J-S03020-25 J-S03021-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.E.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: L.M., FATHER : : : : : No. 1155 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 29, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000040-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.E.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.E.L., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1156 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 29, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000040-2024
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 17, 2025
L.M. (“Father”) and K.E.L. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal
from the August 29, 2024 decree involuntarily terminating their parental J-S03020-25 J-S03021-25
rights to their biological daughter, L.M.E.M. (“Child”), born in January 2023.1
After review, we affirm.
The Orphans’ Court summarized the relevant factual history of this
matter, as follows:
The family has been known to [the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”)] since [July] 2021[,] because of the abuse of [Child’s] sibling. The sibling is a boy born to the same two parents. When the sibling was one week old, he was crying in the night, and Father went into the room and later told the police he had been in a bad mood and had “squeezed” the baby.
Mother . . . later told police that the squeezing lasted for several minutes and was accompanied by cracking sounds in the infant’s body. Mother initially attempted to call for medical help, but Father deleted her attempted 911 call and shut off her phone. The next day, Mother noticed that the infant’s back was purple. Father told Mother that he believed the infant would get better on his own, but the baby’s body made worsening[,] popping sounds. It took [Parents] a full week to bring the baby to the hospital. Mother told CYF that she had been afraid of how Father would react if she tried to take [Child’s sibling] sooner. At the hospital, the infant, then 13 days old, was found to have multiple rib and other fractures, some in early healing stages and some not, as well as deep circular abrasions on his face, all wounds that would cause substantial pain. The injuries were ascribed to abuse, and the infant was admitted to the hospital. Although the damage to the infant was nearly fatal, he survived.
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1 We have consolidated these appeals sua sponte for ease of disposition. The appeals are from the same court order and involve a similar factual and procedural history. Additionally, the Orphans’ Court addressed both appeals in a single opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (“Where there is more than one appeal from the same order, or where the same question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars as if but a single appeal.”).
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In February [] 2022, Mother pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children. Mother served a term of probation. In March [] 2022, Father pleaded nolo contendere to felony [] aggravated assault of a child under the age of 6.
[Ultimately, Parents] consented to the adoption of [Child’s] sibling, and [i]n March [] 2023, their consents were confirmed. The [sibling] now resides with Mother’s great-grandparents.
*****
Within a month of [Parents] entering their criminal pleas, [they] conceived again, and [in January 2023], Child . . . was born. CYF obtained an emergency protective custody order for her two days later [due to ongoing Agency involvement and Parents’ failure to reach their goals]. [Child] was placed with her maternal great-grandparents [along] with her sibling [where she has remained throughout these proceedings].
On February 27, 2023, [Child] was adjudicated dependent as to Mother. Mother’s goals were to complete supervised visits, participate in mental health treatment through Turtle Creek, and undergo intimate partner violence (“IPV”) treatment through the Women’s Center and Shelter. Moreover, she was to work on parenting [skills] and connecting with the Office of [Intellectual] Disability (“OID”) for evaluation and potential services, if recommended.[2]
On March 13, 2023, Child also was adjudicated dependent as to Father. The court found aggravated circumstances, given Father’s recent history of severe abuse of [Child’s] infant sibling.[3]
2 Mother was additionally required to obtain stable housing. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 44.
3 Despite a finding of aggravated circumstances, the Orphans’ Court required
the Agency to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunite Child with Parents.
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Father’s goals included visitation with parenting assistance with the help of Family Resources,[4] participation in mental health care through Turtle Creek, obtaining stable housing, complying with probation, and addressing IPV through the Women’s Center and Shelter.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/17/24, at 2-3 (citations omitted, capitalization
standardized; emphasis added).
Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court held regular
permanency review hearings and maintained Child’s commitment and
placement. See CYF Exhibit 1.
On April 24, 2024, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Parents’ parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a),
(2), (5), (8), (9), and (b). The Orphans’ Court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the Agency’s petition, at which Parents were each present and
represented by separate counsel. Child, then eighteen months old, had been
in foster care for her entire life; her court-appointed guardian ad litem from
KidsVoice represented her at the hearing.5
4 Family Resources is a child abuse prevention agency. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 6. Their prevention services program includes “home visiting, parent education and parenting classes.” CYF Exhibit 7.
5 Our Supreme Court has held that “appellate courts should engage in sua sponte review to determine if [trial] courts have appointed counsel to represent the legal interests of children in contested termination proceedings, in compliance with” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020). Further, if the appointed legal interest counsel also serves as GAL, “appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Mary Safran (“Ms. Safran”), of Family Resources, who provides
parenting and support assistance, testified that Mother began supervised
visitation in June 2023, which included parent coaching. See N.T., 8/8/24, at
8; see also CYF Exhibit 7. These visitations were intended to occur jointly.
However, as the testimony of Chelsea Croner (“Ms. Croner”), a CYF
caseworker, established, Mother’s and Father’s visits were separated and
Father was not permitted at the Agency after an incident on July 4, 2023,
when Father punched or poked Mother in the eye. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 60,
114, 188-189, 227; see also CYF Exhibit 1; see also Joint Exhibit 1 at ¶ 12.
Ms. Croner testified Mother later characterized the incident as a
“misunderstanding.” See N.T., 8/8/24, at 47.
Ms. Safran described an instance of Father’s aggression in August 2023,
when he appeared at the Agency during Mother’s visitation and was
“aggressive” and “intimidating” toward a staff member in Child’s presence
when reminded that he was not permitted to be present. See id. at 11, 13-
14, 17, 27-28. Ms. Croner testified Mother said Father, “[W]on’t listen to me.
I tell him that I’m going to visit alone and he told [sic] me that he was going
[Orphans’] [C]ourt made a determination” that the child’s legal interests and best interests “did not conflict.” Id.
Here, in compliance with Section 2313(a), the Orphans’ Court appointed the Child’s guardian ad litem from the dependency proceedings, KidsVoice, as her legal interest counsel and determined that “no conflict exists that would prevent KidsVoice from accepting this appointment.” Order, 5/7/24.
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to come to the visit anyway.” See id. at 51-53, 99-100, 187-188. In Ms.
Safran’s words, “Everybody was upset. [Child] was upset. She was a baby.
The driver was crying. It was just a big[,] hot mess.” See id. at 14, 17.
Ms. Croner testified that in September 2023, Father, again in the
presence of Child, was aggressive and cursed at Mother while on
speakerphone during Mother’s separate visit. See id. at 51-52, 81-82; see
also CYF Exhibit 6. Ms. Croner testified that after the call, Mother told the
Agency that they were being “too hard” on Father. Id. at 51; see also CYF
Exhibit 6.
Ms. Safran testified that in December 2023, Mother texted her that she
had argued with Father and “was hiding and locked in her bedroom because
[Father] was destroying her house[,] and she was very scared and thought
that [he] would hurt her.” N.T., 8/8/24, at 11, 48, 87-88. Ms. Safran
remained in communication with Mother until the police arrived. See id. at
11, 32. Ms. Safran testified she and other service providers advised Mother
to get a protection from abuse order (“PFA”) against Father, but Mother made
various excuses and never did so. Ms. Croner further testified Mother was not
consistent in attending individual and group intimate violence sessions after
Child’s birth and did not avail herself of a non-offenders’ program, or of OID
treatment. See id. at 12, 45-46, 48-50, 55-57, 72, 85-87. Ms. Safran
testified Mother downplayed the seriousness of the December 2023 incident,
asserted Child’s sibling, who had suffered severe injuries from Father’s
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violence, was “fine,” and stated she and Father were “getting along very well.”
See id. at 12, 14, 16, 48-49.6
Mother was eventually granted partially unsupervised visits with Child
which she began exercising in May 2024. See id. at 19, 28-29, 60, 87, 147.
Father did not progress to unsupervised visitation. See id. at 61. The court
ultimately reinstated Parents’ joint visitation in July 2024. See id. at 6, 8, 10,
60-61; see also CYF Exhibit 1. Although Father completed two IPV-related
programs, Ms. Croner testified he failed to comply with additional, court-
ordered IPV treatment. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 61-62, 94-96. The hearing
testimony also established Father failed to secure independent housing and
has been living with his aunt for an extended period of time. See id. at 65-
66, 120, 186.
Ms. Croner testified the Agency was seeking termination due to Parents’
failure to make progress in meeting their goals over the course of three years,
dating to the time of Child’s sibling’s birth. See id. at 68. She cited continuing
issues with domestic violence, including Father’s destructive behavior in
December 2023, Mother’s and Father’s inconsistent attendance at sessions at
6 However, Ms. Croner testified Mother changed her shifts at Kentucky Fried
Chicken where Father also worked because he was harassing other staff. See N.T., 8//8/24, 55.
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the Women’s Center and Shelter,7 in addition to concerns about Parents’ plan
to live together, Parents’ mental health, Father’s failure to attend scheduled
visits with Child, Father’s lack of housing stability, and the facts Parents had
only recently progressed to unsupervised visits and Child had been in care for
eighteen months, essentially her whole life. See id. at 50, 68-69, 73, 84-87,
95-96, 99. Ms. Croner also testified Mother has failed to attend Child’s medical
appointments. See id. at 71.8
Dr. Beth Bliss, a licensed psychologist and an expert in child psychology
testified she conducted individual, and four interactional, evaluations of
Parents from 2021 through 2024. See id. at 110-11. Dr. Bliss testified
Parents have displayed a consistent pattern of failing to acknowledge, or
address, the serious issues of partner violence in their relationship.
Significantly, neither Mother nor Father reported Father’s December 2023
destructive outburst to Dr. Bliss. See id. at 113-114, 143, 218; see also CYF
Exhibit 5.9 When she learned for the first time at the hearing about that
outburst, Dr. Bliss testified it raised concerns about whether Father had
7 Ms. Croner testified Mother attended two or three sessions in the six to eight
months prior to the hearing, and she and Father were consistent “no-shows.” See id. at 86-87.
8 Ms. Safran did testify that in the two (supervised) visits Parents had with
Child in the two weeks preceding the hearing, they were very attentive and took good care of Child. See N.T., 8/8/24, 10, 32.
9 When questioned at the hearing, Mother testified the incident had “slipped . . . [her] mind” when speaking to Dr. Bliss. See id. at 217-218.
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actually progressed in his therapy, and his continued unwillingness to take
responsibility for the severity of his actions. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 115-18,
123, 141-42, 164-67, 171-72.10
Dr. Bliss diagnosed Mother as having a mild intellectual disability that
increased the risk she could not protect Child, a concern that was ongoing at
the time of the hearing. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 123-24, 130. 165-66; see also
CYF Exhibit 5.11 Dr. Bliss testified Mother had made good progress but she
still had concerns about both the safety of Mother and Child, and whether
Mother and Father could successfully co-parent Child. See id. at 151, 171-
72. Dr. Bliss diagnosed Father as having unspecified personality disorder with
anti-social traits and borderline intellectual functioning, which is difficult to
treat. See id. at 111-112, 121; see also CYF Exhibit 5. Additionally, the
hearing testimony showed Father attended one therapy session per month
between 2022 and 2024, rather than once per week as she had recommended.
See id. at 64-65, 92-93, 98-99, 101-103, 121-22, 158, 161.
Ms. Croner testified Child is “definitely very well-bonded” with both of
her great-grandparents, with whom she lives and who meet all of her needs.
See id. at 68. Further, Dr. Bliss, who also completed interactional evaluations
10 Ms. Safran also testified Mother was in denial when she discussed the serious injuries Father inflicted on Child’s sibling. See N.T., 8/8/24, 16.
11 In her most recent evaluation, Dr. Bliss found improvement in Mother’s and
Father’s parenting. See id. at 132-33.
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of Child and her maternal great-grandparents, observed a “bond and
attachment” and noted “positive and appropriate” interaction. Id. at 134.
She testified Child “[s]ought out sharing experiences with them. She used
them as a secure base to explore the room with me as a stranger in the room.
She was happy and engaged with them throughout. I didn’t have any
concerns with their interactions.” Id. at 134-135; see also CYF Exhibit 5.
Dr. Bliss opined that the maternal great-grandparents were Child’s
“psychological parents.” CYF Exhibit 5.
Mother testified she participated in parenting classes, but admitted she
needs reminders about when Child’s doctors’ appointments and shots are to
be scheduled. See id. at 207-09. She also testified she did not know Father’s
conduct in December 2023 would be classifiable as domestic violence. See
id. at 217.
Father testified the July 2023 incident involved only his playfully poking
Mother, see id. at 189, he stated Mother has not been truthful about the
event, see id. at 198, and he asserted he has matured since 2021, see id. at
196.
Father also presented the testimony of Samantha Speir (“Ms. Speir”),
his current mental health counselor who saw him bi-weekly for the prior two
years that he had made progress in the prior five months. See id. at 175-77.
Ms. Spier was, however, unaware of the severity of the injuries Father had
inflicted on sibling, and Father had not shared Dr. Bliss’s evaluations with her,
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or the recommendation he receive therapy once per week. See id. at 181-
84.12
By decree dated August 29, 2024, the Orphans’ Court involuntarily
terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
(8), (9), and (b). The court additionally terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b), and changed Child’s
permanency goal to adoption. Parents separately filed timely notices of appeal
and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The Orphans’ Court filed a joint Rule 1925(a)
opinion.
On appeal, Parents each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). See Father’s Brief at 3; Mother’s Brief
at 3.
Our standard of review in this context is well-established:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must ____________________________________________
12 We note with disapproval the exhibits from this proceeding were not originally included with the certified record and were only obtained as a supplement by request of this Court. We remind counsel that appellants bear “the responsibility to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wint, 730 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (stating that “[u]ltimate responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising an issue that requires appellate court access to record materials”) (citation omitted).
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accept the [Orphans’ Court’s] findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the [Orphans’ Court’s] factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the [Orphans’ Court’s] ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to [Orphans’ Courts], who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, [the Orphans’ Court] must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted; capitalization standardized).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs the involuntary
termination of parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Under the Act, the
court must first determine whether the parent’s conduct warrants termination
under one of the grounds set forth at section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under
Section 2511(a) does it engage in assessing the petition under Section
2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,
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71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the
petitioner must satisfy both section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021).
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of section 2511(a),
in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental
rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Thus, we will examine Mother’s arguments pursuant to section 2511(a)(2),
Father’s arguments pursuant to section 2511(a)(9), and Parents’ arguments
pursuant to section 2511(b). Those statutory provisions are as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(9) The parent has been convicted of one of the following in which the victim was a child of the parent:
(ii) a felony under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2702 (relating to aggravated assault);
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (9), (b).
We will address Parents’ subsection (a) claims in turn, beginning with
Father’s.
Section 2511(a)(9) Grounds Regarding Father
Father asserts 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2311(a)(9) permits, but does not require,
termination where a parent has been convicted of a felony such as his
aggravated assault of his newborn son and further argues he has made
significant progress in his goals. See Father’s Brief at 21-23.
The Orphans’ Court declared Father’s conduct of squeezing Child’s then
one-week-old sibling for minutes, despite cracking sounds in the infant’s body,
“depraved.” It also noted that Father had kept Mother from getting medical
help for the child for one week. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/17/24, at 17. The
court further found that Father’s explanations of his aggressive conduct in
2023 were “not credible,” nor were his professions that he no longer becomes
angry or frustrated. Id. It concluded Father had never taken full
responsibility for the severity of Child’s sibling’s injuries. See id. at 18.
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The Orphans’ Court did not commit legal error when it found clear and
convincing evidence supporting the application of Section 2511(a)(9). As the
court explained at the conclusion of testimony at the termination hearing,
Father’s angry outbursts in July and December 2023, evidenced Parents still
have issues of violence. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 269, 274. The court also
expressed concern Father failed to continue treatment after his twenty-four
sessions with a men’s group, although he merited praise for participating in
other mental health treatment. See id. at 276-77. The court also specifically
referred to Dr. Bliss’s diagnoses of Father’s mental health concerns as a threat
to Child’s safety. See id. at 278-79. Thus, the court did not rely solely on
Father’s felony aggravated assault conviction as the basis for termination but
considered the relevant factors concerning the risk he posed to Child. Father’s
claims merits no relief.
Section 2511(a)(2) Grounds Regarding Mother
Section 2511(a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs, not
the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read to
compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong,
continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of
the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect
for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(emphasis in original, internal citation omitted). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds
are not limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal
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and incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097,
1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T.,
296 A.3d 1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that
“[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably
prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247
A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Mother asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a continued
lack of protective capacity given her advancements in parenting skills, mental
health, and IPV. She argues that the evidence did not support the concern
she would be unable to protect Child from Father, and that she has made
major improvements in her parenting and mental health. See Mother’s Brief
at 17-18.
The Orphans’ Court found that Mother continued to exhibit a lack of
protective capacity, failed to complete several of her prescribed permanency
goals, and could not or would not remedy any lack of parental care.
Specifically, the Orphans’ Court cited Mother’s consistent downplaying of the
seriousness of Father’s repeat outbursts and aggressive actions in 2023, her
offering excuses for that conduct, and her withholding information from Dr.
Bliss, offering the non-credible excuse Father’s December 2023 destructive
acts “slipped her mind.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/17/24, at 20. The
trial court also expressed concern for Child’s safety because Mother was vague
with Ms. Safran about Father’s aggravated assault of Child’s sibling that
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brought the sibling into care. See id. at 20. The court acknowledged Mother
had made progress in coached parenting, but expressed concern that Mother
defers to Father and “has an unrealistic view of his parenting capacity.” See
id. at 21. The court explained the risk to Child presented by Mother’s inability
to see Father’s character accurately:
[C]hild’s safety is of overwhelming importance, and the evidence was abundant that Mother will not or cannot resist elevating her relationship with Father over that safety, blinding herself to his aggression and remaining naïve at best to his ability to gain better control and parenting abilities after nearly killing their first infant.
See id. at 21. Finally, the court noted Mother did not follow up on non-
offenders’ treatment and was not consistent in attending her IPV program.
See id. at 21.
The Orphans’ Court correctly found the Agency presented clear and
convincing evidence supporting the application of section 2511(a)(2). The
combination of Mother’s intellectual limitations, her continuing inability to
assess, and respond to, the risk Father presented to her and Child,
inconsistent attendance for IPV counseling, failure to avail herself of IOD
services, and Dr. Bliss’s assessment she was not ready to care for the Child,
see N.T., 8/8/25, at 135-136, established Mother’s repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal which has caused Child to be without
essential parental control or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental
well-being. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. Moreover, that evidence established
Mother cannot or will not remedy those deficiencies. See id. Though
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commendable, Mother’s progress over three years was not sufficient to permit
her to care for her nearly-two-year-old Child, who had spent her entire life in
care. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.
2006). Mother’s claim does not merit relief.
Section 2511(b) Grounds Regarding Parents
Section 2511(b) requires the court to “give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” when
considering whether to involuntarily terminate parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
We note that “the determination of the child’s particular developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case
basis” focusing on the specific needs of the child under consideration. K.T.,
296 A.3d at 1105-1106. This inquiry must include consideration of the bond
between the parent and the child. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993). Not all bonds are healthy or worthy of consideration; “only a necessary
and beneficial” parental bond should be maintained. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1009;
In re K.K.S.-R., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (recognizing that the
mere existence of a bond is not proof of a beneficial bond, and that “[e]ven
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the most abused of children will often harbor some positive emotion towards
the abusive parent”). A bond is “necessary and beneficial” if its severance
would cause extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable
harm. K.T., 296 at 1109-10. Further, an Orphans’ Court has the discretion
to prioritize the safety and security of children over any parental bond. See
M.E., 283 A.3d at 839. Courts should also consider whether the Child is in a
pre-adoptive home and has a bond with foster parents. K.T., 296 A.3d at
1106. A child’s “emotional needs and welfare include intangibles, such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” Id.
Parents challenge the Orphans’ Court’s finding that termination of their
parental rights served Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child pursuant to section 2511(b). They each contend that
they enjoy a positive or necessary and beneficial bond with Child, which
termination would negatively impact. See Father’s Brief at 24-25; Mother’s
Brief at 22.
In determining that termination additionally served Child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section
2511(b), the Orphans’ Court found neither Mother nor Father could meet
Child’s needs for security and stability, and although Child had a growing bond
with Mother, Child’s “truest” bonds were with foster parents, who were her
great-grandparents, with whom she had lived virtually her entire life, and who
provided for all of her needs. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/17/24, at 24.
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It further found Father’s “history of . . . violence and his continuing
aggression” rendered him incapable of safeguarding Child, and Mother’s
minimization of Father’s anger and aggression and inability to stand up to him
rendered her unable to ensure Child’s safety. See id. at 23.13 In further
support of its finding, the court cited Father’s difficulty understanding Child’s
developmental stage, the fact he never progressed to unsupervised visits, and
Mother’s unrealistic assertion she could protect Child’s safety if they all lived
together. See id. The court concluded that “[f]orcing continued efforts at
reunification [would] only create further instability by prolonging Child’s
uncertain living arrangements and magnifying attachments with [Parents]
when they are far from achieving the ability to safely parent Child. The weight
of the evidence and factors to consider under Section 2511(b) tips greatly
toward providing Child with permanence in her current home.” See id. at 25.
We discern no abuse of discretion. The record fully supports the
Orphans’ Court’s finding that Child’s developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare favors termination pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Undoubtedly, Dr. Bliss perceived Parents had made “significant progress.”
See N.T., 8/8/24, at 151. However, Dr. Bliss was concerned that IPV issues
continued to exist between them, including Father’s destructive violence in
13 The court also noted Mother’s failure to inform Dr. Bliss of Father’s destructive behavior in December 2023. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/17/24, at 24.
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December 2023, Mother had concealed from her and she first learned of at
the hearing, and Mother’s subservience to Father. All those facts led Dr. Bliss
to the conclusion neither parent was ready to care for the Child.14
We discern no abuse of discretion with the Orphans’ Court’s finding that
the termination of Parents’ parental rights will serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child pursuant to section
2511(b). Upon review, the record substantiates that Child does not share a
“necessary and beneficial” relationship with Parents and instead shares such
a relationship with her maternal great-grandparents. See K.T., 296 A.3d at
1113.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Parents’
parental rights.
Decree affirmed.
14 To the extent that Parents emphasize Dr. Bliss’s reference in her report to
subsidized permanent legal custodianship (“SPLC”)14 as an option, see Father’s Brief at 25; Mother’s Brief at 22, the Agency never approved or pursued such an arrangement. Moreover, Dr. Bliss testified that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause Child to suffer “extreme emotional detriment,” N.T., 8/8/24, at 139-140, Child’s safety and security outweighed their growing bond, see id. at 137-138, and foster parents were Child’s “psychological parents.” CYF Exhibit 5. Further, as the Orphans’ Court noted, Father had a lesser bond with Child.
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DATE: 3/17/2025
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