cannabis prescription. Reynolds visited the website that the mother accessed to purchase the cannabis and called it “misleading. . . . [I]t was discussed in court that it was legal” for the mother to enroll in the program, and the website that the mother accessed “was the first site that came up.”

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Riggs acknowledged the importance of speaking to the parents’ service providers to determine whether the parents were making the necessary changes to eliminate any continuing dangers and to provide a safe environment for their children. Yet he had not reviewed the father’s counseling notes because he never requested them. Moreover, he had not spoken to Reynolds since July 2025, and he never contacted Vasquez or anyone else at Betty Hardwick to inquire about the mother’s progress.

Riggs attended one of the mother’s counseling sessions soon after he was assigned to the case but had no subsequent contact with Reynolds. Reynolds, a former Department caseworker, testified that she routinely received and reviewed family plans of service and removal affidavits from caseworkers of parents that she treated. However, neither Reynolds nor Vasquez received any information from the Department, which they said would have been helpful in treating the mother, and “probably beneficial for this family as a whole.”

After every counseling session, Reynolds documented the mother’s progress and her suggestions for the Department to review, uploaded her notes to a portal, and sent them to Riggs. She testified that she receives a notification once the recipient opens the portal to access her notes. Riggs testified that he reviewed Reynolds’s counseling notes prior to the commencement of the final hearing, but “had not received all of them.” He swore in a permanency report and during his initial testimony that he e-mailed Reynolds a request for the mother’s counseling notes. However, upon further questioning, he was unsure of the last time that he had contacted Reynolds, which notes he had previously reviewed, and when he did so. Riggs eventually admitted that he did “not review[] all of the notes that are in the portal” before the final hearing. Reynolds refuted Riggs’s claims and testified that she never received an e-mail request from Riggs, and it was not until after the first day of the final hearing in November that Riggs accessed the portal to open the

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counseling notes she had previously sent. She further revealed that Riggs never contacted her even after he accessed the portal.

Riggs also conceded that he had not fulfilled his obligation to meet in person with each parent at least once a month. Consequently, Riggs was unaware that the mother was still living at the Noah Project in November 2025 and that the father had just begun inpatient treatment. He knew that the mother had applied for housing assistance, but he was unfamiliar with the various HUD programs. He claimed that the mother refused his offer to request Department funds for a deposit, but then recalled that the mother had asked him to send her the paperwork to apply for that funding, which he never sent her.

Riggs did not know where the father was living before his residential treatment began. Even so, Riggs opposed the return of the children to the parents without attempting to assess the safety of each parent’s living environment. He likewise declared that neither parent demonstrated that they had made sufficient behavioral changes to assuage the concerns of a continuing danger to the children. With respect to the mother, Riggs testified:

We believe there is still continuing danger to the children. We don’t see that sufficient behavior change has been made to assure us of the safety of her home. . . . We are wanting to see, you know, continued sobriety. We are wanting to see stability with regard to her ability to provide for the children and the safety of the home.

Riggs then explained the purported continuing danger that prevented the Department’s return of the children to the father:

We believe that [the father] has not yet fully overcome his issues with addiction. We are hopeful that [inpatient treatment,] where he is now[,] will be able to provide that for him. But as of today, we don’t feel like that he has made that -- he has been successful in that yet.

Riggs repeatedly admitted that he failed to communicate consistently with the parents and did not “make every effort that [he] needed to make.” He stated that the

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mother had “been responsive and mostly cooperative,” and that her drug levels had “consistently gone down” since the beginning of the case. He apologized to the mother for his lack of communication and testified that his notes and the reports that he filed with the trial court were “not as accurate as [he] would like them to be.” Riggs also professed that his communication with the father was “not sufficient and less than what was required of [him] as a caseworker.”

Rhea Rodriguez, the executive director at Treehouse Safe Exchange, testified that since the outset of the case, the mother had “been consistent,” was “very happy and positive,” and “[s]eem[ed] to have learned a lot within herself.” Rodriguez attributed the mother’s improvement in her parenting capabilities to her sobriety and participation in services. Visitation supervisor William Hampton, who observed the most interactions between the children and the parents, testified that the mother was “staying clean, and she love[d] to see her boys.” He noticed over time that the mother was “happier,” “ha[d] more energy,” was “attentive,” and brought food for the children rather than relying on the pantry at Treehouse. Hampton described the mother as interactive during her visits with the children, was “aware of . . . their different needs,” and was able to meet those needs. Neither Hampton nor Rodriguez had any concerns regarding the mother’s ability to be an appropriate, safe, and stable parent to the children. Visits between the father and the children had also gone well and there was a strong bond between the children and the father; the father was safe and appropriate, played with the children, brought them food, and was “[v]ery interactive.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the mother re-urged her request for the monitored return of the children, or the appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator while she continued to demonstrate that she could maintain sobriety. The father also asked the trial court to deny the Department’s petition to

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terminate his parental rights and requested more time to continue receiving services with the hope that his children could be returned to him one day.

In its letter ruling, the trial court specifically found that “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short duration, . . . does not negate the parents’ long and continuing history of irresponsible choices that endangered their children, including but not limited to years of illegal drug use.” The trial court also found “that not all portions of the parents’ testimony was credible.” The trial court acknowledged in a footnote that “[a]lthough the Department’s efforts were not ideal during some portions of this case, the Department’s efforts considered as a whole were reasonable efforts to return the children.”

The trial court terminated each parent’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed.

III. Endangerment

In the father’s second issue, he challenges the trial court’s findings that he endangered the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Because of our resolution of the father’s third issue, we need only address the legal sufficiency challenge to the trial court’s findings under Section 161.001(b)(1), which could potentially result in a rendition rather than a remand. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re T.M., No. 11-25-00273-CV, 2026 WL 770620, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The statutory endangerment grounds require clear and convincing proof that the parent has: “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren],” or “(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re S.M.R., 434

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S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. 2014). “[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that ‘expose[s a child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,” E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803, but “does not require actual harm.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).

To terminate a parent’s rights based on endangerment under subsections (D)

or (E), the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child,’” nor must “the child actually suffer[] injury.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination under [subsection] (D) requires that the child’s environment is a source of endangerment, and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.” C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310. For instance, “[a] parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make the child’s environment endangering to the child.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the parent is aware that the environment creates a potential danger to the child but the parent disregards that risk.” Id. Because conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless the child is exposed to them, the relevant time frame for evaluating the applicability of subsection (D) is before the child’s removal. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749.

In contrast, endangerment under subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s conduct, and whether the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s actions, omissions, or failures to act. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550. Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; instead, a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. Id.; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

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2000, pet. denied). “A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. Further, a parent’s actions prior to and after the child’s removal may show an endangering course of conduct. See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[E]ndangering conduct may include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth and may relate to the parent’s actions while the parent had possession of other children.”). “Even evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and imprisonment prior to the birth of a child will support a finding that a parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child’s well-being.” In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (Illegal drug use and offenses that occurred before the child’s birth may be considered as part of a course of conduct that endangers a child.).

The father began using cocaine around 2019 and used methamphetamine almost daily for a year or two before the final termination hearing commenced. His drug use continued for nearly a year after the children were removed from his care. “[A] parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child, may support a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 (quoting In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).

However, “illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. The evidence must show that a parent’s “pattern of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate[d] related dangers to the child” created “a substantial risk of harm.” Id. Here, the father expressed concerns regarding the mother’s mental health and the children’s safety if they were left in her care. He also knew that the mother had resumed using methamphetamine

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after her years of sobriety. The father refused to sign a safety plan, but he agreed not to permit unsupervised contact between the children and the mother. Despite the father’s concerns and verbal agreement, he left the children with the mother, unsupervised, because he chose to continue using methamphetamine.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding under subsection (E), we hold that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm conviction or belief that the father “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support a termination finding, we need not address the father’s complaint insofar as it relates to subsection (D). See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Accordingly, we overrule the father’s second issue.

IV. The Best Interest of the Children In the mother’s first issue and the father’s third issue, they challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination of that parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-andcircumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72). Because the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we generally do not disturb the factfinder’s determinations so long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.

“The strong presumption is that termination is not in a child’s best interest, so a parental-termination order must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *1. Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to

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support a best interest finding. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547– 48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). However, “[t]he presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will generally not support a finding that termination of parental rights [is] in the child’s best interest.” In re D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Conjecture, proof by only a preponderance of the evidence, or a lack of evidence is not enough for a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination of a parent’s parental rights is the best interest of the child. See E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 808, 810; In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); T.M., 2026 WL 770620, at *11.

We first observe that the trial court, as the factfinder, permissibly disregarded portions of the parents’ testimony that it found not to be credible. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006). The remaining testimony presented to it during the final hearing was from Riggs, A.L., two Department investigators, Officer George Spindler, visitation supervisors Hampton and Rodriguez, Reynolds, Vasquez, and Kaylee Jones, the Noah Project employee who searched the mother’s room.

As set forth above, Riggs recited or otherwise agreed to the legally operative words and phrases that supported the trial court’s termination findings—he attested to developing service plans, sending referrals, offering transportation and financial assistance, and scheduling parent-child visitations. He parroted the Department’s recommendation based on his view of each parent’s respective failures to (1) overcome “issues with addiction,” (2) demonstrate the ability to maintain sobriety, and (3) provide the children with a safe and stable home environment. Considered in isolation and untested by a meaningful adversarial process, such evidence might arguably support the trial court’s best interest findings and termination order. But Riggs’s conclusory testimony collapsed under cross-

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examination, leaving the trial court with verifiably false assertions, questionable conduct, and woefully uninformed opinions. Conclusory testimony does not amount to more than a scintilla of evidence; in fact, “it is no evidence at all.” M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 412; In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). As such, and as the record shows, Riggs’s conceded lack of material knowledge, his complacent and inadequate investigation, and occasional, blatant dishonesty3 cannot be said to be “solid and substantial reasons” to find that the termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See J.Z.A., 2026 WL 1838580, at *1.

Consistent with the supreme court’s recent decisions, the record lacks childcentered evidence that supports the trial court’s best interest findings. See H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *13 (“Just as striking as what the record contains is what it does not contain.”). The Department relied on the parents’ conduct prior to removal, their continued struggles with drug addiction after the Department initiated the underlying suit, and the mother’s prescription for low-THC cannabis to discredit her purported commitment to sobriety. To be sure, drug use by a parent is a factor to be considered in the best interest analysis. See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). And the parents’ decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit, when they were at risk of losing their children, is contrary to the children’s best interest. See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551; A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 580. But a parent’s use of marihuana, standing alone, is

3 The father offered Riggs’s August and September permanency reports that Riggs agreed were inaccurate. In his reports, Riggs noted that the mother failed to secure stable housing and provide proof of income, and that she tested negative for all illegal substances in October 2025. As established, Riggs failed to verify the safety of the mother’s housing and proof of income that she sent him, and he did not direct the mother to submit to drug testing in October 2025.

Additionally, Riggs’s reports noted that the father missed a required drug test in August 2025, when in fact the father submitted to drug testing as directed. Riggs then inaccurately testified at the final hearing that the father missed a drug test in August, which was revealed during cross-examination. As such, no reasonable factfinder could credit any information in Riggs’s permanency reports unless such information was corroborated by additional credible evidence.

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insufficient to establish that termination is in a child’s best interest. In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 276 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied).

Of course, as with any potentially harmful substance, a parent must take certain precautions to protect their children from such exposure. See In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). It is axiomatic that it is not in a child’s best interest to return to a parent who uses intoxicants or illegal substances in a manner that exposes the child to harm, or who knowingly surrounds the child with others who expose the child to harm. See id. Yet, the Department failed to present evidence that the parents exposed their children to illegal drugs, other harmful substances, or failed to adequately supervise their children. The Department likewise failed to present evidence regarding the conditions of the children’s home environment when the Department initiated contact, whether the parents were living together in one home or separately, or whether the children were otherwise harmed prior to their removal because of the parents’ illegal drug use. See M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 416 (concluding that the lack of evidence related to the mother’s living conditions and potential harm to the children did not weigh in favor of termination).

Significantly, Rodriguez testified that she saw the mother every week and never smelled marihuana on her or worried that the mother was under the influence of illegal drugs. The mother notified Rodriguez that she registered for the Compassionate-Use Program, and Rodriguez did not perceive that the mother was being deceptive. Therefore, evidence of each parent’s past illegal drug use does not warrant an inference that the children would be exposed to danger or that either parent would be unable to meet the current and future needs of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

The mother’s conduct was further mitigated by witnesses’ confusion and Riggs’s failure to inform the mother that using THC products was illegal. See R.J.G.,

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681 S.W.3d at 380 (Termination is “not warranted when a parent participates as the [service] plan requires and the Department waits until trial to reveal that it was measuring performance against a previously undisclosed requirement.”); In re X.M.B.E., 706 S.W.3d 714, 723–24 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.) (collecting cases in which courts have addressed a panoply of parents’ excuses for their failure to complete their service plans and considering mitigating circumstances). Initially, Riggs and Reynolds believed that using prescribed cannabis was permitted under the Compassionate-Use Program. Officer Spindler, a law enforcement officer, testified that there was no record in the Compassionate-Use Registry that the mother purchased her THC products through a licensed dispensary, and he was also unaware of THC products that can be used legally. Officer Spindler revealed, however, that he did not know whether the website through which the mother registered and purchased THC products was a licensed dispensary.

The evidence that is relevant to the mother’s and father’s parenting abilities that could support the trial court’s best interest findings, again, unfortunately lies within Riggs’s testimony. Specifically, in response to questioning by the attorney ad litem, Riggs purportedly “recall[ed] getting an email or being present at a replacement visit [in July] where it was told that [the mother] let the boys know she intended to take them to Mexico at their next meeting.” He also agreed that the ad litem had, at some point, mentioned the mother’s unauthorized communication with the children. Riggs was not present for the mother’s statement about Mexico, and learned, “[a]fter talking to others,” that it “was a misunderstanding.” As for the unauthorized communication, A.L. testified that the mother violated court orders at the children’s football games by attempting to hug and speak to the children. There was no dispute that the mother was permitted to attend their games, to wave to the children, and display a sign that she loves them. A.L. even taught the children how to sign “I love you” to their mother. But A.L. took issue with the mother “mak[ing]

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it known that she [was] there”; she would “get up into the stands[] to constantly yell their name[s] to get their attention,” and would “go to the fenceline” and “call them to approach.”

The uncontroverted testimony of Hampton and Rodriguez—the witnesses who personally observed most of the interactions between the parents and the children—bridged the evidentiary gaps left by the Department’s lack of readily ascertainable information. Hampton and Rodriguez established that the children had a strong bond with each parent, and that each parent was safe and appropriate with their children and able to meet their needs. The children “very often [ran] in the building” and were excited to see the mother, “cr[ied] when they [saw] each other at the beginning of almost every visit,” and were “certainly sad to go” when the visits ended. Even Riggs testified that the visit he observed in October 2025 “went well,” and A.L. acknowledged the importance of children having their parents in their lives. Thus, and although there was no direct evidence of the children’s desires, the evidence of the parents’ bond with the children, their improving parental abilities, and their willingness to meet the children’s needs strongly indicate that preserving the parent-child relationship, with both parents, is in the children’s best interest.

Hampton and Rodriguez recounted one visit during which M.A. Jr. became upset after the mother expressed her “desire that [M.A. Jr.] not go over to someone’s house.” Rodriguez clarified that M.A. Jr., as a ten-year-old, “did not fully understand all the things that . . . [the mother] was trying to say or explain to him.” The mother has since learned how to respond to her children’s questions appropriately for their respective ages, and she has continued to improve her parenting skills.

On the other hand, there was limited evidence of the children’s bond with A.L.

and her ability to meet their physical and emotional needs. Riggs’s and A.L.’s termination recommendations were rooted in providing the children with stability.

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Even though the children had only been in A.L.’s home since August 2025, Riggs testified that the children were doing well and had a good relationship with A.L. A.L. mentioned transporting the children to weekly counseling but expounded no further. Stability and permanence are indeed paramount in the upbringing of children. In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied); G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *7. But a parent’s rights cannot be terminated based on “single statement[s] without context,” passing remarks, and unfounded assertions. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (citing Flanz v. Farias, 662 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ)). And the “[t]ermination of parental rights should not be used as a mechanism to merely reallocate children to better and more prosperous [individuals].” M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 409. In that regard, the government must “assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child[ren].” See FAM. § 153.001(a)(1).

Here, both parents successfully completed inpatient substance abuse treatment, visited the children regularly, participated in their required services, and were “doing what [they] had been asked to do: make progress.” See H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *6. It is true, and the trial court noted in its letter ruling, that “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a [parent’s] long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; see also N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 479 (“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights.” (quoting In re K.D.C., No. 02-12-00092-CV, 2013 WL 5781474, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.))). Nevertheless, the circumstance before us is not the scenario with which we are typically confronted. See, e.g., G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *6 (When the mother was given opportunities in the past to participate in services

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and achieve sobriety, she did so only sporadically until the Department’s involvement concluded.).

Undoubtedly, “there are far too many cases where this fearsome power is necessary and proper.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *9. Too often, a parent’s “[i]llegal drug use is a recurring theme” in Department-initiated termination suits. See E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607. And, not infrequently, a parent’s illegal drug use coincides with parental indifference, apathy, or heedlessness that “strongly indicates the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823–24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.); see also, e.g., In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024); In re C.C., 720 S.W.3d 41, 64 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2025, no pet.); In re J.S., No. 05-24-01162-CV, 2025 WL 935020, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). There are, however, parents who put forth genuine efforts to address the Department’s concerns. See, e.g., T.M., 2026 WL 770620, at *10. In those circumstances, such as in the present case, the parents’ efforts and improvements carry significant weight.

Riggs acknowledged the parents’ progress but maintained that neither parent established stability nor their ability to maintain sobriety. As discussed, Riggs never assessed the safety or stability of the mother’s living environment and eventually admitted that he “[couldn’t] make an affirmative statement that [the Noah Project] is safe and stable.” Despite his bare, unsupported conclusion that the mother failed to demonstrate safety, stability, and adequate income, Riggs never informed the mother that he deemed those requirements unmet. In fact, since the mother’s exit from the Noah Project, there was no evidence presented about her current home or its conditions. See M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 416 (noting a lack of evidence and the Department’s burden of proof). Riggs then testified, without contacting or confirming with Reynolds or reviewing the counseling notes, that the mother had “several no-shows” to support his assertion that the mother was not compliant with

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the counseling requirements. Conversely, Reynolds attested that the mother had attended and been successful in counseling.

Similarly, Riggs primarily communicated with the father by text message, spoke to him on the phone in August and October, and only saw the father in person three times throughout the pendency of the case: twice at court hearings and once “at the residence [where] he was staying” after the father’s inpatient treatment had concluded. Riggs did not provide any information on the safety or stability of that home, or whether the father intended to live there long-term with the children. “When a family’s continued existence is on the line and the [D]epartment must produce clear and convincing evidence, Texas courts may not just presume that supporting evidence exists in some undisclosed location.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *13. Here, the Department’s conjecture, fragmented proof, ineptitude, and the lack of evidence is not enough for a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 808, 810.

Of critical importance is the Department’s delay in arranging services for the parents, because their parental rights were terminated based on their failure to demonstrate the ability to maintain long-term sobriety and a stable, drug-free home environment for the children. The purpose of a service plan “is to help [parents] provide [their] child[ren] with a safe environment within the reasonable period specified in the plan.” FAM. § 263.102(b). A parent’s failure to complete the services that are required to regain possession of his or her children is relevant insofar as it permits the inference that the parent lacks the willingness or ability to seek out available resources needed now or in the future. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). But such an inference is not justified when a parent’s failure to strictly comply with a service plan’s requirements is attributable in large part to the Department’s delays, lack of

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communication, inadequate investigation, and other failures, as it is here. See J.Z.A., 2026 WL 1838580, at *1 (“[C]ourt-ordered service plans are strictly construed in the parent’s favor, as are the statutory provisions that supply the predicate ground for termination.”); see also In re A.Y.C., 665 S.W.3d 800, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (The lack of available programs to address the parents’ issues cannot be held against the parents.).

As we have discussed, the record demonstrates that each parent participated in services, consistently attended parent-child visitations, had a strong bond with the children, took responsibility for their past mistakes, and were committed to actively addressing their substance abuse issues. Just as “an uninterested parent poses an emotional and physical danger to the child” now and in the future, A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 823, evidence of a parent’s willingness and commitment to meet the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future favors the preservation of the parent-child relationship. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. In this instance, the parents’ parental rights were terminated while “the process that seemed poised to lead to this family’s reunification . . . was still in full swing.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *7. Consequently, the parents were deprived of the opportunity to continue demonstrating their ability to maintain sobriety and to acquire safe and stable housing. See id. at *6 (“Force a family to play dead long enough, and it may eventually die in truth.”). In sum, the process that could have led to reunification was “short-circuited.” Id. at 13.

Reviewing all the evidence, and the lack thereof, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best interest findings while also considering the undisputed facts that do not support its findings, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re J.B., No. 11-22-00305-CV, 2023 WL 3213089, at *5–6

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(Tex. App.—Eastland May 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding, for the same or similar reasons, that insufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s best interest finding); In re A.O., No. 11-22-00290-CV, 2023 WL 2799132, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 6, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); In re T.S.W., No. 11- 21-00231-CV, 2022 WL 969526, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Even if the evidence is legally sufficient, it is certainly not factually sufficient, as the evidence to support the trial court’s findings is tenuous. See M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 410. In the end, the Department simply failed to “clear the high bar” that the supreme court requires. See K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *6– 7.

Accordingly, we sustain the mother’s first issue and the father’s third issue. V. Sections 161.001(f) and (g): Reasonable Efforts and Continuing Danger Finally, each parent challenges the trial court’s findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to them before the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger remained in their home that prevented the return of the children to either parent. See FAM. § 161.001(f). The mother further challenges the basis for the trial court’s conclusion that a continuing danger remains in her home that prevents the return of the children to her. See id. § 161.001(g). Because of our disposition of the mother’s first issue and the father’s third issue, we need not address the merits of their complaints regarding the “reasonable efforts” or “continuing danger” issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. However, the underlying facts that pertain to their complaints should be mentioned.

Pursuant to Section 161.001(f), the trial court may not terminate the parent-

child relationship unless:

[T]he [trial] court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that . . . the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child[ren] to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits

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and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child[ren] to the parent[s].

FAM. § 161.001(f)(1).

Enacted in 2023, subsection (f) imports the phrase “reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” from Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), the “constructive abandonment” statutory termination ground. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (f); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied). Consistent with the prevailing judicial interpretation of that phrase, the Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to a parent. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases); see also In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570, at *11–12 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, no pet. h.); In re H.B.S., No. 12-26-00007-CV, 2026 WL 960744, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 8, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.). However, evidence of a service plan is not absolutely required nor is it the exclusive means of establishing the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child or children. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases). Instead, the pertinent inquiry “is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” Id. (quoting In re J.A., No. 04-20-00242-CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)); In re J.H., No. 01-25-00854-CV, 2026 WL 968923, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Here, the Department implemented service plans for both parents. But because a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights “demands more than bureaucratic or mechanical box-checking,” R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 381, simply creating a service plan and sending referrals for services does not conclude the Department’s obligations. See, e.g., FAM. §§ 263.3025, .3026 (The Department shall prepare a permanency plan that may include as a goal: reunification, termination and

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adoption, permanent managing conservatorship to a relative or “other suitable individual,” and/or an alternative planned permanent arrangement.); M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 332. While it is true that the Department need not guarantee a parent’s completion of services, it must make genuine efforts to consistently communicate with a parent and facilitate services in pursuit of family reunification. See M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 330–31 (noting that, despite the Department’s suboptimal diligence to implement the parents’ service plans during their confinement, the caseworker maintained consistent contact with the parents and searched for several possible relatives with whom to place the child).

In many cases, a critical component of reasonable reunification efforts is communication with the parents. See id. at 329 (caseworker met with the parents monthly while they were in jail); see also A.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (finding that the existence of a service plan, the caseworker’s repeated attempts to communicate with the mother, and an attempt to initially place the child with a family member constituted reasonable efforts); In re E.L.S., No. 04-22-00651-CV, 2023 WL 2396345, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (The Department’s reasonable efforts included “creating a service plan, ensuring [the father] received it and understood it, meeting with him monthly to review his progress, and investigating the placement options [the parents] offered.”). Moreover, the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts based on the facts and circumstances of each case must be balanced with the parents’ engagement and efforts, or, in some cases, a lack thereof. See M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 332. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence established that Riggs communicated with the parents less than once a month. At times, he failed to respond to the parents’ attempts to contact him, delayed referring services for them despite the parents’ requests for treatment and visitation, failed to contact the parents’ service providers

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to review their respective progress, and failed to ascertain pertinent information regarding the parents’ living situations.4 Of further significance, and unbeknownst to the mother and Reynolds, the Department changed its goal from reunification to termination and adoption in April 2025, just five months after the children were removed. This goal change, which occurred prior to Riggs’s assignment to the case, could explain his inactions. Perhaps, in his mind, the Department’s treatment of termination as a foregone conclusion obviated the need to promptly prioritize services for the parents or to verify their progress. See In re F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d 752, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (Department’s “permanency goal of unrelated adoption is contrary to an attempt to return [the child] to [the parent].”). The Department’s termination-driven intent and approach that instead masqueraded as a reunification effort exposes the “flawed system of offering a parent the chance at family reunification only to have it taken away because of past irresponsible decisions,” regardless of their improvement. In re C.A.M., 633 S.W.3d 68, 76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, no pet.) (questioning, in a similar circumstance, “the purpose of the service plan in the first place”). The parents were indeed “operating in the dark and potentially acting at cross-purposes with the [D]epartment without realizing it.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *12. As Reynolds explained, neither she nor the mother were aware of the Department’s ultimate permanency goal because Riggs had not sent Reynolds any information or maintained contact with her.

Finally, when asked about a continuing danger with the mother, Riggs testified: “I believe that we have not fully established that [the mother’s] drug use

4 The trial court may have been privy to matters presented at previous hearings that are not reflected in the appellate record. Nevertheless, we reiterate that “[t]he only evidence that can support the trial court’s order is [the] evidence admitted at trial.” X.M.B.E., 706 S.W.3d at 720 n.5 (quoting In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 142 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.)). This case exemplifies this point with particular clarity, as the glaring deficiencies in the Department’s unfulfilled obligations to this family were presumably not apparent until the Department’s evidence was subjected to meaningful adversarial testing.

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has fully been dealt with.” He also cited “continuing concerns” of the mother’s marihuana use, “lack of stable income,” and “non-compliance with parts of her [s]ervice [p]lan.” However, and as shown by the record, there is no factual basis for Riggs’s articulated concerns.

VI. This Court’s Ruling

We reverse the trial court’s termination order insofar as it (1) found that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children, and (2) terminated their parental rights based on those findings. 5 See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(b); In re W.J.G.G., No. 04-26-00110-CV, 2026 WL 1893979, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, July 1, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases). We affirm the order of the trial court in all other respects.6 Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Any proceedings on remand must be commenced within 180 days of this court’s mandate. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4(c).

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

August 13, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

5 We recognize that the trial court did not have the benefit of recent Texas Supreme Court precedent, some of which we have cited, that has clarified the standard of review and evolving nuances in parental termination proceedings, both of which we must apply and follow, when it made its rulings in this case.

6 Our holding does not change or affect the trial court’s appointment of the Department as the children’s managing conservator. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615–17 (Tex. 2007).