In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00002-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.T. AND W.T., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 72nd District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-505,551, Honorable Kelley Tesch, Associate Judge Presiding
April 30, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant, Mother, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying the parent-child
relationship that named her possessory conservator of her two children, L.T. and W.T.1
In her sole issue, Mother argues the trial court erred by appointing Father sole managing
conservator with the exclusive right to determine the residence of L.T. and W.T. We affirm
the trial court’s order.
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to the appellant mother as “Mother,” the
appellee father as “Father,” and the children as L.T. and W.T. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were divorced in Dallas County in 2017. They were appointed
joint managing conservators with Mother having the exclusive right to designate the
primary residence of then six-year-old L.T. and three-year-old W.T.
The parties resided in the Dallas area at the time of the divorce in 2017. Mother
testified that Father did not visit the children regularly and did not telephone them or give
them presents. She acknowledged that she and the children “moved a lot,” and that she
did not communicate with Father. During this time, Mother was homeless for one to two
weeks. The children stayed with their paternal grandmother and Mother “chose to stay
in [her] car.” Beginning in 2020, while she was employed as a service coordinator for
Metrocare Services, Mother was stalked and harassed by a work colleague. In June of
2022, Mother quit her job and she, L.T., and W.T. moved to Alabama briefly because of
the trauma associated with the stalking. When her job in Alabama did not work out,
Mother and the children returned to Dallas to get their belongings, then moved to Lubbock
to live with their maternal grandmother. Mother did not tell Father that she was taking the
children to Alabama or that she was residing in Lubbock as of August of 2022.
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services became involved with
Mother and the children in September of 2022. The Department opened an investigation
after receiving a report alleging that Mother was neglectful in her supervision of L.T. and
W.T. The report alleged that Mother was suffering from paranoid delusions and severe
mental health issues. During its investigation, the Department learned that Mother
purchased a chainsaw for protection because she claimed an unknown person was
2 stalking her. Mother withdrew L.T. and W.T. from school to homeschool them. However,
she had not followed through with homeschooling. Maternal grandmother reported that
Mother attempted to “cast a demon” from L.T. and agreed with the Department that
Mother should have no unsupervised contact with L.T. and W.T. due to concerns with
Mother’s untreated mental health issues. The Department filed an original petition for the
protection of L.T. and W.T. The petition also requested the termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights. After a temporary hearing, the Department was appointed
temporary managing conservator and the children were placed in Father’s care in
Arlington. Mother and Father filed counter-petitions to modify the parent-child
relationship.
After the Department removed L.T. and W.T. from her care, Mother received
mental health treatment. She was hospitalized for forty-eight hours at Parkland Hospital
in Dallas and then admitted to a psychiatric hospital for thirty days. She was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder with psychosis “and forced to take medication.” Mother was
prescribed several medications, including Rexulti, Risperdal, and Trazodone. Beginning
in December of 2022, Mother had follow-up appointments with a doctor in Lubbock who
continued her medications. She was supposed to continue taking her medications as
prescribed, but as of the time of trial, she had not taken her medications for several
months because she experienced severe side effects, and it was “absolutely unhealthy
for [her] and [her] body.” Mother disagrees with the diagnosis she received at the
psychiatric hospital and says she has paperwork from her Lubbock doctor that changed
her diagnosis to anxiety with panic attacks, insomnia, and depression. This doctor has
retired, and Mother is waiting to see her doctor in Dallas to obtain an evaluation to
3 determine if she needs medication. She will not take medication for a diagnosis that she
does not believe is appropriate. None of the health care professionals Mother has seen
has told her to stop taking her medications as prescribed.
Jasmyn Brown, a permanency specialist with St. Francis Ministries, testified that
Mother and Father completed the family service plans implemented for each parent by
the Department. L.T. and W.T. have lived with Father and Stepmother in Arlington since
November of 2022. The children attend Berry Elementary and have made friends. They
are A and B students. L.T. and W.T. have thrived in Father’s home. Father and
Stepmother provide a safe, stable, and loving environment for L.T. and W.T. Mother
communicates with Stepmother to arrange visitation with L.T. and W.T. The children love
both their parents and do not want to have to choose between them.
After the hearing, the associate judge dismissed the Department and appointed
Father as sole managing conservator of L.T. and W.T. The court appointed Mother as
possessory conservator with supervised possession of the children. The court found that
these orders were in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending the trial
court abused its discretion by appointing Father sole managing conservator.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has broad discretion to decide the best interest of a child in family law
matters such as custody, visitation, and possession. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Accordingly, we review a decision to modify
2 This case was submitted on Mother’s brief only since the Department was dismissed and Father
did not appeal.
4 conservatorship for an abuse of discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451
(Tex. 1982). A trial court may modify a conservatorship order if modification would be in
the best interest of the child and the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or another
party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the date of
the rendition of the prior order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a)(1)(A).3 We will not
disturb a trial court’s decision in a modification case unless the complaining party shows
a clear abuse of discretion, meaning the trial court acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner or without reference to guiding principles. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d at 196–97. In
our review of a modification order under an abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual
sufficiency challenges to the evidence are not independent grounds of error but are
relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 197. An
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00002-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.T. AND W.T., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 72nd District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-505,551, Honorable Kelley Tesch, Associate Judge Presiding
April 30, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant, Mother, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying the parent-child
relationship that named her possessory conservator of her two children, L.T. and W.T.1
In her sole issue, Mother argues the trial court erred by appointing Father sole managing
conservator with the exclusive right to determine the residence of L.T. and W.T. We affirm
the trial court’s order.
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to the appellant mother as “Mother,” the
appellee father as “Father,” and the children as L.T. and W.T. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were divorced in Dallas County in 2017. They were appointed
joint managing conservators with Mother having the exclusive right to designate the
primary residence of then six-year-old L.T. and three-year-old W.T.
The parties resided in the Dallas area at the time of the divorce in 2017. Mother
testified that Father did not visit the children regularly and did not telephone them or give
them presents. She acknowledged that she and the children “moved a lot,” and that she
did not communicate with Father. During this time, Mother was homeless for one to two
weeks. The children stayed with their paternal grandmother and Mother “chose to stay
in [her] car.” Beginning in 2020, while she was employed as a service coordinator for
Metrocare Services, Mother was stalked and harassed by a work colleague. In June of
2022, Mother quit her job and she, L.T., and W.T. moved to Alabama briefly because of
the trauma associated with the stalking. When her job in Alabama did not work out,
Mother and the children returned to Dallas to get their belongings, then moved to Lubbock
to live with their maternal grandmother. Mother did not tell Father that she was taking the
children to Alabama or that she was residing in Lubbock as of August of 2022.
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services became involved with
Mother and the children in September of 2022. The Department opened an investigation
after receiving a report alleging that Mother was neglectful in her supervision of L.T. and
W.T. The report alleged that Mother was suffering from paranoid delusions and severe
mental health issues. During its investigation, the Department learned that Mother
purchased a chainsaw for protection because she claimed an unknown person was
2 stalking her. Mother withdrew L.T. and W.T. from school to homeschool them. However,
she had not followed through with homeschooling. Maternal grandmother reported that
Mother attempted to “cast a demon” from L.T. and agreed with the Department that
Mother should have no unsupervised contact with L.T. and W.T. due to concerns with
Mother’s untreated mental health issues. The Department filed an original petition for the
protection of L.T. and W.T. The petition also requested the termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights. After a temporary hearing, the Department was appointed
temporary managing conservator and the children were placed in Father’s care in
Arlington. Mother and Father filed counter-petitions to modify the parent-child
relationship.
After the Department removed L.T. and W.T. from her care, Mother received
mental health treatment. She was hospitalized for forty-eight hours at Parkland Hospital
in Dallas and then admitted to a psychiatric hospital for thirty days. She was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder with psychosis “and forced to take medication.” Mother was
prescribed several medications, including Rexulti, Risperdal, and Trazodone. Beginning
in December of 2022, Mother had follow-up appointments with a doctor in Lubbock who
continued her medications. She was supposed to continue taking her medications as
prescribed, but as of the time of trial, she had not taken her medications for several
months because she experienced severe side effects, and it was “absolutely unhealthy
for [her] and [her] body.” Mother disagrees with the diagnosis she received at the
psychiatric hospital and says she has paperwork from her Lubbock doctor that changed
her diagnosis to anxiety with panic attacks, insomnia, and depression. This doctor has
retired, and Mother is waiting to see her doctor in Dallas to obtain an evaluation to
3 determine if she needs medication. She will not take medication for a diagnosis that she
does not believe is appropriate. None of the health care professionals Mother has seen
has told her to stop taking her medications as prescribed.
Jasmyn Brown, a permanency specialist with St. Francis Ministries, testified that
Mother and Father completed the family service plans implemented for each parent by
the Department. L.T. and W.T. have lived with Father and Stepmother in Arlington since
November of 2022. The children attend Berry Elementary and have made friends. They
are A and B students. L.T. and W.T. have thrived in Father’s home. Father and
Stepmother provide a safe, stable, and loving environment for L.T. and W.T. Mother
communicates with Stepmother to arrange visitation with L.T. and W.T. The children love
both their parents and do not want to have to choose between them.
After the hearing, the associate judge dismissed the Department and appointed
Father as sole managing conservator of L.T. and W.T. The court appointed Mother as
possessory conservator with supervised possession of the children. The court found that
these orders were in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending the trial
court abused its discretion by appointing Father sole managing conservator.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has broad discretion to decide the best interest of a child in family law
matters such as custody, visitation, and possession. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Accordingly, we review a decision to modify
2 This case was submitted on Mother’s brief only since the Department was dismissed and Father
did not appeal.
4 conservatorship for an abuse of discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451
(Tex. 1982). A trial court may modify a conservatorship order if modification would be in
the best interest of the child and the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or another
party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the date of
the rendition of the prior order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a)(1)(A).3 We will not
disturb a trial court’s decision in a modification case unless the complaining party shows
a clear abuse of discretion, meaning the trial court acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner or without reference to guiding principles. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d at 196–97. In
our review of a modification order under an abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual
sufficiency challenges to the evidence are not independent grounds of error but are
relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 197. An
appellate court applies a two-prong analysis when it determines whether legal or factual
insufficiency has resulted in an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the trial court had
sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) whether the trial court
erred in applying its discretion. Id. The sufficiency review is related to the first inquiry. If
it is revealed in the first inquiry that there was sufficient evidence, then we must determine
whether the trial court made a reasonable decision, and that involves a conclusion that
the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Id. The trial court’s
exercise of discretion will withstand appellate scrutiny unless clearly abused. In re A.D.T.,
588 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).
3 Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section __” or
“§ __.”
5 APPLICABLE LAW
In determining conservatorship and possession issues, the best interest of the
child shall always be the primary consideration. § 153.002. We review a trial court’s best-
interest finding by using the well-established Holley factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).4
Because of the fact-intensive nature of reviewing custody issues, an appellate
court must afford great deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor
because the child’s and parents’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed
through words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the record.
Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
In her sole issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
modifying the previous order and appointing Father sole managing conservator of the
children. Mother does not challenge the finding that the circumstances of the children or
parties have materially and substantially changed since the divorce; rather, she contends
that the modification to sole managing conservatorship is not in the best interest of the
children. See § 156.101(a)(1)(A). We disagree.
4 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and
physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See id. In the context of a custody modification, other factors to consider include the child’s need for stability and the need to prevent constant litigation. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).
6 A child’s need for permanence through the establishment of a stable, permanent
home has been recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest.
See In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). The record
reflects that L.T. and W.T. were placed with Father shortly after their removal from
Mother’s custody and had lived with Father and Stepmother for more than a year at the
time of trial. Father and Stepmother are providing L.T. and W.T., currently ages eleven
and eight, with a safe, stable, and structured home environment, in which the children are
thriving. They have made friends at school and have perfect attendance. Father owns
his home, and he has been employed full-time as a supervisor at American Building
Maintenance for four years. Moreover, Father and Stepmother accommodate and
encourage L.T. and W.T.’s relationship with Mother.
In contrast, the trial court heard evidence that Mother moved L.T. and W.T.
frequently and struggled to maintain a stable home environment while they were in her
care. On two occasions, Mother and the children were homeless. Mother described
being stalked and harassed for a period of years which led to her fleeing to Alabama
because she feared for her life and the lives of her children. The trial court also heard
testimony concerning Mother’s erratic behavior leading to the Department’s intervention
and Mother’s hospitalization to treat her mental health issues. During the pendency of
the case, Mother refused to take medications prescribed by her treating physicians, had
difficulty staying employed, and was sleeping in her car for days at a time.
The trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities
of the witnesses and was able to “‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be
discerned by merely reading the record.” Bell v. Campbell, 328 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex. 7 App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). We defer to the trial court’s determinations regarding the
credibility of the witnesses. As sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence,
the trial court was entitled to determine which evidence to credit, and, in doing so, could
reasonably conclude that it was in L.T. and W.T.’s best interest that Father be appointed
sole managing conservator.
Because some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support
the trial court’s decision, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding it is in the best
interest of L.T. and W.T. to designate Father as the sole managing conservator with the
right to designate the residence of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Mother’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Finding no abuse of discretion, we overrule Mother’s sole issue and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Judy C. Parker Justice