J-S09031-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 1351 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered October 19, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000148-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: May 5, 2023
J.B (“Mother”) appeals the order that involuntarily terminated her
parental rights to L.B. (“Child”), her daughter born in April 2018.1 After careful
review, we affirm.
We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter from
the certified record. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and
Families (“CYF”) first became involved with this family five days after Child’s
birth when Mother admitted to substance abuse during her pregnancy. See
N.T., 9/12/22, at 99-100. CYF did not seek to remove Child from the home
at that time. Mother and Child’s putative father, C.S. (“Father”), were
undergoing treatment for their substance abuse problems. See id. at 100.
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1 The Orphans’ Court’s October 19, 2022 order also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.S. (“Father”) and any “unknown” father. Father did not file a notice of appeal and he has not participated in this matter. J-S09031-23
In August 2019, CYF received a referral regarding allegations of intimate
partner violence (“IPV”) by Father against Mother. See id. at 101-02. CYF
accepted the family for service, referred Mother to an IPV specialist to assist
her in seeking a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order,2 and interviewed
members of Mother’s and Father’s extended families. See id. at 102-03.
In September 2019, Mother contacted CYF and reported that Father held
her against her will in their shared home until she was able to flee to a nearby
police station. See id. at 103-04. On the day of Mother’s report, CYF obtained
an emergency custody authorization placing Child in the physical care of
maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”), where she remained almost three
years later. See id. at 104-07. In October 2019, Child was adjudicated
dependent and ordered that she remain in kinship care with Grandmother.
See id. at 107-08. In the same order, the court directed Mother, inter alia,
to address her ongoing mental health issues and to receive drug screenings.
See id. at 108.
CYF set goals that Mother obtain independent employment and housing,
continue both IPV counseling and substance abuse treatment, participate in
visitations with Child, and address her mental health problems and provide
signed medical information releases to CYF. See id. at 117, 121. Mother
successfully obtained housing in January 2020, and claimed to have found
2 Mother ultimately did so, albeit reluctantly. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 132.
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employment as an in-home care provider. See id. at 118-19. Mother
completed IPV counseling in September 2020 and continued treatment for
substance abuse. See id. During this initial time period, the court granted
Mother “liberal, unsupervised” visits with Child. See id. at 106, 118-19.
Despite multiple attempts, CYF was unable to confirm Mother’s
employment and she lost her housing when Pennsylvania’s Emergency Rental
Assistance Program (“ERAP”) expired in 2022. Id. at 119-22, 185; see also
N.T., 10/17/22, at 8. Mother experienced relapses in substance abuse in June
2020 and August 2021. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 124-27. In June 2020, Mother
rescinded the releases she had previously signed permitting CYF to obtain
records of her drug treatment; after signing new releases, she rescinded those
releases in April 2022, preventing CYF from assessing her compliance with
drug and alcohol counseling. See id. at 42-43, 86, 123-24, 191. Despite
Mother’s expressed continued fear of violence from Father and her assertion
that he violated the existing PFA in the case, Mother declined to proceed
against Father. See id. at 131-32.
Mother’s mental health increasingly became a concern for CYF and the
court. In 2019, she received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”), persecutory delusion disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), opioid use
disorder, and cannabis use disorder. See id. at 48, 52, 110. Mother took
several medications in connection with these diagnoses. See id. at 12-13,
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25. Mother unilaterally ceased participating in medical or psychological
treatment after May 2022. See id. at 12-13, 25.
In August 2021, Mother stated that Child, then three years old, could
make her own medical and dental decisions, which resulted in the court
appointing Grandmother as Child’s medical decisionmaker. See id. at 57-59,
114, 207-08. From March 2022 onward, Mother’s mental health decline
continued to accelerate: she insisted that her case file was fabricated and her
case should be closed, sent rambling, unpunctuated texts to CYF, and evinced
a lack of mental stability. See id. at 194-96, 200, 202. Also in March 2021,
CYF determined that Mother had made no progress toward her mental health
goals and adopted concurrent goals of reunification and adoption. See id. at
148, 180. In April 2022, CYF visited Mother’s apartment and found that she
placed her bed in her living room. Mother explained that the living room was
the best place to be if someone broke into her apartment. See N.T., 9/12/22,
at 183. At that meeting, Mother exhibited paranoia, claimed that her mail
was being stolen and the Freemasons were acting against her, and had great
difficulty focusing. See id. at 53-56, 193; see also N.T., 10/17/22, at 34-
35. Mother had continued to visit Child even after the court’s May 2020 order
that their meetings be supervised after she threatened to abscond with Child.
See id. at 109. However, after April 2022, Mother made only one or two visits
to Child claiming that she had work responsibilities, which CYF was unable to
corroborate. See id. at 111, 151-52, 204-06.
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The Orphans’ Court issued an order in June 2022 stating that Mother
“continues to have moderate to severe behaviors that are a manifestation of
her mental health because she has refused to engage in meaningful mental
health treatments, the primary and substantial barrier keeping her from
reunification with [Child],” and stated that Mother had made no progress
toward alleviating the circumstances that led to the initial placement. See id.
at 147, 176-77, 199-200.
Since May 2022, Mother has repeatedly stated that she does not need
mental health treatment, does not have mental health issues, and that CYF
forced treatment upon her. See id. at 140-44, 147. Mother has also stated
that CYF is trafficking and making money off of Child. See id. at 144.
Mother’s CYF caseworkers testified that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in Child’s best interest because neither Mother nor Father had made
progress in resolving the reasons that led to the initial placement and
Grandmother, with whom Child had a strong bond and who wants to adopt
Child, expressed willingness to maintain Child’s relationship with Mother and
paternal grandparents. See N.T, 9/12/22, at 165-66.3 One of Mother’s CYF
caseworkers testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not
3 CYF caseworkers have observed that Child and Grandmother have a great relationship, and that Grandmother meets all of Child’s physical, medical, educational, and developmental needs, and has shielded Child from the worst of Mother’s behavior. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 208-14. The trial court clarified with CYF that if it were to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the permanency plan would be for Grandmother to adopt Child. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 46.
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have a detrimental effect on Child because Grandmother has such a strong
and significant bond with Child, will always make Mother welcome, and Child
will continue to thrive with Grandmother. See id. at 215-16.
Mother testified that Child’s removal from her home was “rigged,” and
that materials from her file had been suppressed. See N.T., 10/17/22, 6, 9,
10, 11-12. Mother stated that the court was “whisper[ing] in my mother’s ear
and try to divide me and conquer and cause chaos and get my mom to hate
me and me to hate her. . ..” See id. at 21-22. She stated that she needed
to be with Child for her mental health to improve. See id. at 22. Mother also
declared that CYF had manipulated Grandmother and another person who
used the money she made from that process to pay for her wedding. See id.
at 23. Mother declared, “There’s nothing wrong with my mental health. You
keep playing mental.” See id. at 32-33. At the end of a lengthy, passionate
declaration in which she criticized the previous judge in the case, Mother
declared, “[F]reewill is dead like that. The governments are taking over. They
think they have the power. This is crazy. Like I have every - - I had all
proof . . .. Every one of my witnesses . . . [t]hey don’t see why I need all this
supervision. It’s because it was being tacked on me to try to break me . . ..”
See id. at 38-43.
On August 12, 2021, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination
of Mother’s (and Father’s) parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
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§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).4 The Orphans’ Court held evidentiary hearings
on September 12 and October 17, 2022, respectively, at which CYF presented
the testimony of Dr. Muhammad Shaikh, the psychiatrist who had monitored
Mother’s medication, Dr. Beth Bliss, an expert psychologist who observed
Mother and Child and prepared a report,5 Kaitlyn Joyce, the CYF caseworker
who supervised this case from October 2019 through February 2021, and
Shante Washington, the CYF caseworker who supervised this case beginning
in approximately 2021. On October 19, 2022, the Orphans’ Court filed an
order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court along with a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, the Orphans’ Court submitted a responsive
opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii).
4 On December 2, 2021, the Orphans’ Court appointed KidsVoice to represent Child’s interests at the proceeding. Child’s counsel filed a brief in this Court advocating affirmance of the October 2022 order that terminated Mother’s parental rights.
5 Dr. Bliss’s report was entered as an exhibit at the September 12, 2022 hearing without objection. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 40. Mother has failed to comply with her responsibility to include the report in the certified record and ensure that this Court is supplied with a “complete record for purposes of review.” Smith v. Smith, 637 A.2d 622, 623 (Pa. Super. 1993). Such an oversight may result in waiver if it impedes our review of the case. See Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355, 359-60 (Pa. Super. 2000). The absence of that report does not impair our ability to review the case.
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Mother raises two issues for our consideration:
1. Did the [Orphans’] [C]ourt abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the [Orphans’] [C]ourt abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 6 (internal citations clarified).
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
“appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the termination
court’s decree is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M.,
255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In conducting this review,
an appellate court must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and
credibility determinations so long as they are supported by the underlying
record. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). Where
the Orphans’ Court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb that ruling absent an error of law or abuse of
discretion. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
An abuse of discretion “does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion,” but “only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Interest
of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and quotations
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omitted). This standard “reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who
often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.” Id. at 830.
In considering the propriety of terminating an individual’s parental
rights, the Orphans’ Court must balance a parent’s fundamental “right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control” of her child with the
“child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” In re
Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 358 (citation omitted). Severing of parental
rights can have “significant and permanent consequences for both the parent
and child.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. Accordingly, the
moving party must establish the statutory grounds for termination by “clear
and convincing evidence, which is so “direct, weighty, and convincing as to
enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (citation
and quotations omitted). Finally, we also remain mindful that “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [her] child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill [her] parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of [her] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511 (“the
Adoption Act”). In pertinent part, the statute provides as follows:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for h[er] physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. . . .
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). Grounds for termination pursuant to section
2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct but concern parental
incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439,
443 (Pa. Super. 2021). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward
the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” Id (citation
omitted). Extended relegation of a child to the care of others as a result of
parental incapacity is relevant to determining whether a child has been
without essential parental care or control. See In re Adoption of Sabrina,
472 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. Super. 1984).
Our precedent has interpreted section 2511 as requiring a “bifurcated
process” prior to the termination of parental rights:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
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termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of . . . [her] parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
In order to affirm an order of termination, we need only agree with the
Orphans’ Court’s assessment as to any one subsection set forth at section
2511(a), as well as the requirements of section 2511(b). See id. at 922. The
Orphans’ Court determined that Mother’s conduct warranted termination
pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), and that terminating her
parental rights served Child’s needs and welfare pursuant to section 2511(b).
Our analysis will focus solely upon section 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Relevant to section 2511(a)(2),6 Mother asserts that she either
completed her goals or would do so within a reasonable period of time,
received mental health and substance abuse treatment, and could provide
essential parental care to Child. See Mother’s Brief at 22-25.
The Orphans’ Court stated in its Opinion that Mother made little to no
progress in her mental health treatment, has repeatedly stated that she does
not need it or believe in it, and any mental health issues she has are the result
6Mother does not subdivide her issue concerning sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) by individual subsection.
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of not having Child. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/22/22, at 14-15. The
court also cited Mother’s outbursts throughout the hearings, and her inability
to function at a level that would allow her to care for Child on a day-to-day or
long-term basis. See id. Finally, the court stated that no witness testified
that Mother had made any meaningful progress on her mental health goals,
other than Mother, whom the court found not credible. See id.
Our review of this case reveals ample record support for the Orphans’
Court’s conclusions. Dr. Beth Bliss, an expert in psychology, child psychology,
and forensic psychology, testified that she evaluated Mother, Grandmother,
and Child, and prepared a report on her findings. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 38-
39. Dr. Bliss noted that Mother was “extremely tangential and difficult to
redirect” and became “belligerent and angry” at multiple junctures. See id.
at 40-41, 60. Despite Mother’s lack of cooperation, Dr. Bliss was able to
diagnose Mother as having, inter alia, a persecutorial delusion disorder, which
caused Mother to regularly devolve into tangents that went beyond mere
anger at the system and concerned allegations of an intricate government
conspiracy. See id. at 54-56. Dr. Bliss found that Mother “has great difficulty
comporting her behavior and focusing on anything other than these delusions
and her anger.” Id. at 59-60.7 Dr. Bliss reported that Mother was unable to
7 The court removed Mother from the courtroom when she interposed repeated outbursts during testimony, including an explicative-laden interjection as Dr. Bliss testified. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 54-55. Mother (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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control her outbursts in Child’s presence and lacked awareness of “how her
outbursts might be affecting [Child].” Id. at 62-63.
Dr. Bliss also emphasized that Mother’s delusions had serious
implications for broader concerns such as Child’s education, healthcare, and
safety. Id. at 57-60. Specifically, Dr. Bliss expressed concern that Mother
would refrain from contacting child protective services or the police in the
future if there was a concern for safety and would fail to take her to a doctor
or emergency room if necessary. Id. at 59, 73, 90. Dr. Bliss found Mother
has a substantial inability to “put aside her own emotions . . . in order to be
there for [Child] and meet the needs of [Child].” See id. at 67
Dr. Bliss opined that Mother would not be able to care for Child in the
near future and would only be able to do so in the future if she received
extensive treatment to acknowledge and work on her delusions and paranoia
and increased her visits with Child significantly, “but . . . that’s a lot of ifs.”
See id. at 74. Given Mother’s current level of functioning, Dr. Bliss believed
Mother would not be amenable to the necessary treatment, and even if she
were willing to work diligently, it would take more than six months for her to
make the necessary progress. See id. at 66, 74-75, 77. At the time of the
involuntary termination hearings, Child had been in care for thirty-five of her
fifty-two months of life. See id. at 76, 105-06. Dr. Bliss testified that
repeated her intemperate conduct on the second day of the hearing. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 49-50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61.
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termination would only cause harm to Child if she were never to see or talk to
Mother again, see id. at 88, but that harm could be outweighed by the
security and benefits of permanency and adoption, particularly because
Grandmother, if permitted to adopt Child, has stated that she will continue to
allow Mother to have ongoing contact with Child. See id. at 92, 207.
Mother’s testimony and outburst during the hearings lent support to Dr.
Bliss’s opinion. Mother accused CYF of manipulating her family and declared
that “freewill is dead” since “[t]he governments are taking over.” See N.T.,
10/17/22, at 6, 23 34-35, 38-43. Concerning her mental health, Mother
testified that therapy was not necessary and that, “There’s nothing wrong with
my mental health. You keep playing mental. You guys keep playing saying
mental because it’s just to keep – put words in, to keep it in people’s ears[.]”
Id. at 11, 32-33.
Based on the foregoing, the record supports the Orphans’ Court’s
conclusions that Mother continued to have mental health impairments that
rendered her incapable of providing parenting to Child and her incapacity
cannot and will not be remedied. This Court has previously found grounds for
termination under analogous circumstances. See, e.g., In re Adoption of
A.H., 247 A.3d at 444 (finding appropriate grounds for termination pursuant
to section 2511(a)(2) where a parent who had been diagnosed with
incapacitating mental health conditions manifested an “outright refusal to
cooperate” with directives to seek and confirm treatment and made
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“insufficient progress” over the course of more than two years). Thus, no
relief is due on Mother’s first appellate issue.
Mother’s second issue asserts that the Orphans’ Court erred in
concluding that termination of her parental rights would serve Child’s needs
and welfare. See Mother’s Brief at 25-28. Mother cites Dr. Bliss’s testimony
that “termination is not the correct outcome for this family because of the
strong desire that [Child] has for contact with her Mother.” Id. at 27. The
Orphans’ Court determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights served
Child’s needs and welfare. See Orphans’ Court Order, 10/19/22.8
Our review pursuant to section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921-22
(citation omitted). We must “discern the nature and status of the parent-child
bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing
that bond.” In re A.H. 247 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted). “Importantly, the
question is not merely whether a bond exists, but whether termination would
destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. at 445
(citation omitted). Additionally, this inquiry must also focus upon various
supplemental “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]”
Id. at 444 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Furthermore,
8The Orphans’ Court did not articulate the basis for this finding in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
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“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also
consider whether the child[] [is] in a pre-adoptive home and whether [she
has] a bond with [her] foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa.
2013) (citation omitted). The strength of emotional bond between a child and
a potential adoptive parent is also an important consideration” in a section
2511(b) “best interests” assessment. See In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 13 (Pa.
Super. 2009).
At the time of the involuntary termination hearings, Child was four years
old and had been in Grandmother’s custody for approximately three years. In
her observations of Child and Mother, Dr. Bliss recognized that a bond exists
between the two. See N.T., 9/12/22 at 69. However, Dr. Bliss found the
overall level of attachment between Child and Mother to be “insecure” and
“[s]omewhat limited.” Id. at 65-69, 88. Dr. Bliss described Mother’s
interactions with Child as “quite low in energy” and not matching Child’s level
of enthusiasm. See id. at 66 (Dr. Bliss testifies that in one instance, “[Mother]
was interacting appropriately, there wasn’t anything negative, but it wasn’t
positive either. There wasn’t a lot of energy. There wasn’t a lot of attention
and she wasn’t matching what [Child] was seeking.”). Dr. Bliss identified
Grandmother as Child’s “psychological parent,” i.e., the person with whom
Child had developed a secure parental bond. Id. at 71 (also stating that the
secure attachment is to . . . [G]randmother, which would be what you would
equate to a psychological parent.”). In contrast to Mother, Dr. Bliss reported
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that Grandmother fully reciprocated Child’s need for attention and direction.
See id. at 70.
Further, although Dr. Bliss stated a preference for permanent legal
custody arrangement in lieu of termination, she ultimately conceded that
Child’s need for permanency after three years was a more important
consideration with respect to Child’s welfare:
Q. And what do you make of [Child’s] needs for permanency at this time, having been in care for that period of time?
A. She needs permanency. It would help her to continue to have secure attachments and to develop in healthier ways. I had stated in my report that I don’t believe that termination of parental rights is the correct thing because of the strong desire that [Child] and her mother have for contact with one another. However, I do believe that permanency is the appropriate step at this point.
Id. at 76-77 (emphasis added). Dr. Bliss further testified that Child would
suffer harm if she were never allowed to see or talk to Mother again, see id.
at 88-89, but averred that Grandmother’s ability to provide for Child’s needs
for permanency and stability could outweigh these concerns:
Q. [W]ould you say that the harm that would occur should [Child] never have contact with [Mother] again could be out weighed [sic] by the security and benefits that permanency and adoption could provide?
A. Yes, it could be.
Q. Okay. And would you say that the limited bond and insecure attachment to [Child] is currently healthy, beneficial or necessary to her?
A. The way that it currently is, no.
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Id. at 91-92.9
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
Orphans’ Court’s conclusion that Mother and Child did not have a healthy bond
and termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to section
2511(b). Thus, severing Mother’s parental rights will not cause detrimental
effects to Child. See In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197, 208 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(holding termination was appropriate where the foster parents provided the
child’s “main sources of love, comfort, stability and security,” foster parents
and birth parent was unable to meet child’s “emotional, physical, and
developmental needs,” and had not been able to do so for almost two years
prior to the termination hearing). Accordingly, we affirm the order
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2023 ____________________________________________
9 Dr. Bliss also reported Grandmother “would always be open” to Mother having contact with Child, post-adoption, and that Grandmother averred she was supportive of Mother’s visits with the child. See N.T., 9/12/22, at 81-82.
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