In the Interest of M. R. S., a Child

321 Ga. 521

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: S25G0338
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 521 FINAL COPY

S25G0338. IN THE INTEREST OF M. R. S., a child.

PINSON, Justice.

In this case, the juvenile court ordered the termination of pa-

rental rights of the mother of M. R. S. on June 10, 2022. The mother

filed a notice of appeal, but her counsel did not take the appropriate

steps for a discretionary appeal.1 After realizing her counsel’s mis-

take, the mother got new counsel and then moved for an out-of-time

appeal, asked the court to set aside the termination order, and

sought a new trial. The court denied the requests in a single order,

and the mother appealed, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order

for jurisdictional reasons. So the mother made the same requests

again, and the trial court denied them again in another order.

The mother appealed to the Court of Appeals a second time.

This time — more than two years after the mother’s parental rights

1 Appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by

discretionary application. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). had been terminated — the court affirmed the termination of paren-

tal rights, holding (as relevant here) that the mother failed to ade-

quately “enumerate” as error the juvenile court’s denial of her mo-

tion for an out-of-time appeal. In the Interest of M. R. S., 373 Ga.

App. 201, 204 (1) (b) (907 SE2d 203) (2024) (citing OCGA § 5-6-48

(f)).

Presiding Judge McFadden dissented in part, noting among

other things that OCGA § 5-6-48 requires appellate courts to try to

“discern what errors an appellant is attempting to articulate”; that

the Appellate Practice Act must be “liberally construed so as to bring

about a decision of the merits of every case appealed”; and that the

Act “authorizes practically unlimited looseness in an appellant’s

enumeration of errors.” In the Interest of M. R. S., 373 Ga. App. at

205-06 (1) (McFadden, P. J., dissenting in part) (citations and punc-

tuation omitted). In light of these principles, the dissent reasoned

that, “[w]hen her enumeration of errors is read together with the

notice of appeal and the record, particularly the order appealed from

— as subsection (f) requires — it is clear that her first enumeration

2 encompasses the dismissal of her motion for out-of-time appeal” and

so complied with the statutory requirement. Id. at 208 (1).

The mother sought review in this Court, and we asked the

State to address in a response to her petition whether she properly

raised her challenge to the denial of her motion for an out-of-time

appeal. For largely the reasons set out in Division 1 of the dissent,

In the Interest of M. R. S., 373 Ga. App. at 205-08 (1), the State con-

ceded that the denial of the motion for an out-of-time appeal was

properly raised on appeal. We agree. The case is remanded for the

Court of Appeals to consider the mother’s claims about the denial of

her motion for an out-of-time appeal.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ., concur.

3 Decided May 6, 2025.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 373 Ga. App.

201.

Forrest K. Shealy, for appellant.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Bryan K. Webb, Deputy

Attorney General, Jason S. Naunas, Calandra A. Harps, Senior As-

sistant Attorneys General, Sanders B. Deen, Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral, for appellee.