In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.I.B., WD84107 Appellant, OPINION FILED: v. March 8, 2022 JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Jalilah Otto, Judge
Before Division Two: Thomas N. Chapman, P.J., Karen King Mitchell, and W. Douglas Thomson, JJ.
L.I.B. appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County in which the court
found that L.I.B. committed acts which would constitute second-degree assault and armed
criminal action if committed by an adult. L.I.B. contends that the circuit court erred in requiring
him to participate in the adjudication hearing via two-way videoconference from secure
detention. L.I.B. contends that his physical exclusion from the adjudication violated his
constitutional rights to be present and confront his accusers face to face. The circuit court’s
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. Background
On March 15, 2020, the Jackson County Juvenile Officer filed a two-count petition in the
circuit court, alleging that L.I.B. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would
constitute first-degree assault under section 565.0501 and armed criminal action under section
571.015. The Juvenile Officer alleged that, on March 14, 2020, L.I.B. knowingly caused serious
physical injury to M.W. by shooting him with a handgun.
On August 19, 2020, the circuit court held L.I.B.’s adjudication hearing utilizing a
“hybrid” format in which the majority of people involved with the proceeding (including the
judge, L.I.B.’s counsel, counsel for the Juvenile Officer, L.I.B.’s mother, L.I.B.’s sister, and all
witnesses (while testifying)) would be permitted to be present in the courtroom in person,
whereas L.I.B. was not allowed to be physically present at his own adjudication and appeared
instead only via Webex videoconferencing technology from secure detention.
At the beginning of the hearing, L.I.B. objected to being physically excluded from his
own adjudication and being allowed to participate only via video conferencing. The oral
objection was accompanied by a written motion, which argued that allowing L.I.B. to appear
only via video violated L.I.B.’s due process rights to be adjudicated in person and to confront
witnesses. The circuit court overruled L.I.B.’s objection, stating that the use of Webex had been
sanctioned by the Missouri Supreme Court in response to the ongoing pandemic for the purpose
of having limited numbers of people in the courtroom.
As the adjudication proceeded, the Juvenile Officer called seven witnesses, who each
testified in person.2 After the witnesses’ direct examinations, L.I.B.’s counsel was given an
1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 2 A number of exhibits were also admitted.
2 opportunity to cross-examine each of the witnesses. Court was then adjourned and the remainder
of the hearing was scheduled for a later day.
On September 2, 2020, the hearing proceeded again in a “hybrid” format, in which L.I.B.
would appear only from secure detention via videoconferencing technology. The court
acknowledged that L.I.B. had made a record of his objection to proceeding via Webex, and
L.I.B.’s counsel informed the court that L.I.B. would stand on that previous record of objection.
The Juvenile Officer rested without putting on further evidence, and the court took up and denied
L.I.B.’s motion for judgment of acquittal. L.I.B. then called three witnesses (his mother and his
two sisters) to testify on his behalf.
Following the adjudication, the circuit court determined that, on Count 1, the Juvenile
Officer established beyond a reasonable doubt that L.I.B. had committed the lesser included
offense of second-degree assault in violation of section 565.052. The court also sustained the
allegations in Count 2 of armed criminal action. Disposition was held on October 8, 2020, after
which the court entered a judgment committing L.I.B. to the custody of the Division of Youth
Services.
L.I.B. appeals.
Standard of Review
“Juvenile proceedings are reviewed in the same manner as other court-tried cases.” D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cnty Juv. Off., 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotations omitted). “This Court will affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding unless it is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. Whether a person’s constitutional rights were violated is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Mo. banc 2006). Properly preserved constitutional violations are presumed prejudicial. Id. at 881. “The constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceedings are also applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings due to the possibility of a deprivation of liberty equivalent to criminal incarceration.” In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc 2007).
3 J.A.T. v. Jackson Cnty. Juv. Off., 637 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Mo. banc 2022) (brackets omitted).
Analysis
In his sole point, L.I.B. contends that the circuit court erred by overruling his objection
and proceeding in the adjudication without his physical presence in the courtroom in violation of
his rights to due process, to be present, and to confront adverse witnesses, as provided by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 10
and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection applies to juvenile proceedings.”
Id. at 7 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967)). “The United States Supreme Court has
held certain rights enumerated within the Bill of Rights apply to juvenile proceedings, including
notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege
against self-incrimination.” Id. (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 56). “One of the most basic
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). “The right to
be present at critical stages of trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the Missouri
Constitution, and Missouri statutory law.” J.A.T., 637 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Johns, 34
S.W.3d 93, 116 (Mo. banc 2000)). “A defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any
stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to
the fairness of the procedure.” Id. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)).3
3 We note that the right to be present may be voluntarily waived, State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015), or lost due to severely disruptive behavior. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.I.B., WD84107 Appellant, OPINION FILED: v. March 8, 2022 JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Jalilah Otto, Judge
Before Division Two: Thomas N. Chapman, P.J., Karen King Mitchell, and W. Douglas Thomson, JJ.
L.I.B. appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County in which the court
found that L.I.B. committed acts which would constitute second-degree assault and armed
criminal action if committed by an adult. L.I.B. contends that the circuit court erred in requiring
him to participate in the adjudication hearing via two-way videoconference from secure
detention. L.I.B. contends that his physical exclusion from the adjudication violated his
constitutional rights to be present and confront his accusers face to face. The circuit court’s
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. Background
On March 15, 2020, the Jackson County Juvenile Officer filed a two-count petition in the
circuit court, alleging that L.I.B. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would
constitute first-degree assault under section 565.0501 and armed criminal action under section
571.015. The Juvenile Officer alleged that, on March 14, 2020, L.I.B. knowingly caused serious
physical injury to M.W. by shooting him with a handgun.
On August 19, 2020, the circuit court held L.I.B.’s adjudication hearing utilizing a
“hybrid” format in which the majority of people involved with the proceeding (including the
judge, L.I.B.’s counsel, counsel for the Juvenile Officer, L.I.B.’s mother, L.I.B.’s sister, and all
witnesses (while testifying)) would be permitted to be present in the courtroom in person,
whereas L.I.B. was not allowed to be physically present at his own adjudication and appeared
instead only via Webex videoconferencing technology from secure detention.
At the beginning of the hearing, L.I.B. objected to being physically excluded from his
own adjudication and being allowed to participate only via video conferencing. The oral
objection was accompanied by a written motion, which argued that allowing L.I.B. to appear
only via video violated L.I.B.’s due process rights to be adjudicated in person and to confront
witnesses. The circuit court overruled L.I.B.’s objection, stating that the use of Webex had been
sanctioned by the Missouri Supreme Court in response to the ongoing pandemic for the purpose
of having limited numbers of people in the courtroom.
As the adjudication proceeded, the Juvenile Officer called seven witnesses, who each
testified in person.2 After the witnesses’ direct examinations, L.I.B.’s counsel was given an
1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 2 A number of exhibits were also admitted.
2 opportunity to cross-examine each of the witnesses. Court was then adjourned and the remainder
of the hearing was scheduled for a later day.
On September 2, 2020, the hearing proceeded again in a “hybrid” format, in which L.I.B.
would appear only from secure detention via videoconferencing technology. The court
acknowledged that L.I.B. had made a record of his objection to proceeding via Webex, and
L.I.B.’s counsel informed the court that L.I.B. would stand on that previous record of objection.
The Juvenile Officer rested without putting on further evidence, and the court took up and denied
L.I.B.’s motion for judgment of acquittal. L.I.B. then called three witnesses (his mother and his
two sisters) to testify on his behalf.
Following the adjudication, the circuit court determined that, on Count 1, the Juvenile
Officer established beyond a reasonable doubt that L.I.B. had committed the lesser included
offense of second-degree assault in violation of section 565.052. The court also sustained the
allegations in Count 2 of armed criminal action. Disposition was held on October 8, 2020, after
which the court entered a judgment committing L.I.B. to the custody of the Division of Youth
Services.
L.I.B. appeals.
Standard of Review
“Juvenile proceedings are reviewed in the same manner as other court-tried cases.” D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cnty Juv. Off., 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotations omitted). “This Court will affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding unless it is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. Whether a person’s constitutional rights were violated is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Mo. banc 2006). Properly preserved constitutional violations are presumed prejudicial. Id. at 881. “The constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceedings are also applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings due to the possibility of a deprivation of liberty equivalent to criminal incarceration.” In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc 2007).
3 J.A.T. v. Jackson Cnty. Juv. Off., 637 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Mo. banc 2022) (brackets omitted).
Analysis
In his sole point, L.I.B. contends that the circuit court erred by overruling his objection
and proceeding in the adjudication without his physical presence in the courtroom in violation of
his rights to due process, to be present, and to confront adverse witnesses, as provided by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 10
and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection applies to juvenile proceedings.”
Id. at 7 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967)). “The United States Supreme Court has
held certain rights enumerated within the Bill of Rights apply to juvenile proceedings, including
notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege
against self-incrimination.” Id. (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 56). “One of the most basic
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). “The right to
be present at critical stages of trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the Missouri
Constitution, and Missouri statutory law.” J.A.T., 637 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Johns, 34
S.W.3d 93, 116 (Mo. banc 2000)). “A defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any
stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to
the fairness of the procedure.” Id. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)).3
3 We note that the right to be present may be voluntarily waived, State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015), or lost due to severely disruptive behavior. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). However, neither of these circumstances are present in the matter before us.
4 In J.A.T., the Missouri Supreme Court recently decided a case substantially similar to the
one now before us. See id. at 8-9. In J.A.T., like the matter now before us, the circuit court had
excluded a juvenile from being physically present in the courtroom at his adjudication hearing
during which his guilt or innocence would be determined. Id. The circuit court had instead
allowed the juvenile to be present only through two-way video over the juvenile’s objections. Id.
The circuit court’s reasons for excluding the juvenile related to the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic and the circuit court’s belief that allowing the juvenile to be present only via two-way
video was consistent with the Missouri Supreme Court’s Operational Directives and was not
violative of the juvenile’s due process rights. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the
circuit court’s judgment and remanded. Id. at 10. The J.A.T. Court held that the juvenile’s
constitutional right to due process was violated by requiring him to appear at his own
adjudication hearing via two-way video over objection. Id. The J.A.T. Court further noted that
its orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic were drafted “to ensure the
constitutional and statutory rights of juveniles were protected during the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Id.
The same result is warranted here. In this matter, L.I.B. asserted his right to be
physically present at his adjudication hearing. Over his objection, L.I.B. was denied the right to
be present at a critical stage of the proceedings during which his guilt or innocence would be
determined. The circuit court erred in requiring L.I.B. to participate in his own adjudication only
by two-way video over his objection.
“Properly preserved constitutional violations are presumed prejudicial.” Id. at 7 (citing
Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881). In this matter, the Juvenile Officer has not asserted that this
5 presumption was rebutted. Accordingly, the deprivation of L.I.B.’s due process right to be
physically present during his own adjudication constitutes reversible error.
Conclusion
The circuit court’s judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
All concur.