In the Interest of L.A.F., a Child v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of L.A.F., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of L.A.F., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00090-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.A.F., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 92919
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother and Father appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to
their child, L.A.F.1 In one issue on appeal, Mother argues that the trial court did not acquire
personal jurisdiction over her, rendering the trial court’s termination order void. Father’s
appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California asserting that Father’s appeal
presents no issues of arguable merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967).
Because we find that Mother waived any defects in service by appearing and seeking the trial
court’s judgment on the merits of the Department’s petition to terminate her rights, and because
we agree with counsel’s assertion that Father’s appeal is frivolous, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
In Mother’s sole issue on appeal, she argues that “[t]he trial court lacked in personam
jurisdiction to enter a judgment terminating [her] parental rights because the record is devoid of a
filed return of service evidencing service of citation that comports with the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure upon [her].”
A. Standard of Review
“To render a valid judgment, ‘a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction over a
case and personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind.’” J.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00435-CV, 2023 WL 213928, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 17,
2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379
1 To protect the identity of the child and persons through whom the child could be identified, we will refer to the Appellants as “Mother” and “Father,” and to the child by his initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8. 2 (Tex. 2022)). “Establishing personal jurisdiction over a party requires ‘citation issued and
served in a manner provided for by law.’” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650
S.W.3d at 380 (citing In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012))). The Texas Family Code
states that in a suit seeking termination of parental rights, citation “shall be issued and served as
in other civil cases.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.009(c) (Supp.). “If service is invalid, it is ‘of
no effect’ and cannot establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over a party.” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d
at 563 (quoting Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.
1985) (per curiam)). A litigant is deprived of due process, and a trial court is deprived of
personal jurisdiction, when there is a complete failure of service. Id. at 566. Thus, “the resulting
judgment is void and may be challenged at any time.” Id.
“A party waives service of process and submits itself to the authority of the court if it
makes a general appearance or files an answer.” In re P.Y.M., No. 04-13-00024-CV, 2013 WL
4009748, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 7, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R.
CIV. P. 120, 121). “If a party retains counsel and counsel appears in court on its behalf and
‘seeks a judgment or an adjudication on some question,’ the party is also considered to have
appeared.” Id. (quoting In re C.T., No. 13-12-00006-CV, 2012 WL 6738266, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “[A] party enters a general
appearance when it invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court’s
jurisdiction, recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or seeks affirmative action
from the court.” J.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 604 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex.
3 App.—Austin 2020, no pet.) (alteration in original) (quoting Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142
S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).
B. Mother’s Appearance Waived Any Complaints of Defects in Service
Here, the Department filed its petition seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights on
October 18, 2024. An attorney ad litem was appointed for Mother by the trial court on October
23, 2024. The record establishes that Mother personally appeared for one adversary hearing on
November 6, 2024, and otherwise generally appeared through counsel. Neither Mother nor her
appointed counsel complained about lack of service and submitting to the court’s jurisdiction.
Mother’s appointed counsel appeared ready at trial, though he noted that he had not been in
contact with Mother. Mother’s counsel participated in the hearing and asked questions of the
witnesses. See In re C.T., 2012 WL 6738266, at * 11. As a result, we hold that Mother’s
appearance at an adversary hearing, as well as her counsel’s actions, established the trial court’s
personal jurisdiction over Mother. We, therefore, overrule Mother’s sole issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights
to L.A.F.
II. Termination of Father’s Rights
Father’s appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief in Father’s appeal. “The procedures
set forth in Anders are applicable to an appeal from a trial court’s order terminating parental
rights when an appellant’s appointed appellate counsel concludes that there are no non-frivolous
issues to assert on appeal.” In re G.P., 501 S.W.3d 252, 253 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no
4 pet.) (citing In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (recognizing that Anders
procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases)).
Generally, in order to comply with the requirements of Anders, appointed counsel is required to comply with certain educational requirements along with the filing of the Anders brief, which includes advising the appellant that counsel filed the brief pursuant to Anders, that the appellant has the right to review the record and file a pro se response on his or her own behalf, and that the appellant has the right to have counsel file a petition for review on the appellant’s behalf in the Texas Supreme Court.
In re A.S., 653 S.W.3d 298, 299–300 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.).
On November 13, 2025, counsel mailed to Father copies of the brief, the appellate record,
and the motion to withdraw. Father was informed of his right to review the record and file a
pro se response. On November 13, 2025, we notified Father that we received an Anders brief
from counsel and informed Father that his pro se response, if any, was due on or before
December 3, 2025. On December 18, 2025, we notified Father that the case would be set for
submission on the briefs on January 8, 2026. We received neither a pro se response from Father
nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response.
Father’s court-appointed counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by providing a
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