IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0682 Filed August 17, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF K.R. and K.R., Minor Children,
S.R., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,
District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two
children. AFFIRMED.
David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Rebecca Williams, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two
children, born in 2013 and 2018.1 The juvenile court ordered termination under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (as to the older child) and (h) (as to the younger
child) (2021). The mother argues the children could have been returned to her
care at the time of the termination trial or, in the alternative, that she should be
given additional time to work toward reunification before a permanency decision is
made. She asserts that termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s
best interests and the bond she shares with the children precludes termination.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703,
706 (Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116.” Id.
Here, for the juvenile court to properly terminate the mother’s parental rights
under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), proof of several elements, including that the
children could not be returned to parental custody at the time of the termination
trial, had to be established. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); see also
D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (applying “at the present time” to mean “at the time of
the termination hearing”). Here on appeal, the mother concedes all elements but
the return-to-parental-custody element. The court concluded the mother continued
to use methamphetamine, which prevented the children from being safely returned
to the mother’s care; the mother challenges this conclusion.
1The parental rights of each child’s father were also terminated; neither father appeals. 3
Initially, concerns over the mother’s alleged heroin use led to the Iowa
Department of Human Services’s (DHS) involvement with this family. After
learning the mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the children,
DHS removed the children from the mother’s care in January 2021. By the
mother’s own admission, she used methamphetamine daily from March to June
15, 2021. Then, according to the mother’s testimony, she “just quit cold turkey” on
June 15, 2021. Yet the mother had seven sweat-patch tests that were positive for
methamphetamine between July 16, 2021, and the termination trial in February
2022.2 As she did to the juvenile court, the mother claims those tests are
unreliable; she pointed to urinalysis tests she completed during the same time
frame that were negative for all illegal substances. To explain these results, she
asked the juvenile court to consider a scientific study that states external
contamination of sweat patches is possible. See David A. Kidwell & Frederick P.
Smith, Susceptibility of PharmChek Drugs of Abuse Patch to Environmental
Contamination, available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/195986.pdf (last
visited Aug. 4, 2022).
But the scientific study the mother offers supports the conclusion that she
was ingesting methamphetamine rather than having positive sweat-patch tests
due to exposure and external contamination. As we understand it, the mother
maintained that her continued positive results were due to her sweaty skin touching
clients—whom she presumes use methamphetamine—at the strip club where she
was employed. The scientific study the mother introduced to support this claim
2 It is of note that the mother only completed eighteen of fifty-nine drug tests offered. 4
characterizes this as “prior presence of drugs on the exterior of the skin, not
removed by the cleaning process (external contamination from within, under the
patch, CFWI).” Id. at 2. The study references a number of experiments and
concludes that having methamphetamine on one’s skin before the sweat patch is
placed on, and then “exercise and active sweating” after application of the patch,
can result in a sweat patch test that is positive for methamphetamine—even when
no methamphetamine is ingested. Id. at 13. However, in these instances, “[n]o
conversion of methamphetamine to amphetamine was observed.” Id. They
concluded: “This experiment shows that CFWI appears in the patch rapidly when
the individual actively sweats. . . . Methamphetamine did not decompose or be
metabolized into amphetamine. Alcohol swab ‘cleansing’ removed some, but not
all, of the drug contamination.” Id. at 14. Additionally, the researchers opined:
The laboratory studies show that the potential for external contamination of skin (CFWI) . . . can occur and generate false positive results. . . . To the extent that drugs must pass through the human body to produce metabolites, metabolites can increase the reliability of a positive result. . . . [A]mphetamine is the major metabolite of methamphetamine . . . . [M]ethamphetamine is relatively stable and thus the presence of amphetamine may be a marker that the drug excreted from the human body rather than entered the patch from the outside.
Id. at 17–18.
While the study the mother offered states that outside contamination—i.e.
positive sweat patch tests for methamphetamine without ingesting the drug—is
possible, it also states that in the experiments where that occurred, no
amphetamine was found in the test results. In fact, it suggests that the presence
of amphetamine, as the major metabolite of methamphetamine, may actually be 5
“a marker that the drug excreted from the human body” and was not the result of
external contamination. Id. at 18. Here, the mother had seven sweat patches that
were positive for methamphetamine between July 16, 2021 and February 8, 2022,
and each of those seven patches also had amphetamine present. According to
the study relied upon by the mother, the presence of amphetamine supports the
conclusion that she was ingesting the methamphetamine rather than receiving a
positive result due to external contamination. In spite of the mother’s claims
otherwise, we agree with the district court that the mother continued to use
methamphetamine up until the time of the termination trial and that her use of the
drug prevents her from being able to safely parent the children. See, e.g., In re
J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“A parent’s
methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.”).
The State proved the grounds for termination under 232.116(1)(f) and (h).
In passing, the mother mentions that she should be given more time to work
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0682 Filed August 17, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF K.R. and K.R., Minor Children,
S.R., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,
District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two
children. AFFIRMED.
David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Rebecca Williams, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two
children, born in 2013 and 2018.1 The juvenile court ordered termination under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (as to the older child) and (h) (as to the younger
child) (2021). The mother argues the children could have been returned to her
care at the time of the termination trial or, in the alternative, that she should be
given additional time to work toward reunification before a permanency decision is
made. She asserts that termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s
best interests and the bond she shares with the children precludes termination.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703,
706 (Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116.” Id.
Here, for the juvenile court to properly terminate the mother’s parental rights
under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), proof of several elements, including that the
children could not be returned to parental custody at the time of the termination
trial, had to be established. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); see also
D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (applying “at the present time” to mean “at the time of
the termination hearing”). Here on appeal, the mother concedes all elements but
the return-to-parental-custody element. The court concluded the mother continued
to use methamphetamine, which prevented the children from being safely returned
to the mother’s care; the mother challenges this conclusion.
1The parental rights of each child’s father were also terminated; neither father appeals. 3
Initially, concerns over the mother’s alleged heroin use led to the Iowa
Department of Human Services’s (DHS) involvement with this family. After
learning the mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the children,
DHS removed the children from the mother’s care in January 2021. By the
mother’s own admission, she used methamphetamine daily from March to June
15, 2021. Then, according to the mother’s testimony, she “just quit cold turkey” on
June 15, 2021. Yet the mother had seven sweat-patch tests that were positive for
methamphetamine between July 16, 2021, and the termination trial in February
2022.2 As she did to the juvenile court, the mother claims those tests are
unreliable; she pointed to urinalysis tests she completed during the same time
frame that were negative for all illegal substances. To explain these results, she
asked the juvenile court to consider a scientific study that states external
contamination of sweat patches is possible. See David A. Kidwell & Frederick P.
Smith, Susceptibility of PharmChek Drugs of Abuse Patch to Environmental
Contamination, available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/195986.pdf (last
visited Aug. 4, 2022).
But the scientific study the mother offers supports the conclusion that she
was ingesting methamphetamine rather than having positive sweat-patch tests
due to exposure and external contamination. As we understand it, the mother
maintained that her continued positive results were due to her sweaty skin touching
clients—whom she presumes use methamphetamine—at the strip club where she
was employed. The scientific study the mother introduced to support this claim
2 It is of note that the mother only completed eighteen of fifty-nine drug tests offered. 4
characterizes this as “prior presence of drugs on the exterior of the skin, not
removed by the cleaning process (external contamination from within, under the
patch, CFWI).” Id. at 2. The study references a number of experiments and
concludes that having methamphetamine on one’s skin before the sweat patch is
placed on, and then “exercise and active sweating” after application of the patch,
can result in a sweat patch test that is positive for methamphetamine—even when
no methamphetamine is ingested. Id. at 13. However, in these instances, “[n]o
conversion of methamphetamine to amphetamine was observed.” Id. They
concluded: “This experiment shows that CFWI appears in the patch rapidly when
the individual actively sweats. . . . Methamphetamine did not decompose or be
metabolized into amphetamine. Alcohol swab ‘cleansing’ removed some, but not
all, of the drug contamination.” Id. at 14. Additionally, the researchers opined:
The laboratory studies show that the potential for external contamination of skin (CFWI) . . . can occur and generate false positive results. . . . To the extent that drugs must pass through the human body to produce metabolites, metabolites can increase the reliability of a positive result. . . . [A]mphetamine is the major metabolite of methamphetamine . . . . [M]ethamphetamine is relatively stable and thus the presence of amphetamine may be a marker that the drug excreted from the human body rather than entered the patch from the outside.
Id. at 17–18.
While the study the mother offered states that outside contamination—i.e.
positive sweat patch tests for methamphetamine without ingesting the drug—is
possible, it also states that in the experiments where that occurred, no
amphetamine was found in the test results. In fact, it suggests that the presence
of amphetamine, as the major metabolite of methamphetamine, may actually be 5
“a marker that the drug excreted from the human body” and was not the result of
external contamination. Id. at 18. Here, the mother had seven sweat patches that
were positive for methamphetamine between July 16, 2021 and February 8, 2022,
and each of those seven patches also had amphetamine present. According to
the study relied upon by the mother, the presence of amphetamine supports the
conclusion that she was ingesting the methamphetamine rather than receiving a
positive result due to external contamination. In spite of the mother’s claims
otherwise, we agree with the district court that the mother continued to use
methamphetamine up until the time of the termination trial and that her use of the
drug prevents her from being able to safely parent the children. See, e.g., In re
J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“A parent’s
methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.”).
The State proved the grounds for termination under 232.116(1)(f) and (h).
In passing, the mother mentions that she should be given more time to work
toward reunification with her children. Section 232.104(2)(b) allows the court to
give a parent a six-month extension before permanency is established if there are
specific “factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that “comprise the
basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] . . . will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” We cannot make such
findings. At the time of the termination trial, the mother continued to use
methamphetamine—notwithstanding her claims about unreliable drug tests.
Additionally, she had recently married a man who was in jail after reporting him for
domestic violence against her. According to the mother’s testimony, her now-
husband provided her with methamphetamine, is “violent” and a “thief,” and is not 6
safe or appropriate for the children to be around. Yet the mother remained in
contact with the husband in violation of a no-contact order between the two and,
due to this continued contact, both the husband and mother had to serve jail
sentences. The mother claimed she was trying to divorce the husband, but she
also admitted talking to the husband on the first day of the termination trial because
he knew it was “an important day for [her].” Based on these facts, we cannot say
the mother will be able to safely parent the children in six months, so an extension
is not warranted. And for the same reasons, we conclude termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2); see also In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008)
(concluding termination was in the children’s best interests because “the children
need a safe and permanent home”).
Finally, the mother argues her rights should not be terminated “due to the
bond between the children and their mother.” We understand her to be invoking
the exception to termination in section 232.116(3)(c). See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c) (allowing the court to forego termination when “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The parent bears the
burden to prove an exception to termination is warranted. See In re A.S., 906
N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). Other than broadly testifying3 that she believes
termination of parental rights “destroys people,” the mother did not offer any
3 The mother’s attorney asked if she felt “[her] kids would be damaged” by termination, and the mother responded: “Yes. I know what it’s like. I know a lot of other foster kids too. It destroys people.” 7
evidence to establish why the exception should be applied here. Like the juvenile
court, we decline to apply it.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to both children.
AFFIRMED.