IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0940 Filed April 12, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF L.H., ALLEGED TO BE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY IMPAIRED,
L.H., Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Ty Rogers,
District Associate Judge.
A respondent appeals his civil commitment. AFFIRMED.
William (Bill) Monroe, Burlington, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Chandlor Glenn Collins, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2
PER CURIAM.
L.H. appeals a district court order continuing his civil commitment. He
contends counsel was ineffective for failing to move to recuse the judge, failing to
object to a periodic report, and failing to adequately challenge his commitment. 1
He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We find counsel was not
ineffective. Sufficient evidence supports L.H.’s continued commitment. We affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
L.H. is serving a life sentence for murder. His conviction was affirmed on
direct appeal in 2005. He has been civilly committed since 2013. See In re L.H.,
No. 19-1888, 2020 WL 2988236, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (per curiam).
He is diagnosed with schizophrenia and a delusional disorder with an erotomanic
subtype. His mental illness causes him to engage in hypergraphia—excessive
writing—which includes writing sexually explicit content to staff and other members
of the public. He also has exposed himself and masturbated in front of prison staff.
He most recently received a “major report” in January 2022 for sexual misconduct
and sexual violence after he was discovered masturbating in front of a prison
guard.
1 Our supreme court has not held that a respondent subject to an involuntary commitment proceeding has a right to effective assistance of counsel. See In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437, 438-39 n.3 (Iowa 2005) (explaining that while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is not directly implicated” by civil commitments, because committees have a statutory right to counsel, “due process demands the appointed counsel provide effective assistance”). Our court has previously addressed this claim, determining that the right to effective assistance of counsel “appears to be consistent with precedent.” In re D.M.T., No. 11-0654, 2012 WL 1440230, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (citation omitted). We elect to reach the merits of L.H.’s claims. 3
L.H. sent multiple pro se letters to the district court in the spring of 2022. In
the letters, he claimed prison staff engaged in harassment directed toward him
since 2007. He also alleged staff submitted false reports about him, resulting in
his ongoing commitment. He asked to be transferred to a prison in Minnesota. He
asserted that he did not need “this unlawful medication to function correctly in my
everyday life.” In a May 5, 2022, order, the court noted L.H.’s pro se letters were
“nonsensical,” but scheduled a hearing soon thereafter “to review the necessity of
the current committal proceedings”.
A review hearing was held on May 18, 2022. The State relied on the
periodic report submitted on May 17, 2022, by the staff psychiatrist nurse
practitioner under Iowa Code section 229.15 (2022). That report alleged L.H. was
seriously mentally impaired, his condition had remained unchanged from the last
review hearing, and identified the January 2022 report as a recent episode of
dangerous behavior. L.H., through counsel, presented no evidence. The district
court ordered L.H. to remain civilly committed. L.H. now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Crane, 704
N.W.2d at 438. “To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a
defendant must prove (1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2)
prejudice resulted.” Id. at 439.
To the extent L.H. raises a free-standing claim challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence, we review such claim for the correction of errors at law. In re
B.T.G., 784 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). “The district court’s findings
of fact are binding upon this court if supported by substantial evidence. Evidence 4
is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the findings were
established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
III. Judicial Bias
L.H. contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to recuse the
judge. In its May 5, 2022 order, the court characterized L.H.’s pro se letters as
“nonsensical in nature.” Because those letters allege correctional staff fabricated
reports about him that serve as the basis for his continued commitment, he alleges
the court pre-decided the issue of his continued civil commitment.
We reject L.H.’s claim for two reasons. First, even though the May 5 order
found L.H.’s letters nonsensical in nature, the court immediately thereafter issued
an order scheduling a hearing “to review the necessity of the current committal
proceedings.” This suggests that the court did not dismiss L.H.’s complaints
summarily. Instead, it suggests that the court, while not understanding L.H.’s
filings because the court found them nonsensical, scheduled a hearing to give L.H.
the opportunity to voice any concerns he had about continued commitment. As
the court had not prejudged the issue, the court had no obligation to be recused
and counsel was not ineffective for not requesting recusal.
Second, the supreme court recently summarized a judge’s obligation to
recuse themselves from a proceeding:
“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11(A); see also Iowa Code § 602.1606(1)(a) (2020) (“A judicial officer is disqualified from acting in a proceeding . . . if . . . [t]he judicial officer has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”). The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology, defines impartiality as “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in 5
considering issues that may come before a judge.” Actual prejudice must be shown before recusal is necessary, and speculation is not sufficient. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). The test is “whether reasonable persons with knowledge of all facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994). The party seeking disqualification must show that the judge’s “alleged bias and prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the case.” State v. Bear, 452 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1990).
Carter v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0940 Filed April 12, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF L.H., ALLEGED TO BE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY IMPAIRED,
L.H., Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Ty Rogers,
District Associate Judge.
A respondent appeals his civil commitment. AFFIRMED.
William (Bill) Monroe, Burlington, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Chandlor Glenn Collins, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2
PER CURIAM.
L.H. appeals a district court order continuing his civil commitment. He
contends counsel was ineffective for failing to move to recuse the judge, failing to
object to a periodic report, and failing to adequately challenge his commitment. 1
He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We find counsel was not
ineffective. Sufficient evidence supports L.H.’s continued commitment. We affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
L.H. is serving a life sentence for murder. His conviction was affirmed on
direct appeal in 2005. He has been civilly committed since 2013. See In re L.H.,
No. 19-1888, 2020 WL 2988236, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (per curiam).
He is diagnosed with schizophrenia and a delusional disorder with an erotomanic
subtype. His mental illness causes him to engage in hypergraphia—excessive
writing—which includes writing sexually explicit content to staff and other members
of the public. He also has exposed himself and masturbated in front of prison staff.
He most recently received a “major report” in January 2022 for sexual misconduct
and sexual violence after he was discovered masturbating in front of a prison
guard.
1 Our supreme court has not held that a respondent subject to an involuntary commitment proceeding has a right to effective assistance of counsel. See In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437, 438-39 n.3 (Iowa 2005) (explaining that while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is not directly implicated” by civil commitments, because committees have a statutory right to counsel, “due process demands the appointed counsel provide effective assistance”). Our court has previously addressed this claim, determining that the right to effective assistance of counsel “appears to be consistent with precedent.” In re D.M.T., No. 11-0654, 2012 WL 1440230, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (citation omitted). We elect to reach the merits of L.H.’s claims. 3
L.H. sent multiple pro se letters to the district court in the spring of 2022. In
the letters, he claimed prison staff engaged in harassment directed toward him
since 2007. He also alleged staff submitted false reports about him, resulting in
his ongoing commitment. He asked to be transferred to a prison in Minnesota. He
asserted that he did not need “this unlawful medication to function correctly in my
everyday life.” In a May 5, 2022, order, the court noted L.H.’s pro se letters were
“nonsensical,” but scheduled a hearing soon thereafter “to review the necessity of
the current committal proceedings”.
A review hearing was held on May 18, 2022. The State relied on the
periodic report submitted on May 17, 2022, by the staff psychiatrist nurse
practitioner under Iowa Code section 229.15 (2022). That report alleged L.H. was
seriously mentally impaired, his condition had remained unchanged from the last
review hearing, and identified the January 2022 report as a recent episode of
dangerous behavior. L.H., through counsel, presented no evidence. The district
court ordered L.H. to remain civilly committed. L.H. now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Crane, 704
N.W.2d at 438. “To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a
defendant must prove (1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2)
prejudice resulted.” Id. at 439.
To the extent L.H. raises a free-standing claim challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence, we review such claim for the correction of errors at law. In re
B.T.G., 784 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). “The district court’s findings
of fact are binding upon this court if supported by substantial evidence. Evidence 4
is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the findings were
established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
III. Judicial Bias
L.H. contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to recuse the
judge. In its May 5, 2022 order, the court characterized L.H.’s pro se letters as
“nonsensical in nature.” Because those letters allege correctional staff fabricated
reports about him that serve as the basis for his continued commitment, he alleges
the court pre-decided the issue of his continued civil commitment.
We reject L.H.’s claim for two reasons. First, even though the May 5 order
found L.H.’s letters nonsensical in nature, the court immediately thereafter issued
an order scheduling a hearing “to review the necessity of the current committal
proceedings.” This suggests that the court did not dismiss L.H.’s complaints
summarily. Instead, it suggests that the court, while not understanding L.H.’s
filings because the court found them nonsensical, scheduled a hearing to give L.H.
the opportunity to voice any concerns he had about continued commitment. As
the court had not prejudged the issue, the court had no obligation to be recused
and counsel was not ineffective for not requesting recusal.
Second, the supreme court recently summarized a judge’s obligation to
recuse themselves from a proceeding:
“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11(A); see also Iowa Code § 602.1606(1)(a) (2020) (“A judicial officer is disqualified from acting in a proceeding . . . if . . . [t]he judicial officer has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”). The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology, defines impartiality as “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in 5
considering issues that may come before a judge.” Actual prejudice must be shown before recusal is necessary, and speculation is not sufficient. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). The test is “whether reasonable persons with knowledge of all facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994). The party seeking disqualification must show that the judge’s “alleged bias and prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the case.” State v. Bear, 452 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1990).
Carter v. Carter, 957 N.W.2d 623, 643-44 (Iowa 2021) (alterations in original).
L.H. has failed to establish the district court’s purported bias was based on
extrajudicial sources that resulted in a decision premised on information not
obtained through the court’s participation in the case. Indeed, the alleged bias
stemmed from L.H.’s own pro se filings, which he does not suggest the court
should have ignored. The court considered his allegations, found them to lack
credibility, and made a decision solely on the information the judge learned from
the judge’s participation in the case. See id. at 644. Because L.H. has not shown
the court was improperly biased, his claim fails—counsel has no obligation to file
a meritless motion. L.H. was not prejudiced by counsel’s inaction.
IV. Periodic Report
L.H. contends his counsel should have objected to the May 17, 2022
periodic report. He claims the report contains false information—specifically the
allegation that he masturbated in front of staff on January 26, resulting in a major
report of sexual misconduct and sexual violence. Consistent with prior pro se
filings, L.H. asserts correctional staff filed false reports of his behavior.
L.H.’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the report. L.H.
identifies no grounds for challenging the report’s admissibility. Periodic reports are 6
required by statute. See Iowa Code § 229.15. L.H.’s allegation that the report
contains false information goes to its weight, not its admissibility. See State v.
Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 576 (Iowa 2020) (“Most evidence can be called into
question in some way; however, that does not give the . . . court the ability to
preclude admission. We have cross-examination for a reason; evidence often is
tested in that way.”) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d
813, 828 (Wis. 2019)). L.H.’s counsel had no obligation to object because there
was no basis for doing so.
V. Sufficiency of Evidence
L.H. contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his commitment. A
person may be involuntarily committed if they have a serious mental impairment,
as defined in Iowa Code section 229.1(21). See Iowa Code § 229.6.
The definition of serious mental impairment has three elements. The respondent must be found to have (1) a mental illness, consequently (2) to lack “sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person’s hospitalization or treatment” and (3) to be likely, if allowed to remain at liberty, to inflict physical injury on “the person’s self or others,” to inflict serious emotional injury on a designated class of persons, or be unable to satisfy the person’s physical needs.
In re J.P., 574 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 1998). The final element may now be proven
by a fourth category, “a history of lack of compliance with treatment.” Iowa Code
§ 229.1(21)(d). The State bears the burden of proving each element. See In re
L.H., 890 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). “[T]o prolong a person’s
commitment, all three elements—mental illness, lack of judgment, and
dangerousness, must continue to exist.” Id. 7
L.H. does not appear to seriously contest the first two elements. He is
diagnosed with “schizophrenia as well as a delusional disorder with an erotomanic
subtype.” The second element—lack of judgment—requires that the respondent
“lacks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the
person’s hospitalization or treatment.” Iowa Code § 229.1(21). The nurse
practitioner who submitted the most recent periodic report detailed how L.H. lacks
insight on the inappropriate and harmful nature of his behavior, instead seeing it
as a way to connect with others. In a pro se letter L.H. sent the court on
January 25, 2022, he derided the “unlawful medication,” asserting he did not need
it to function. That sentiment is similar to his long-standing belief that he does not
need medication, contradicted by medical staff who worked with him. In particular,
the staff psychiatrist testified in a 2019 review proceeding that L.H.’s behavior
worsens when he receives too low a dose of medication, and relayed L.H.’s
statements suggesting he would stop taking medication if he were not committed.
L.H. challenges the last element. “We have said the endangerment element
requires a predictive judgment, based on prior manifestations but nevertheless
ultimately grounded on future rather than past danger. The danger the person
poses to herself or others must be evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or
threat.” J.P., 574 N.W.2d at 344 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The
district court found L.H. was likely to inflict serious emotional injury2 on others if
2 Iowa Code § 229.1(20) provides: “Serious emotional injury” is an injury which does not necessarily exhibit any physical characteristics, but which can be recognized and diagnosed by a licensed physician or other mental health professional and which can be causally connected with the act or omission of a person who is, or is alleged to be, mentally ill. 8
treatment ceased—in particular, the court identified staff members at the prison
who could not avoid contact with L.H.
We find substantial evidence supports that assessment. L.H. received
discipline in January 2022 for exposing himself and masturbating in front of a staff
member. That conduct resulted in a major report for sexual misconduct and sexual
violence. When he is not medicated or is under-medicated, his behavior worsens,
resulting in L.H. sending highly explicit letters to staff members and other members
of the public. Someone receiving those letters or witnessing L.H. masturbating is
likely to endure a serious emotional injury. And L.H. will not comply with
medication if not ordered to do so.
L.H. highlights that the only evidence demonstrating a recent overt act was
the report from January 2022, which he claims was a false report. But the only
evidence supporting his claim is his own pro se letters making conclusory
allegations. And we, like the district court, find those allegations lack credibility.
Evidence was sufficient to establish L.H. is seriously mentally impaired pursuant
to chapter 229.
VI. Structural Error
L.H. claims his counsel committed structural error by failing to subject the
State to adversarial testing. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Iowa 2011).
He highlights that the only evidence indicating a recent overt act causing serious
emotional injury came from the January 2022 periodic report. And L.H. claims this
periodic report relied on false reports from prison staff. He argues his counsel
failed to adequately represent his position that the discipline report was premised 9
on false information. He also generally asserts counsel failed to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence.3
“We have recognized structural error occurs when . . . counsel does not
place the prosecution’s case against meaningful adversarial testing . . . .” Id.
“Under these circumstances, ‘[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required’ as
the . . . process itself is ‘presumptively unreliable.’” Id. (first and second alterations
in original) (quoting U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)).
Here, the hearing was short. The State relied on the information provided
in the May 18, 2022 periodic report. Counsel for L.H. did not present any evidence.
But L.H. was allowed to speak to the court. L.H. bears the burden of establishing
counsel failed to subject the State to adversarial testing. See id. On the record
before us, we do not find structural error.
VII. Cumulative Error
L.H. also asserts the culmination of all errors he identified warrants reversal.
It is well-settled law that “we analyze all claims ‘individually and cumulatively’”
when considering whether counsel was ineffective. State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488,
500 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). Because we conclude L.H. failed to establish
counsel breached any essential duties, we do not address L.H.’s cumulative error
claim.
AFFIRMED.
3 L.H. further claims counsel committed structural error by failing to object to the admissibility of the report and to move to recuse the judge. Because we have already found counsel was not ineffective in those regards, his claims fail here as well.