IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1348 Filed December 4, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF L.T., Minor Child,
A.T., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Richelle Mahaffey,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Dusty Lea Clements of Clements Law and Mediation, Newton, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Samuel K. Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
In its order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her toddler, the
juvenile court found she “is an excellent and loving mother to [the child] when she
is sober, safe, and healthy.” But after two decades of methamphetamine-use, the
court found the mother’s forty-one days of sobriety at an inpatient treatment facility
came too late to avoid termination. The mother appeals,1 challenging each of the
steps in our termination analysis and the court’s denial of her request for more
time. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This forty-year-old mother of five children first used methamphetamine
when she was just fourteen years old. She has been battling her addiction ever
since. In the years before her youngest child was born in September 2022, the
mother had her parental rights to two of her children terminated. Her other two
children were placed in their father’s care through a juvenile court bridge order.
At this child’s birth, the mother tested positive for amphetamines and
marijuana. The infant was also exhibiting signs of withdrawal, including tremors
and irritability, and his umbilical cord tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamines, and carboxy-THC. A report was made to the Iowa Department of
Health and Human Services which, after conducting a child protective assessment,
allowed the child to remain in the mother’s custody under a safety plan that
1 The father consented to the termination of his parental rights. He does not appeal, although he filed a statement supporting the mother’s appeal. We have not considered that statement in our review of the mother’s claims. See In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating one parent cannot argue facts or legal positions relating to the other parent). 3
required a neighbor to supervise her contact with the infant. During the
assessment, the mother told the child protective worker that “she is ready to get
clean and she has never felt more ready to go to treatment.”
The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition in October, but
because the mother was participating in services and doing well, the petition was
dismissed in March 2023. The department continued to offer the mother services
on a voluntary basis, but her participation soon declined. The mother was
discharged from her mental-health therapy and started missing outpatient
substance-use sessions. After dodging multiple drug tests, a sweat patch that was
applied at the end of June came back positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines. The child was allowed to remain in the mother’s custody under
the neighbor’s supervision, but the State filed a new petition in July. The next
month, the mother entered an inpatient treatment facility that allowed her to bring
the child with her. At her admission into treatment, the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamines, and MDMA. She was discharged after just
two weeks for smoking a cigarette when she was not supposed to. Because the
department disagreed with the reason for the mother’s discharge, and “she had
sobriety underneath her,” the child was not removed from her custody.
In its order adjudicating the child as in need of the court’s assistance, the
juvenile court noted:
Happily, [the mother] has been doing well since her reuse in July of 2023. [The child] remains in [the mother’s] care due in large part to her efforts to course-correct. . . . [The mother] has a lot of reasons to be hopeful this case can close safely and successfully in the near future if she follows through with recommended services and expectations. 4
Unfortunately, the mother veered off course again in November when she
relapsed on methamphetamine. The department’s case manager reported that
the mother “expresses a desire to be sober long term and states that even when
she uses, she does not want to. [The mother] states that she knows that she has
to take accountability for her choices but that her past is the contributing factor to
her use.” After this relapse, the child was removed from the mother’s custody and
placed with the neighbor.
In the months that followed, the mother inconsistently participated in
substance-use and mental-health treatment. And she continued to have positive
tests for methamphetamine, with the case manager noting that while the mother
“had a month sober here and there, . . . it did not appear to be anything
substantial.” At the end of March 2024, the mother “shared she is wanting to do
inpatient treatment.” The mother was offered a spot at a facility in April, but she
turned it down because she had obtained housing and was twenty-one days sober
then. But the housing fell through, and the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine again in May.
The State petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights in June. At
the end of that month, the mother entered an inpatient treatment facility with one-
week of sobriety under her belt. By July, her counselor at the facility noted the
mother’s “dedication to treatment increases daily, and her insight is consistently
growing.” At a combined permanency and termination hearing, the department’s
case manager testified the mother was “doing really well in that program” and had
progressed to overnight visits with the child. Yet the case manager recommended
termination because of the mother’s historical inconsistency in treatment: 5
[The mother] has had quite some time to address the concerns leading to [the child’s] removal and leading to the Department’s involvement. She has been very inconsistent with treatment. [The mother] does amazing while she is in treatment. She does amazing with [the child] while she’s sober. She’s an amazing mom, and she loves her son very much. And the Department wishes that she could remain sober to have him in her care full-time, but [the child] deserves that permanency, and we have to look at the history of inability to remain sober.
Given that history, which included past failed attempts at substance-use treatment,
the case manager did not believe that the child could be returned to her care in six
months. The case manager explained that although the mother “has great insight”
and “knows what she needs to do . . . there is something blocking her from being
able to apply [her sobriety] long term.”
The mother acknowledged her tough history, testifying: “I cannot expect
people to think differently of me when I’ve never given them a reason to.” But she
maintained this time was different: “I love my kids. And any time I’ve been in this
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1348 Filed December 4, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF L.T., Minor Child,
A.T., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Richelle Mahaffey,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Dusty Lea Clements of Clements Law and Mediation, Newton, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Samuel K. Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
In its order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her toddler, the
juvenile court found she “is an excellent and loving mother to [the child] when she
is sober, safe, and healthy.” But after two decades of methamphetamine-use, the
court found the mother’s forty-one days of sobriety at an inpatient treatment facility
came too late to avoid termination. The mother appeals,1 challenging each of the
steps in our termination analysis and the court’s denial of her request for more
time. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This forty-year-old mother of five children first used methamphetamine
when she was just fourteen years old. She has been battling her addiction ever
since. In the years before her youngest child was born in September 2022, the
mother had her parental rights to two of her children terminated. Her other two
children were placed in their father’s care through a juvenile court bridge order.
At this child’s birth, the mother tested positive for amphetamines and
marijuana. The infant was also exhibiting signs of withdrawal, including tremors
and irritability, and his umbilical cord tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamines, and carboxy-THC. A report was made to the Iowa Department of
Health and Human Services which, after conducting a child protective assessment,
allowed the child to remain in the mother’s custody under a safety plan that
1 The father consented to the termination of his parental rights. He does not appeal, although he filed a statement supporting the mother’s appeal. We have not considered that statement in our review of the mother’s claims. See In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating one parent cannot argue facts or legal positions relating to the other parent). 3
required a neighbor to supervise her contact with the infant. During the
assessment, the mother told the child protective worker that “she is ready to get
clean and she has never felt more ready to go to treatment.”
The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition in October, but
because the mother was participating in services and doing well, the petition was
dismissed in March 2023. The department continued to offer the mother services
on a voluntary basis, but her participation soon declined. The mother was
discharged from her mental-health therapy and started missing outpatient
substance-use sessions. After dodging multiple drug tests, a sweat patch that was
applied at the end of June came back positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines. The child was allowed to remain in the mother’s custody under
the neighbor’s supervision, but the State filed a new petition in July. The next
month, the mother entered an inpatient treatment facility that allowed her to bring
the child with her. At her admission into treatment, the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamines, and MDMA. She was discharged after just
two weeks for smoking a cigarette when she was not supposed to. Because the
department disagreed with the reason for the mother’s discharge, and “she had
sobriety underneath her,” the child was not removed from her custody.
In its order adjudicating the child as in need of the court’s assistance, the
juvenile court noted:
Happily, [the mother] has been doing well since her reuse in July of 2023. [The child] remains in [the mother’s] care due in large part to her efforts to course-correct. . . . [The mother] has a lot of reasons to be hopeful this case can close safely and successfully in the near future if she follows through with recommended services and expectations. 4
Unfortunately, the mother veered off course again in November when she
relapsed on methamphetamine. The department’s case manager reported that
the mother “expresses a desire to be sober long term and states that even when
she uses, she does not want to. [The mother] states that she knows that she has
to take accountability for her choices but that her past is the contributing factor to
her use.” After this relapse, the child was removed from the mother’s custody and
placed with the neighbor.
In the months that followed, the mother inconsistently participated in
substance-use and mental-health treatment. And she continued to have positive
tests for methamphetamine, with the case manager noting that while the mother
“had a month sober here and there, . . . it did not appear to be anything
substantial.” At the end of March 2024, the mother “shared she is wanting to do
inpatient treatment.” The mother was offered a spot at a facility in April, but she
turned it down because she had obtained housing and was twenty-one days sober
then. But the housing fell through, and the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine again in May.
The State petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights in June. At
the end of that month, the mother entered an inpatient treatment facility with one-
week of sobriety under her belt. By July, her counselor at the facility noted the
mother’s “dedication to treatment increases daily, and her insight is consistently
growing.” At a combined permanency and termination hearing, the department’s
case manager testified the mother was “doing really well in that program” and had
progressed to overnight visits with the child. Yet the case manager recommended
termination because of the mother’s historical inconsistency in treatment: 5
[The mother] has had quite some time to address the concerns leading to [the child’s] removal and leading to the Department’s involvement. She has been very inconsistent with treatment. [The mother] does amazing while she is in treatment. She does amazing with [the child] while she’s sober. She’s an amazing mom, and she loves her son very much. And the Department wishes that she could remain sober to have him in her care full-time, but [the child] deserves that permanency, and we have to look at the history of inability to remain sober.
Given that history, which included past failed attempts at substance-use treatment,
the case manager did not believe that the child could be returned to her care in six
months. The case manager explained that although the mother “has great insight”
and “knows what she needs to do . . . there is something blocking her from being
able to apply [her sobriety] long term.”
The mother acknowledged her tough history, testifying: “I cannot expect
people to think differently of me when I’ve never given them a reason to.” But she
maintained this time was different: “I love my kids. And any time I’ve been in this
position—I’ve never been sitting in this stand—I usually run and would be using
right now, but I’m fighting. Not just this, but I’m fighting my addiction. . . . I don’t
ever plan on using again.”
While the juvenile court commended the mother “for her newly found
journey to sobriety and recovery,” the court found it was not enough to overcome
her past failed attempts at sobriety:
Unfortunately, the Court lacks evidence to find it is likely [the mother] will maintain her sobriety and stability once she leaves [inpatient treatment] and reenters the community. [The child] should not be subjected any longer to ‘”yo-yo”-ing in and out of [the mother’s] care. The pattern of return and removal is extremely harmful, especially to young children. 6
The court accordingly granted the State’s petition to terminate the mother’s
parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l) (2024). The
mother appeals.
II. Analysis
“Termination proceedings are reviewed de novo.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d
311, 313 (Iowa 2022). In this de novo review, we use a three-step analysis that
asks whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, (2) the child’s best
interests are served by termination, and (3) a statutory exception applies and
should be exercised to preclude termination. Id.; see also Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)–(3). If all three steps support termination, we then consider any other
issues the parent raises, such as whether more time should have been granted.
See Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5). The mother challenges each step
in this analysis and requests more time for reunification.
A. Statutory Grounds
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
ground, as it did here, we may affirm the court’s order on any ground we find
supported by the record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We
choose to focus on section 232.116(1)(h).
The mother’s challenge to that ground is limited to its final element—that
the child could not be safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination
hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h) (requiring clear and convincing evidence
“that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents”); In re D.W.,
791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the statutory language “at the
present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). The mother argues 7
that because she was in an inpatient treatment facility, sober, and having overnight
visits, “the child could immediately be returned to her care.” We disagree—though
we applaud the mother for the progress she made in her decades-long battle
against her addiction to methamphetamine.
The department’s case manager testified that the concern with the child
being returned to the mother’s care “would not be his immediate safety while he’s
at treatment because he would be safe there. It would be the concern about [the
mother’s] stability in the sobriety and him being able to remain in her care without
having to be removed again.” The case manager continued, “we would definitely
need to see consistency of maintaining that sobriety and doing well in treatment”
before considering returning the child to the mother’s custody. As our supreme
court concluded in In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021): “A long history
of substance abuse, repeated relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain
sobriety outside a supervised setting demonstrates the child[] could not have been
returned to [the mother’s] care at the time of the termination hearing.” We
accordingly find clear and convincing evidence supported termination under
section 232.116(1)(f).
B. Best Interests
The mother combines the second and third steps of our analysis by arguing
that because of her “bond with the child the Court errored in finding termination
was in the child’s best interest.” Because these are two separate issues, we will
address them that way, starting with the child’s best interests. See In re A.A.,
No. 21-1972, 2022 WL 946503, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (“We choose
to separately address the often-conflated best-interests and statutory-exception 8
arguments.”); In re E.S., No. 23-0590, 2023 WL 4104126, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 21, 2023) (“Consideration of the parent-child bond is not a part of our best-
interests analysis.”).
On that question, Iowa Code section 232.116(2) directs us to “give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” The defining elements of a child’s best interests
are safety and need for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa
2011). While the law “requires a ‘full measure of patience with troubled parents
who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,’” Iowa has built this patience into
the statutory scheme of Iowa Code section 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495
(Iowa 2000) (citation omitted).
From the beginning of this case, the department afforded the mother that
patience—allowing the child to stay in her custody even after positive drug tests,
relapses, and missed substance-use treatment sessions. Despite the
department’s efforts, which resulted in the mother being given nearly two years to
address her methamphetamine use, the juvenile court found “that process has only
just begun over the last forty-one days, in a highly structured environment.”
Meanwhile, the child was being well-cared for in his foster home, which had been
part of his life since birth and is “able to meet his long-term needs for safety, love,
and security.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (considering the child’s integration
into the foster family); accord W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 314. We agree with the court
upon our de novo review of the record that this young child “should not have to
wait any longer for permanency.” See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010) 9
(reiterating the well-settled rule that, where statutory grounds for termination exist,
permanency should not be denied based on a sheer hope that the parent might
someday provide a stable home).
C. Permissive Exception
The permissive exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) allows
the court to maintain a parent-child relationship if it finds “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” See In re A.S., 906
N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018) (“We may use our discretion, based on the unique
circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply
the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.” (cleaned up)).
Once the State has proven a ground for termination, the parent resisting
termination bears the burden to establish an exception in section 232.116(3). Id.
The record before us is filled with evidence about the bond the mother
shares with her child, who was always happy to see her and sad to leave. The
provider who supervised the mother’s visits told the juvenile court that she was
testifying for the mother because the child’s “voice needs to be heard.” The
provider testified the child “has a very close bond with his mom,” explaining:
When I pick up [the child], [the mother is] the only client I have who climbs in the back. She never sits up front by me. She sits by her son. He is happy to the point—the only word I can use is “giddy” when he sees his mother. . . . And when it’s time to part and I pick up the diaper bag, [the child] throws himself on the floor and cries. . . . “[I]t is heart-wrenching to hear him cry because he wants to be with his mom.
The juvenile court found this evidence “emotionally compelling,” as do we,
but determined the strength of the bond was outweighed by the child’s need for 10
permanency and the mother’s “inability to safely parent by properly addressing her
methamphetamine use disorder and her need for long term sobriety.” We agree.
Even though the mother and child have an unquestionable bond, “the existence of
a bond is not enough.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). Given the
child’s young age and the mother’s newfound sobriety after decades of use, we
affirm the court’s decision not to apply the permissive exception to termination
under section 232.116(3)(c). See In re N.S., No. 24-0750, 2024 WL 3290380,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2024).
D. Additional Time
The mother requested a six-month extension at the combined permanency
and termination hearing. The juvenile court denied this request because “based
on [the mother’s] long history of using illegal substances, and her struggle to
achieve sobriety, the Court cannot say the need for removal will no longer exist in
six months.” The mother claims the court erred in denying her request because of
“her progress since June of 2024, and the fact that she had already moved to
overnights with the child.”
An extension of time is appropriate only if we can conclude “the need for
removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa
Code § 232.104(2)(b). The mother candidly testified that she has used
methamphetamine “a long time. Over half my life.” She had successfully
completed inpatient substance-use treatment before, only to relapse again. And
she was only six weeks into her current program at the termination hearing. So
while the mother vowed that she was done with the drug, we agree with the juvenile
court that she “will ‘need a significant amount of time to establish’ that she can 11
maintain her progress.” See N.S., 2024 WL 3290380, at *2 (citing In re L.L., 459
N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Given [the father’s] past performance we are not
convinced additional time or services will change him.”)); In re M.T., No. 24-1009,
2024 WL 4502261, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2024) (finding progress comes
too late when the mother starts treatment and maintains sobriety for ten months in
a treatment facility because of her long history of methamphetamine use). We
accordingly affirm the juvenile court’s denial of her requested extension. In doing
so, we echo the court’s hope for the mother that she “continues to build on the
good progress she has already made.”
For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the
mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.