In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-11-00083-CV ____________________
IN THE INTEREST OF K.M.L.
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 258th District Court San Jacinto County, Texas Trial Cause No. CV12547 ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this parental rights termination case, which is before us on remand from
the Texas Supreme Court, we consider the issues the appellants raised that we did
not reach in their prior appeal. See In re K.L., 442 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2012), reversed by In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2014). After
considering the issues not reached on the original submission of the appeal, we
hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that
M.L., the child’s mother, failed to comply with the provisions of a court-ordered
1 parenting plan.1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O) (West 2014).2 We
overrule the appellants’ challenge to that finding, and based on the jury’s finding
that M.L. failed to comply with the provisions of the plan, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment terminating M.L.’s rights.
Background
The underlying facts and procedural history of this case are detailed in the
Texas Supreme Court’s opinion and in our prior opinion, as both discussed the
evidence admitted in the course of the trial. See K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 105-07;
K.L., 442 S.W.3d at 399-400. Briefly, however, this case arises from the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services’s 2009 removal of K.M.L. from the
home of A.T., her maternal grandmother, after K.M.L. fractured her jaw. K.M.L.’s
injuries occurred when she fell onto a tile floor from stairs, not guarded by a rail or
barrier, inside Grandmother’s home. K.M.L. fell approximately six feet. K.M.L.
was two when she fractured her jaw, and she was living with Grandmother and
Grandmother’s two sons, who were fourteen and twelve years old. Just before
1 The trial court ordered the parenting plan based on the provisions in section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code. 2 We cite to the current version of the Texas Family Code because the post- trial amendments to the Family Code do not affect the outcome of this appeal. 2 K.M.L. fell, Grandmother left the children without adult supervision to run some
errands.
In 2011, based on the jury’s findings to support terminating the parental
rights of both of K.M.L.’s parents, the trial court terminated their rights.
Additionally, based on the jury’s finding that the Department should serve as
K.M.L.’s sole managing conservator, the trial court appointed the Department to be
K.M.L.’s sole permanent managing conservator.
Issues on Remand
In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court directed us to consider on remand
“whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support a finding by the jury under
subsections (D), (E), or (O) of section 161.001(1).” K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 117; see
also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1) (West 2014). After the case was
remanded, we invited the parties (Mother, Grandmother, and the Department) to
file supplemental briefs. We requested the parties to file briefs addressing the
factual sufficiency of the jury’s findings on the following three issues: (1) whether
Mother knowingly placed or allowed K.M.L. to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being; (2) whether
Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed K.M.L. with persons who
engaged in conduct that endangered her physical or emotional well-being; and (3)
3 whether Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
specifically established the actions Mother was required to take to obtain K.M.L.’s
return. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O).
Mother and the Department filed supplemental briefs, but Grandmother did
not supplement the brief she filed on original submission. However,
Grandmother’s attorney advised the Court in a letter after the deadline we set for
the briefs that we should reach the legal sufficiency arguments that the appellants
had raised on original submission. Therefore, she suggested we were required to
address both the appellants’ legal and factual sufficiency arguments, not just the
factual sufficiency issues mentioned by the Supreme Court in its opinion. See
K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 117.
After carefully considering the parties’ briefs and supplemental briefs, we
conclude the issues that we must decide on remand are whether legally and
factually sufficient evidence supports the findings that: (1) Mother “knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed [K.M.L.] to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child[;]” (2) Mother
“engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [K.M.L.] with persons who engaged in
conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child[;]”
and (3) Mother “failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
4 specifically established the actions necessary for [Mother] to obtain the return of
[K.M.L.] who has been in temporary managing conservatorship of the
[Department] for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from
the parent for abuse or neglect of the child.”
Standard of Review
In a legal sufficiency review of an order terminating parental rights, the
evidence relating to a challenged finding is reviewed “in the light most favorable to
the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002). We “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of
its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. . . . [and] disregard all evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been
incredible.” Id. If no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction
that the matter the Department was required to prove is true, we are required to
render judgment in favor of the parent. Id.
With respect to a party’s factual sufficiency arguments, we must “give due
consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be
clear and convincing.” Id. Under a factual sufficiency standard, the findings are
sufficient unless, based on the entire record, the disputed evidence that could not
5 have been credited in favor of the finding is so significant that the jury could not
have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that the challenged finding was
true. See id. Additionally, “[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.
Parenting Plan
Because the challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
concerning Mother’s failure to comply with a court-ordered parenting plan are
dispositive of the appeal, we address the arguments raised by the parties addressing
the jury’s finding on that issue first.
The evidence that was before the jury shows that Mother was an eighteen-
year-old high school student in 2007 when K.M.L. was born. Mother’s and
Grandmother’s relationship was not always harmonious. Over the next two years,
Mother alternated between living with Grandmother and living with various
friends and relatives. During the first two years of her life, K.M.L. lived primarily
with Grandmother.
In August 2009, approximately three weeks before K.M.L. fell and fractured
her jaw, Grandmother moved into a one-bedroom loft apartment. K.M.L. and
6 Grandmother’s two sons were also living with Grandmother when she moved. The
stairs to the loft in the apartment they moved into had no railing or gate. Before
K.M.L. fell, Grandmother left the three children alone in her apartment to run
errands. While Grandmother was away, K.M.L. fell from the stairs leading to the
loft, fracturing her jaw and injuring her teeth and gums.
Following K.M.L.’s injury, the Department sought K.M.L.’s removal and
filed a suit, in which it sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights to K.M.L.
Following an adversary hearing, the trial court appointed the Department as
K.M.L.’s temporary managing conservator, appointed Mother as K.M.L.’s
temporary possessory conservator, and ordered Mother, while the case was
pending, to comply with the requirements of a written parenting plan that was
established by the Department.
The Department, in its brief, contends the evidence introduced during the
trial allowed the jury to form a firm belief that Mother failed to comply with the
requirements of a court-ordered parenting plan. According to the Department, the
evidence shows that Mother failed to meet the requirements of the parenting plan
because she failed to obtain the parenting skills to provide K.M.L. with a safe and
stable home. According to Mother and Grandmother, Mother complied with the
safe and stable home requirement in the parenting plan based on her plans to
7 provide K.M.L. a place to live in Grandmother’s home and to allow Grandmother
to help her raise K.M.L. Mother does not claim that she can provide a place to live
without relying on Grandmother or that she can, without Grandmother’s help,
provide a loving home: in her brief, Mother concedes that her “intellectual and
educational hardships” prevent “her from providing [a loving home] of her own for
her daughter.” 3
The record reflects that the trial court ordered that Mother comply with the
Department’s parenting plan as a condition of having K.M.L. returned to her care.
The record further reflects that in September 2009, Mother signed the family
service plan. In the plan, Mother acknowledged that the purpose of the parenting
plan was to help her, by August 2010, provide K.M.L. a safe environment. Mother
also acknowledged that her rights could be terminated if she was unable or
unwilling to provide K.M.L. with a safe environment, that her progress would be
evaluated based on her completion of the tasks and goals established under the
plan, and that she needed to demonstrate that she had the ability to provide for
K.M.L.’s safety and well-being. For example, one of the goals in the plan was that
3 The evidence, some of which is discussed below, shows that before the removal occurred, both Mother and Grandmother had been diagnosed with and treated for bipolar disorder and borderline intellectual function. 8 Mother “acquire appropriate parenting skills to provide [K.M.L.] with a safe and
stable home.”
The record of the evidence admitted during the trial includes evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mother failed to acquire the skills
necessary to provide K.M.L. a safe and stable home. Mother indicated at the trial
that her plan was to allow K.M.L. to continue to live with Grandmother. However,
whether Grandmother possessed the ability to give K.M.L. a safe and stable home
was a matter that the Department addressed during the trial.
Amanda Jackson, a conservatorship supervisor for the Department, testified
that given Grandmother’s history in making poor decisions related to K.M.L.’s
care, Grandmother’s history with the Department regarding the care of her own
children, Mother and Grandmother’s “tumultuous relationship,” and
Grandmother’s mental health history, she did not believe that it would be in
K.M.L.’s best interest to reside with Grandmother.4 Jackson testified that the
Department had records from a 1997 or 1998 case involving Grandmother, and that
the information she had reflects that Grandmother had threatened to kill herself and
had made homicidal threats towards her husband and her children; Jackson
explained that in her opinion, Mother was placing K.M.L. in danger by leaving her 4 The same evidence may be probative of both the predicate issue and the best interest issue. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). 9 with someone who had admitted having “homicidal thoughts towards her own
kids.” Jackson also testified, without objection, that Mother had not demonstrated
“an ability to maintain a safe and stable household” in which “she could care for
her child[.]” For example, according to Jackson, prior to the trial, Grandmother
suggested that K.M.L. could be placed with a man that Child Protective Services
had investigated for allegedly sexually abusing Mother. Although the appellants
dispute that Grandmother’s home would not be a safe and stable place to raise
K.M.L., the testimony by Jackson that she did not believe it would be safe and
stable and the foundational facts that Jackson used to form her opinion were before
the jury. We also note that the trial court’s decision to admit Jackson’s testimony
has not been challenged on appeal. See In re A.B.G., No. 09-11-00545-CV, 2013
WL 257311, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re
Commitment of Crosby, No. 09-11-00371-CV, 2012 WL 983168, at **1-2 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Mar. 22, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Sarah Miller, a special investigator with Child Protective Services, also
testified that placing K.M.L. with Grandmother would not be suitable. According
to Miller, leaving K.M.L. with Grandmother would be inappropriate given that
Grandmother left K.M.L. in an apartment with dangerous stairs without adult
supervision. Miller explained that this incident demonstrates that Grandmother is
10 neglectful. Miller also testified that Grandmother, during their initial meeting after
the Department removed K.M.L., admitted that she used marijuana. The jury could
reasonably form a firm conviction or belief from the evidence about
Grandmother’s past behaviors, which given her characteristics, there would likely
be other incidents that would involve similar conduct. See Wischer v. Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-12-00165-CV, 2012 WL 3793151, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Additionally, the jury could reasonably consider Grandmother’s and
Mother’s relationship and their history of mental illness in evaluating whether
Mother’s plan for K.M.L. would give K.M.L. a safe and stable home. The
testimony before the jury indicates that the Department referred Mother and
Grandmother to a psychologist, Dr. Frankie Clark, and his records were admitted
into evidence during the trial. According to Dr. Clark’s report, Grandmother and
Mother have bipolar disorders and borderline intellectual functions. Records
introduced during the trial indicate that Grandmother’s problems cause her to have
severe mood swings, and that these problems are aggravated by family stress.
Before the Department removed K.M.L. from Grandmother’s care, Mother
and Grandmother were being treated by Dr. Athi Venkatesh, a psychiatrist, for
their bipolar disorders. Dr. Venkatesh testified during the trial. According to his
11 February 2008 report, Grandmother was complaining chiefly about her mood
swings and that she was suffering from bipolar disorder, a condition that had
existed for 20 years. Although Dr. Venkatesh testified during the trial that
Grandmother and Mother were doing fine and that Grandmother could safely care
for K.M.L., his records and the other evidence before the jury allowed the jury to
reasonably conclude that Grandmother would not continue to do well if she was
responsible for taking care of K.M.L.
Dr. Venkatesh’s records tend to show that Grandmother’s condition does not
remain stable. The psychiatrist’s records show that Grandmother suffers from
chronic mood swings, that her mood swings are treated with medication, and that
the medications Grandmother is given for her problems have changed. Generally,
Dr. Venkatesh’s records show Grandmother has consistently denied having
suicidal thoughts during the years she received treatment from Dr. Venkatesh, and
they show that Grandmother’s caregivers considered her risk of suicide to be low.
Nevertheless, the records also reflect that Grandmother is being monitored at each
visit for suicidal thoughts, and there are some entries suggesting that Grandmother
has had thoughts of this type. For example, Dr. Venkatesh was asked about a note
in his records relating to a statement Grandmother made in July 2009, which
reflected that she did not continue having suicidal thoughts after she started taking
12 an antidepressant. Dr. Venkatesh indicated the note was made by his assistant, and
he indicated that the assistant was ultimately terminated due to charting errors.5
While Dr. Venkatesh described that Grandmother was functioning well on
her medications as of the date of the trial, his records allowed the jury to form a
firm belief or conviction that, at times, Grandmother has exhibited impaired levels
of function over the approximate three year period that Dr. Venkatesh had been
caring for her. For example, Dr. Venkatesh’s October 2010 appointment note
indicates that Grandmother’s mood swings are “getting worse and rages are
occurring at times. She is confined to ‘the couch[,]’ not going out or socializing
with others.” In one of his records, dated November 2010, Dr. Venkatesh indicated
that Grandmother had no improvement in her ongoing complaints of mood swings.
His note on that day documents that Grandmother was irritable and easily
frustrated. Another of Dr. Venkatesh’s reports indicates that Grandmother had
become severely depressed, noting that Grandmother “[h]as been overwhelmed
with guardianship [and] court date for grand[d]aughter coming up, but coping
well.” The medical testimony before the jury allowed the jury to conclude that
stress made Grandmother’s symptoms worse, and to view Dr. Venkatesh’s
5 It is not clear whether or not Dr. Venkatesh thought this particular entry was due to his assistant’s charting error; we note that during his testimony, Dr. Venkatesh testified that he was the person who made the notes in his chart. 13 testimony about Grandmother’s condition at the time of the trial as a condition that
was unlikely to remain stable over the course of K.M.L.’s childhood if
Grandmother were to be given the responsibilities required by Mother’s plan.
Both Mother and Grandmother testified during the trial that Mother
completed all of the tasks required by her parenting plan. In her brief, Mother
claims the Department unreasonably required her to obtain a residence on her own.
However, that argument is not supported by the record, which includes Jackson’s
testimony that Mother needed to demonstrate that she had a stable house with an
adequate support system to help her raise K.M.L.; Jackson did not indicate that the
Department expected Mother to obtain a residence of her own. Moreover, there is
also evidence in the record which indicates that Mother was a contributing factor to
the stresses that Grandmother faced. For example, the jury heard testimony
indicating that Mother resided with a series of unrelated individuals during the
time K.M.L. was in the Department’s care and that Grandmother was concerned
about Mother’s situation. Grandmother explained that Mother tends to leave when
she gets upset because she just “needs a little bit of a break, so she will go and she
will spend some time with her friends, and she will come back home.” While
Mother’s plan heavily involved Grandmother, the jury could form a firm belief or
conviction that given their historical relationship, Mother’s plan would not likely
14 create a stable home. Although the jury heard conflicting evidence and opinions,
there is evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Mother failed to comply with
the parenting plan because she had not demonstrated that she had the capacity to
provide K.M.L. with a safe and stable home.
The evidence supporting Mother’s claim that her plan would provide K.M.L.
a safe and stable home is not overwhelming. In August 2009, Mother was not
living in Grandmother’s home when K.M.L. was placed in the Department’s care.
Grandmother bought a trailer home several months after K.M.L. was placed in the
Department’s care. Grandmother was living in the trailer at the time of trial.
Photographs of the trailer were admitted into evidence at trial. According to
Grandmother, another trailer home is being delivered to the property so that
Mother would have her own quarters. The Department does not argue that any
defects exist in the physical conditions of Grandmother’s home that would make
the home a dangerous place for a child to reside. However, providing a safe
structure for a child to live in is not the sole consideration the jury was required to
use in determining if Mother’s plan would allow her to provide K.M.L. with a safe
and stable home.
We conclude that the jury could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
that Mother failed to comply with a court order that specifically established the
15 actions necessary to obtain the return of her child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
161.001(1)(O). The evidence allowed the jury to conclude that Mother’s plan
would not give K.M.L. a safe and stable home. 6 While Mother argues that a single
accidental injury to K.M.L. while being cared for by Grandmother is insufficient to
allow the jury to reject her plan, the jury was entitled to consider all of the
evidence in resolving whether Grandmother’s home would be a safe and stable
place to raise K.M.L. The record reflects a history of instability that was not
limited to a momentary lapse of judgment. Considering the evidence of the
instability that had historically existed in the living arrangement, an arrangement
not significantly different than the one Mother had provided to K.M.L. since her
6 The Department requested that it be appointed as K.M.L.’s permanent managing conservator. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.005, 263.404 (West 2014). The trial court instructed the jury to appoint Grandmother as sole managing conservator in preference to the Department unless the jury found from a preponderance of the evidence that appointing her was not in K.M.L.’s best interest. The jury found that the Department should be appointed sole managing conservator of K.M.L. The trial court’s judgment includes findings that the appointment of Grandmother as permanent managing conservator is not in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development, and that Grandmother is not appointed possessory conservator because appointing her would not be in the child’s best interest and would endanger the child’s physical or emotional welfare. We considered and overruled Grandmother’s challenge to the conservatorship findings in our previous opinion, and those findings were not challenged in the Supreme Court. See K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 108; K.L., 442 S.W.3d at 412-13; see also In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. 2007).
16 birth, the jury could reasonably determine that Grandmother would frequently be
required to be K.M.L.’s sole caregiver and that at times, Grandmother would not
be capable of providing K.M.L. with the care she needed. We conclude that the
jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that K.M.L.’s welfare would be at
risk under the living arrangement that Mother proposed. See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d
763, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (noting that generally, a parent’s
substantial compliance with a court-ordered parenting plan does not excuse the
parent’s failure to comply with the court’s order).
We further conclude that the evidence to the contrary of the jury’s finding
regarding Mother’s plan is not so significant that no reasonable juror could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother failed to complete the requirements
of the plan. We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the jury’s finding by clear and convincing evidence. We overrule Mother’s and
Grandmother’s issues that argue the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support Mother’s termination for failing to comply with her court-ordered
parenting plan.
Endangerment—Conditions
We address the jury’s endangerment findings because these findings were
challenged but were not addressed in our original opinion. In re K.L., 442 S.W.3d
17 at 405. In response to one of the questions in the charge, the jury found by clear
and convincing evidence that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
K.M.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or
emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). When the
termination finding under review depends on section 161.001(1)(D), we examine
evidence related to the environment of the child to determine if the environment
was the source of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In
re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). Based on
the charge, the evidence in this case must show that Mother knowingly placed or
allowed her child to remain in conditions that endangered her child’s physical or
emotional well-being. Consequently, in this case the evidence focuses on what
Mother knew about the conditions in which K.M.L. was living immediately before
K.M.L. fell and fractured her jaw.
While Grandmother suggests that she expected the railing for the stairs to be
installed before she moved the family into the apartment, the finding that K.M.L.
was endangered by her parent placing her in a dangerous condition depends on
Mother’s knowledge of the condition, not Grandmother’s. In this case, the
evidence does not show before K.M.L. fell, Mother knew that Grandmother left
K.M.L. in the apartment without adult supervision or that Mother was aware the
18 stairs in the apartment Grandmother moved to were unprotected by rails. Evidence
that a child is living in a dangerous environment will not support a finding under
subsection (D) where the evidence does not show that the child’s parent was aware
of the dangerous condition. See In re C.D.E., 391 S.W.3d 287, 296-97 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).
In jury argument, counsel for the Department argued that Mother’s
knowledge of the endangering conditions of Grandmother’s household could be
inferred from Mother’s voluntary statement of August 7, 2009. In that statement,
Mother said: “And my opinion [is] that the [environment] that [K.M.L. is] in is not
a very good one.” When questioned about that statement at the trial, Mother
suggested it was her response to K.M.L.’s injury, as opposed to a statement
regarding Mother’s personal knowledge of conditions that existed before K.M.L.’s
accident. Mother’s statement indicates she was aware that Grandmother was not
providing an ideal environment, but evidence of a less-than-ideal family
environment alone is insufficient to establish endangerment under the clear-and-
convincing standard that is required in a termination case. Tex. Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
We hold that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that Mother knowingly allowed K.M.L. to remain in conditions that
19 endangered her physical or emotional well-being. We sustain Mother’s and
Grandmother’s issues asserting the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that Mother allowed K.M.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.
Endangerment—Conduct
The jury also found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed K.M.L. with persons who engaged in conduct that
endangered K.M.L.’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(1)(E). In reviewing a conduct-endangerment finding, “[subsection (E)]
requires us to look at the parent’s conduct alone, including actions or omissions.”
In re D.J., 100 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
Mother argues that before K.M.L. fell, the evidence fails to show that she
was aware that Grandmother might be dangerous. To establish endangerment, it is
not necessary to show conduct that was directed at the child, but it “means more
than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal
family environment[.]” Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.
Grandmother moved into the loft apartment after Mother left K.M.L. in
Grandmother’s care. Mother was aware that Grandmother was mentally ill, and
there is some evidence in the record that Grandmother was investigated by the
20 Department during Mother’s childhood. However, there was no evidence in the
record showing that when K.M.L. fell and was injured, Mother was aware that
Grandmother had suffered from chronic and severe mood swings that created any
danger to K.M.L. or knew that Grandmother left K.M.L. without proper
supervision in an environment that could endanger K.M.L.’s physical or emotional
well-being. We conclude there is legally insufficient evidence showing that Mother
knew at the time of K.M.L.’s injury that Grandmother would leave K.M.L.
unattended while K.M.L. was in her care. We sustain Mother’s and Grandmother’s
issues challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
finding that Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed K.M.L. with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-
being.
Conclusion
When a jury has found that termination is in a child’s best interest, a single
predicate finding on a ground justifying termination under the Family Code can
support a judgment terminating a parent’s rights. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362
(Tex. 2003). As discussed, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the
jury’s finding that Mother failed to comply with her court-ordered parenting plan.
In our previous opinion, we held that the jury’s best interest finding was legally
21 and factually sufficient, and the Supreme Court overruled Mother’s and
Grandmother’s arguments challenging the jury’s best interest finding. K.M.L., 443
S.W.3d at 116-17; K.L., 442 S.W.3d at 407. Based on our conclusion that legally
and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Mother failed to
comply with the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan, and based on the jury’s
best interest finding favoring the Department’s claim that terminating Mother’s
rights was in K.M.L.’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that
terminates M.L.’s parental rights to her minor child, K.M.L.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice
Submitted on December 15, 2014 Opinion Delivered January 29, 2015
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.