in the Interest of L.A.F., a Child

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 5, 2009·No. 02-07-00445-CV·Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 2-07-445-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF L.A.F., A CHILD

------------

FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

Mark (Father) and Christina (Mother) married and had a daughter, L.A.F.,

born in June 1998. L.A.F. has Downs Syndrome. When L.A.F. was almost

three years old, Father and Mother divorced. L.A.F. lived with Mother. Father

filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in January 2005, which

was transferred to Wise County and assigned Cause No. 05-02-102. Agreed

temporary orders signed in February 2005 left L.A.F. primarily in the care of

Mother but allowed Father greater possession than a standard possession order.

1 … See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. Father died in November 2006; the case was still pending. L.A.F.’s paternal

grandmother, Cleta (Grandmother), filed a petition to intervene in Cause No. 05-

02-102 as well as an original petition in suit affecting the parent-child

relationship (SAPCR) almost three weeks after Father’s death. Grandmother’s

SAPCR was assigned Cause No. 06-11-881. In December 2006, Father’s

widow, Donna (Stepmother), filed a petition to intervene in the modification suit

and L.A.F.’s paternal grandfather, Jeff (Grandfather), and his wife filed a

petition to intervene in Grandmother’s SAPCR.

The final order in the modification suit was signed on March 13, 2007.

On that same day, Grandmother’s SAPCR was consolidated with Cause No. 05-

02-102. After a bench trial in the SAPCR, the trial court named Mother and

Grandmother joint managing conservators of L.A.F. and gave Grandmother the

exclusive right to designate L.A.F.’s primary residence. The SAPCR order was

signed November 19, 2007.

In two points, Mother challenges Grandmother’s standing to seek

managing conservatorship and the trial court’s order awarding Grandmother

joint managing conservatorship and appears to challenge the standing of

Grandfather, who was named a possessory conservator in the final orders of

both the modification suit and the SAPCR. Because we hold that Grandfather’s

possessory rights stem from an agreed final order that was not appealed; that

2 Grandmother established standing to file an original suit seeking managing

conservatorship; and that, on this record, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in naming her joint managing conservator with the

exclusive right to establish L.A.F.’s primary residence, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

In her second point, Mother argues that “Appellees” lack standing. A

party’s standing to pursue a claim is an issue of law that we review de novo. 2

To the extent that Mother’s second point pertains to Grandfather, the final

order in the modification suit states that on December 11, 2006, the parties

(Stepmother, Grandmother, Grandfather, and Mother) dictated an agreement

into the record. As part of the agreement, Grandmother withdrew her petition

to intervene in the modification suit. Mother was appointed a parent sole

managing conservator with the exclusive right to designate L.A.F.’s primary

residence, and Stepmother and Grandfather were appointed nonparent

possessory conservators and awarded possession of L.A.F. according to a

possession schedule. The order specifically provides that Grandmother

“currently has pending a [SAPCR] involving the same child of this proceeding,

but that such suit is independent of this cause of action and is not affected by

2 … Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999).

3 this cause of action.” The final order in the modification suit was signed on

March 13, 2007, and was not appealed.

Mother does not argue that the March 2007 order in the modification suit

was not final and appealable. Instead, she argues that the modification suit

should have been dismissed or abated after Father died because of that death

and that there was no viable suit after Father’s death. There is no indication

in the record that she sought such dismissal or abatement from the trial court

on that ground. Additionally, as the case Mother relies on, Smelscer v.

Smelscer, 3 points out,

Once a trial court in which parties initiate divorce proceedings thus acquires jurisdiction over the minor children of the marriage and enters temporary orders concerning their custody, such orders survive any subsequent dismissal of the underlying divorce action and continue in effect until a court of competent jurisdiction modifies them or provides for permanent custody of the children. . . . [A] trial court’s jurisdiction over minor children is “sticky” and is a product of the continuing need to act, or to at least be able to act, in the best interest of the children. 4

The trial court here had entered a temporary order before Father died. Finally,

to the extent that Mother is implicitly arguing that the March 2007 order in the

3 … 901 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ). 4 … Id. at 711 n.4 (citations omitted).

4 modification suit is void, we note that she failed to appeal this final order

directly.5 This attack is therefore collateral:

There is no set procedure for a collateral attack and no statute of limitations. A collateral attack may be used to set aside a judgment that is void or involves fundamental error. However, the ability to collaterally attack a judgment is limited because we presume the validity of the judgment under attack, and extrinsic evidence may not be used to establish a lack of jurisdiction. To prevail on a collateral attack, the challenger must show that the judgment is void on its face. A collateral attack fails if the judgment contains jurisdictional recitals, even if other parts of the record show a lack of jurisdiction. 6

The March 13, 2007 final order in the modification suit provides, “The Court,

after examining the record and the evidence and argument of counsel, finds

that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties and that no other court

has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case.” The order also provides,

Respondent, [Mother], appeared in person and through attorney of record . . . and announced ready for trial.

....

The Court finds that the parties have entered into an agreement regarding this final order and that the agreement is in the best interest of the child. IT IS ORDERED that the agreed final order, as dictated into the record of this Court, is accepted by the Court and is made this Court’s Order.

5 … See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). 6 … In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (citations omitted); see also In re J.W.L., 291 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, orig. proceeding).

5 The order names Grandfather a non-parent possessory conservator, gives him

certain rights and duties, and awards him possession of L.A.F. for one overnight

visit each month and for a week in the summer. Mother does not challenge the

jurisdictional recitations or her agreement to this order. Accordingly, we hold

that the trial court did not err by later awarding Grandfather, who was already

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

in the Interest of L.A.F., a Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

in the Interest of L.A.F., a Child (in the Interest of L.A.F., a Child) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Anderson v. City of Seven Points
806 S.W.2d 791 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Raman Chandler Properties, L.C. v. Caldwell's Creek Homeowners Ass'n
178 S.W.3d 384 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Critz v. Critz
297 S.W.3d 464 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann
722 S.W.2d 694 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale
964 S.W.2d 922 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)
Smelscer v. Smelscer
901 S.W.2d 708 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
in the Interest of K.R.P., a Child
80 S.W.3d 669 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
in Re J.W.L.
291 S.W.3d 79 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
in the Interest of A.G.G., a Child
267 S.W.3d 165 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)