In the Interest of K.L.B., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00195-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00195-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.L.B., A CHILD,

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 84976-L1, Honorable James W. Anderson, Presiding

December 19, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, V.D. (Mother), appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights to K.L.B.1 Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

termination, contends termination was not in the child’s best interest, and argues the trial

court erred by denying her motion to extend the jurisdictional deadline. Finding the

evidence sufficient and no error in the trial court’s rulings, we affirm.

1 We use initials or pseudonyms to protect the child’s identity.TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The parent- child relationship was also terminated between the child and Father, but Father is not a party to this appeal. BACKGROUND

The Department of Family and Protective Services removed K.L.B. from his

parents’ care on June 11, 2024, after receiving reports that Mother and Father used

methamphetamine in the child’s presence and engaged in domestic violence. The trial

court granted the Department’s request for temporary managing conservatorship that

same day and ordered family service plans for both parents.

Department Investigator Isamar Pineda testified that Mother and Father initially

refused to speak with her, allow her into their apartment, or submit to drug testing. When

they eventually agreed to testing, both parents tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and

methamphetamine. Most troubling, the child (just ten months old) also tested positive for

all three substances.2

The Department attempted a voluntary safety plan that would have allowed the

parents to remain with the child under the paternal grandmother’s supervision. The plan

failed when the Department discovered the grandmother’s own history with the agency

disqualified her as a suitable supervisor.

Mother’s court-ordered service plan required her to complete drug and alcohol

assessment, individual counseling, domestic violence courses, and parenting classes.

Permanency specialist Jalisa Byrd testified that Mother completed her drug and alcohol

assessment twice due to a relapse and completed her psychosocial assessments.

2 Mother and Father were charged with endangering a child, a state jail felony. They received deferred adjudication community supervision.

2 However, Mother failed to attend her first counseling session after the psychosocial

assessment. She began but did not complete her drug treatment program or domestic

violence group.

Throughout the case, Mother tested positive for marijuana multiple times. Father

continued testing positive for marijuana, cocaine, and amphetamines. Due to these

positive results, the trial court suspended both parents’ visitation until they could provide

negative drug screens. Neither parent achieved this milestone before trial.

According to Byrd, Mother reported Father physically assaulted her during the

case, yet the couple remained together. Meanwhile, K.L.B. thrived in placement with his

maternal grandmother, a licensed foster parent prepared to adopt him. Byrd described

the placement as protective, nurturing, and caring.

Mother’s participation in some services came late and sporadically. Haley

Hamilton testified that Mother began her assessment on April 10, 2025, and enrolled in

the program on April 21, approximately ten months after removal. By trial on June 3,

Mother had attended only four classes while missing three others. Hamilton warned

Mother she risked discharge from the telehealth program due to excessive absences.

During announcements for trial, Mother moved to extend the jurisdictional deadline

to complete her service plan. The trial court denied the motion and proceeded to trial.3

3 Mother’s trial request did not specify whether she sought extension under § 263.401(b) or § 263.403(a-1). Compare TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b) (extraordinary circumstances required) with id. § 263.403(a-1) (near completion of services). The trial court found no extraordinary circumstances. Because Mother now relies solely on § 263.401(b), we limit our analysis accordingly.

3 After hearing the evidence, the court found both parents committed predicate grounds for

termination under subsections (D), (E), and (O), found termination in the child’s best

interest, and appointed the Department as permanent managing conservator. This

appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The standards for reviewing the evidence for sufficiency are well-known and

require little elaboration. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). As factfinder,

the trial court exclusively judges witness credibility and weighs testimony. In re H.E.B.,

No. 07-17-00351-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 855, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 31,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). While only one predicate ground is necessary to support

termination of parental rights when it is in the best interest of the child, due process

requires us to review the endangerment grounds when presented, as termination of rights

under predicate grounds (D) or (E) can carry consequences for the parent’s relationship

with other children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237

(Tex. 2019).

Subsection (E) requires proof that a parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The relevant

inquiry focuses on whether the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures

to act, endangered the children. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2003, no pet.). Termination under Subsection (E) requires more than a single act

or omission; it demands a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct. In re

4 M.M., 584 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, pet. denied). The conduct need

not target the child directly, nor must the child suffer actual injury. Id.4

A. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Predicate Ground for Termination

Characterizing the Department’s evidence as “stale,” Mother argues the

Department presented no evidence of continued drug use after June 2024. The assertion

turns a blind eye to the actual evidence presented at trial. Mother’s drug tests results,

admitted as exhibits, show continuous marijuana use throughout the case. In fact,

because of that illegal drug use, her visits were suspended pending a negative test; she

never produced one. Additionally, Mother and Father’s drug use resulted in their ten-

month-old child testing positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana.

“While illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment, a

pattern of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the

child can establish a substantial risk of harm.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex.

2024); D. H. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 652 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2021, no pet.) (drug use may support termination under subsection (E)); In

re D.D.J.-C., No. 07-24-00245-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 624, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Feb. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying R.R.A.’s analysis of (P)-ground drug

use to (D)-ground endangerment). Here, Mother engaged in continuous drug use before

4 See also, e.g., In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (“A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being . . . . Those risks can be developed by circumstances arising from and surrounding a parent’s behavior. Such risks must be more than ‘a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less- than-ideal family environment.’”) (ellipses added; footnotes omitted).

5 and throughout the case—not a single episode—including while caring for the child. This

evidence is sufficient to support the factfinder’s conclusion that Mother engaged in a

pattern of conduct endangering the child’s physical and emotional well-being. In re

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009) (finding legally sufficient evidence under

predicate ground (E), and holding that father’s recent improvement in behaviors did not

conclusively negate “a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices,” including

continued use of marijuana after child was removed from custody).

Appellant’s first issue is overruled. Having affirmed termination under subsection

(E), we need not address Mother’s challenges to subsections (D) and (O). See TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.1; In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022).

B. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Child’s Best Interest

Beyond proving a predicate ground, the Department must establish that

termination of parental rights serves the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(2). Courts consider the non-exhaustive Holley factors in this analysis.5 The

Department need not prove each factor; evidence of one factor may suffice in some

circumstances. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.).

5 See Holley v. Adams, 544. S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Those factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. at 372.

6 The evidence here reveals ongoing parental drug use, even after the child was

removed from custody. Moreover, evidence supports the judgment through the child’s

positive drug tests, alleged continuing domestic violence, Mother’s failure to complete

substantial service plan provisions, and testimony that the child thrives in a foster-to-adopt

placement.6 This evidence sufficiently supports the finding that termination serves the

child’s best interest. We overrule Mother’s second issue.

C. Denial of Statutory Extension

Per statute, Department-initiated suits to terminate the parent-child relationship

must reach trial within one year after the Department receives temporary managing

conservatorship. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a). This deadline is jurisdictional but may be

extended under certain circumstances. Id. § 263.401(a), (b). Relevant here, the trial

court may extend the jurisdictional deadline when (1) extraordinary circumstances

necessitate the child remaining in temporary conservatorship, and (2) continuing that

arrangement serves the child’s best interests. Id. § 263.401(b). A parent’s voluntary

failure to complete a service plan generally does not constitute extraordinary

circumstances. In re D.R., 631 S.W.3d 826, 837 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.).

We review denial of extension requests under § 263.401(b) for abused discretion.

In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). Due process

complaints are subject to the ordinary preservation rules. In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707,

6 Mother argues less restrictive alternatives could have protected the child. However, given evidence of the child’s positive drug tests, Mother’s continued drug use throughout the case, ongoing domestic violence concerns, and failure to complete required services, the trial court was free to determine that no lesser intervention would ensure the child’s safety.

7 710–11 (Tex. 2003) (declining to consider father’s due process argument in termination

suit where he failed to raise the complaint at trial); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

Mother requested an extension at trial, arguing she would soon complete her

service plan. She never objected on due process grounds, leaving nothing for our review.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 710–11.

Mother takes issue with the trial court’s characterization of her progress as a “last-

ditch effort,” characterizing her “engagement was genuine and achievable, not contrived.”

She claims she “was only weeks away from [successful] discharge.” As with her

statements about the state of the evidence of drug use, the record tells a different story.

Mother waited approximately ten months after removal before she attempted to undertake

the requirements in her plan of service. Even after she began, her participation was

sporadic, missing three of seven treatment sessions and facing discharge for non-

compliance. While completion was theoretically possible in six sessions, the evidence

shows that Mother would likely need twelve. This testimony, standing alone, provided the

only support for Mother’s request. Additional evidence revealed she had failed to

complete several other required services.

Accordingly, we conclude that Mother failed to preserve her due process claim.

Moreover, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying her request for

an extension given the conflicting evidence of any circumstance that would warrant an

extension. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b); In re D.R., 631 S.W.3d at 837. We overrule

her third issue.

8 CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order.

Lawrence M. Doss Justice