IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0425 Filed June 18, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF L.K., A.H., and T.H., Minor Children,
T.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Shannon L. Wallace of Youth Law Center, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
After more than three years of family-reunification services,1 the district
court entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her three
children, born in 2015, 2018, and 2023.2 The mother appeals, claiming the State
failed to prove the grounds for termination cited by the court and termination is not
in the children’s best interests because of the bond she shares with them. She
also claims her due process rights were violated “when the court permitted hearsay
evidence to be admitted at the termination trial.” Upon our de novo review, see In
re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019), we affirm the termination of the mother’s
parental rights.
I. Hearsay Evidence
We turn first to the mother’s evidentiary challenge. She claims the court
abused its discretion by considering “inadmissible” hearsay evidence and she “did
not receive a fair trial.” The mother does not specify what evidence she argues is
hearsay. Her failure to “point us to the facts she believes support reversal waives
error.” In re of C.B., No. 20-0048, 2020 WL 1049888, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 4, 2020) (citing In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all
encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo
review.”)).
1 This family most recently came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (the department) in 2021. Services were also provided to the family in 2018, to address concerns similar to those present this case. 2 The parental rights of the father of L.K. and A.H. were previously terminated. The
parental rights of the father of T.H. were not terminated; in November 2024, he was provided a six-month extension to work toward reunification. 3
We elect to proceed to the mother’s claim, however, by analyzing the
exhibits and testimony she objected to on hearsay grounds at the termination
hearing—specifically a statement from her therapist; a Family Centered Services
(FCS) visit note; and emails from A.H.’s teacher, the children’s therapist, and the
children’s doctor.3
In deciding to allow the challenged evidence, the district court observed that
our supreme court has determined hearsay evidence is admissible in termination-
of-parental-rights hearings. See, e.g., In re E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d 531, 532–33
(Iowa 1987). The mother’s attorney acknowledged such and cited this court’s
holding in In re J.M., No. 02-1768, 2002 WL 31883595, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2002), as “consistent with” the ruling in E.J.R. Ultimately, the court
admitted the evidence subject to the mother’s objection. Finding no error in the
court’s admission of the challenged evidence,4 we affirm on this issue.
II. Grounds for Termination
Next, the mother claims the State did not prove termination by clear and
convincing evidence. “Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a
three-step analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). First, the court
must determine whether a statutory ground for termination exists. Id. Here, the
court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
3 The mother also objected to two other email exhibits offered by the guardian ad
litem (GAL), but the GAL withdrew those exhibits. 4 Specifically regarding the testimony from the mother’s therapist relating to the
opinion of the children’s therapist as to whether the children are suffering from trauma, even assuming that testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it was cumulative of other evidence presented and therefore not prejudicial. See In re S.D., No. 22-0683, 2022 WL 2347512, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022). 4
section 232.116(1)(f) (2024) as to the older children, L.K. and A.H., and under
section 232.116(h) as to the youngest child, T.H. These two paragraphs permit
termination upon clear and convincing proof that (1) the children meet the age
requirements of the applicable subparagraphs; (2) the children have been
adjudicated in need of assistance; (3) the children have been removed from the
physical custody of the parents for the time specified in the applicable
subparagraphs; and (4) the children cannot be returned to the custody of the
parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), (h).
The mother challenges only the fourth element under both paragraphs,
contending the children could be returned to her custody at the time of the
termination hearing in December 2024. Specifically, she claims that she
“demonstrated through her participation in therapy, with her interactions with the
children and her care that the reasons for adjudication no longer existed and the
children should have been returned to her care and custody.”
L.K. and A.H. were removed from the mother’s custody in August 2021, for
reports of domestic violence (between the mother and multiple individuals); the
mother’s methamphetamine and marijuana use; unsanitary and unsafe living
conditions; and the mother’s mental health concerns. At that time, the children
had been informally residing with the maternal grandmother, but they had
unsupervised contact with the mother. The children were adjudicated in need of
assistance. The mother engaged in services, and in February 2023, the children
were returned to her custody. T.H. was born in April. The three children were
removed from the mother’s custody approximately six months later, due to similar
concerns as those initially present. The mother blamed the department for the way 5
her case had progressed. At the termination hearing, however, the mother
acknowledged the children were removed from her custody in fall 2023 due to
“[t]attooing the children, being exposed and staying around unapproved in—like
unapproved people and homes, mental health.”
True, the mother had participated in therapy for more than three years since
the inception of this case in 2021 (although in 2024, the mother was discharged
from her prior therapist due to no-shows at scheduled appointments). At the
termination hearing, however, the mother’s current therapist opined the mother
had not “show[n] stability in the long-term in regards to her mental health.” The
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0425 Filed June 18, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF L.K., A.H., and T.H., Minor Children,
T.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Shannon L. Wallace of Youth Law Center, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
After more than three years of family-reunification services,1 the district
court entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her three
children, born in 2015, 2018, and 2023.2 The mother appeals, claiming the State
failed to prove the grounds for termination cited by the court and termination is not
in the children’s best interests because of the bond she shares with them. She
also claims her due process rights were violated “when the court permitted hearsay
evidence to be admitted at the termination trial.” Upon our de novo review, see In
re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019), we affirm the termination of the mother’s
parental rights.
I. Hearsay Evidence
We turn first to the mother’s evidentiary challenge. She claims the court
abused its discretion by considering “inadmissible” hearsay evidence and she “did
not receive a fair trial.” The mother does not specify what evidence she argues is
hearsay. Her failure to “point us to the facts she believes support reversal waives
error.” In re of C.B., No. 20-0048, 2020 WL 1049888, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 4, 2020) (citing In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all
encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo
review.”)).
1 This family most recently came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (the department) in 2021. Services were also provided to the family in 2018, to address concerns similar to those present this case. 2 The parental rights of the father of L.K. and A.H. were previously terminated. The
parental rights of the father of T.H. were not terminated; in November 2024, he was provided a six-month extension to work toward reunification. 3
We elect to proceed to the mother’s claim, however, by analyzing the
exhibits and testimony she objected to on hearsay grounds at the termination
hearing—specifically a statement from her therapist; a Family Centered Services
(FCS) visit note; and emails from A.H.’s teacher, the children’s therapist, and the
children’s doctor.3
In deciding to allow the challenged evidence, the district court observed that
our supreme court has determined hearsay evidence is admissible in termination-
of-parental-rights hearings. See, e.g., In re E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d 531, 532–33
(Iowa 1987). The mother’s attorney acknowledged such and cited this court’s
holding in In re J.M., No. 02-1768, 2002 WL 31883595, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2002), as “consistent with” the ruling in E.J.R. Ultimately, the court
admitted the evidence subject to the mother’s objection. Finding no error in the
court’s admission of the challenged evidence,4 we affirm on this issue.
II. Grounds for Termination
Next, the mother claims the State did not prove termination by clear and
convincing evidence. “Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a
three-step analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). First, the court
must determine whether a statutory ground for termination exists. Id. Here, the
court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
3 The mother also objected to two other email exhibits offered by the guardian ad
litem (GAL), but the GAL withdrew those exhibits. 4 Specifically regarding the testimony from the mother’s therapist relating to the
opinion of the children’s therapist as to whether the children are suffering from trauma, even assuming that testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it was cumulative of other evidence presented and therefore not prejudicial. See In re S.D., No. 22-0683, 2022 WL 2347512, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022). 4
section 232.116(1)(f) (2024) as to the older children, L.K. and A.H., and under
section 232.116(h) as to the youngest child, T.H. These two paragraphs permit
termination upon clear and convincing proof that (1) the children meet the age
requirements of the applicable subparagraphs; (2) the children have been
adjudicated in need of assistance; (3) the children have been removed from the
physical custody of the parents for the time specified in the applicable
subparagraphs; and (4) the children cannot be returned to the custody of the
parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), (h).
The mother challenges only the fourth element under both paragraphs,
contending the children could be returned to her custody at the time of the
termination hearing in December 2024. Specifically, she claims that she
“demonstrated through her participation in therapy, with her interactions with the
children and her care that the reasons for adjudication no longer existed and the
children should have been returned to her care and custody.”
L.K. and A.H. were removed from the mother’s custody in August 2021, for
reports of domestic violence (between the mother and multiple individuals); the
mother’s methamphetamine and marijuana use; unsanitary and unsafe living
conditions; and the mother’s mental health concerns. At that time, the children
had been informally residing with the maternal grandmother, but they had
unsupervised contact with the mother. The children were adjudicated in need of
assistance. The mother engaged in services, and in February 2023, the children
were returned to her custody. T.H. was born in April. The three children were
removed from the mother’s custody approximately six months later, due to similar
concerns as those initially present. The mother blamed the department for the way 5
her case had progressed. At the termination hearing, however, the mother
acknowledged the children were removed from her custody in fall 2023 due to
“[t]attooing the children, being exposed and staying around unapproved in—like
unapproved people and homes, mental health.”
True, the mother had participated in therapy for more than three years since
the inception of this case in 2021 (although in 2024, the mother was discharged
from her prior therapist due to no-shows at scheduled appointments). At the
termination hearing, however, the mother’s current therapist opined the mother
had not “show[n] stability in the long-term in regards to her mental health.” The
therapist testified the mother’s longest period of “sustained stability” has been
“about two to three months.” She further testified that the mother had not taken
responsibility or accountability for her lack of supervision of the children or allowing
them to be around unsafe people.
Relating to the mother’s interactions with the children, the mother testified
she had only seen the children in person three times since September 2024
because her visits had been suspended due to her escalating behaviors. The
mother also reported that T.H.’s father has a history of child abuse and is “unsafe.”
She agreed there was a no-contact order in place between T.H.’s father and T.H.,
stemming from his physical abuse of T.H. Yet the mother had recently allowed the
father around T.H. during a visit with the children.
On the relevant inquiry to this issue, the court found:
At the present time, the children in interest cannot be returned to Mother’s custody as provided in Iowa Code section 232.102 because they would be subjected to further adjudicatory harm as Mother continues to have unresolved mental health issues, lack[s] the ability to meet the children’s emotional and mental health needs, continues 6
to associate with unsafe persons, and lacks the ability to provide appropriate supervision, which were all issues which led to removal.
We concur and conclude the elements of section 232.116(f) and (h) were satisfied.
III. Best Interests
Termination also must serve the children’s best interests. To determine
best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and
to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Id.
§ 232.116(2).
The mother argues termination is not in the children’s best interests due to
the bond she shares with them.5 The record confirms the children share a bond
with the mother. That said, that bond must be viewed through the lens of the
mother’s overall presence in their young lives. L.K. and A.H. were removed from
the mother’s care in 2021, and they were living primarily with their grandmother
before that time. Although they returned to the mother’s custody for a portion of
2023, they have spent much of the last four years out of her custody. And T.H.
has been out of the mother’s custody nearly all his life.
“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the
State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping
5 “We address only those steps raised by a parent.” In re A.B., No. 24-1979, 2025 WL 1324338, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 7, 2025). The mother does not separately claim her bond with the children should preclude termination pursuant to the permissive exception under section 232.116(3), so we analyze her claim only as a best-interests challenge. See In re L.A., __ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 855764, at *3 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“We interpret the father’s bond-based argument as a best-interests argument rather than a permissive-exception argument because his issue heading referenced only best interests and that is the thrust of his argument.”). 7
someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home
for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). Here, despite years of
services, many of the issues that prompted the department’s involvement with the
family remained unresolved at the time of the termination hearing. Termination is
in the children’s best interests.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.