In the Interest of L.S. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 09-25-00386-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00386-CV ________________

IN THE INTEREST OF L.S.

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On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25DCFM0391 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.M. (“Iris”) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son,

L.S. (“Lee”).1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds exist for the termination of Iris’s parental rights and that termination of her

parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (O), (2).

1 To protect the child’s identity, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s Order of Termination also terminated the child’s father’s parental rights, but the father is not a party to this appeal. 1 Iris’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

termination cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the

record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s

judgment. The attorney filed a letter with this Court indicating that she gave Iris a

copy of the Anders brief she filed, a copy of the appellate record, and notified Iris of

her right to file a pro se brief. The Court notified Iris of her right to file a pro se

response and of the deadline for doing so. Iris did not file a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Iris’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.).

Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal,

and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d

at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error

but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it

2 unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Iris’s parental

rights.2

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS Justice

Submitted on January 2, 2026 Opinion Delivered February 12, 2026

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review in the Supreme Court of 2

Texas, counsel may satisfy her obligations to Appellant “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016). 3