In the Interest of K.M.S.

Texas Supreme Court

In the Interest of K.M.S.

91 S.W.3d 331, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 877, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 94, 2002 WL 1338100

CourtTexas Supreme Court

DecidedJune 20, 2002

Docket01-0753

StatusPublished

Cited by55 cases

This text of 91 S.W.3d 331 (In the Interest of K.M.S.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In the Interest of K.M.S., 91 S.W.3d 331, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 877, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 94, 2002 WL 1338100 (Tex. 2002).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this suit to establish paternity, David Gernenz seeks to set aside a prior order adjudicating Christopher Smith to be the father of K.M.S. Gernenz asserted that Smith’s failure to notify him of the prior paternity proceedings denied him due process, but the trial court refused to set aside the order. Reversing the trial court’s judgment, the court of appeals concluded that Smith’s failure to give notice and serve citation on Gernenz in the earlier paternity suit violated Gernenz’s constitutional right to due process. 68 S.W.3d 61, 67-71.

In its opinion, the court of appeals “decline[d] to follow” Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857 (Tex.2001), in which this Court interpreted various provisions of the Texas Family Code. Id. at 70. The court’s refusal to follow Sherry does not affect the disposition of this case. Nevertheless, in reaching their conclusions, courts of appeals are not free to disregard pronouncements from this Court, as did the court of appeals here. Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex.1989) (“This court need not defend its opinions from criticism from courts of appeals; rather they must follow this court’s pronouncements.”).

The petitions for review are denied.

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PER CURIAM.

In this suit to establish paternity, David Gernenz seeks to set aside a prior order adjudicating Christopher Smith to be the father of K.M.S. Gernenz asserted that Smith’s failure to notify him of the prior paternity proceedings denied him due process, but the trial court refused to set aside the order. Reversing the trial court’s judgment, the court of appeals concluded that Smith’s failure to give notice and serve citation on Gernenz in the earlier paternity suit violated Gernenz’s constitutional right to due process. 68 S.W.3d 61, 67-71.

In its opinion, the court of appeals “decline[d] to follow” Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857 (Tex.2001), in which this Court interpreted various provisions of the Texas Family Code. Id. at 70. The court’s refusal to follow Sherry does not affect the disposition of this case. Nevertheless, in reaching their conclusions, courts of appeals are not free to disregard pronouncements from this Court, as did the court of appeals here. Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex.1989) (“This court need not defend its opinions from criticism from courts of appeals; rather they must follow this court’s pronouncements.”).

The petitions for review are denied.

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91 S.W.3d 331, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 877, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 94, 2002 WL 1338100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-kms-tex-2002.

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