in the Interest of K.J.L., III and C.A.L.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 23, 2004
Docket11-03-00091-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of K.J.L., III and C.A.L. (in the Interest of K.J.L., III and C.A.L.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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in the Interest of K.J.L., III and C.A.L., (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

                                                             11th Court of Appeals

                                                                  Eastland, Texas

                                                             Memorandum Opinion

In the Interest of K.J.L., III and C.A.L.

No. 11-03-00091-CV B Appeal from Nolan County

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Victoria M. (Alvarado) Lee (Vickie) appeals from the trial court=s modification order that removed her and her former husband, Kenneth Jack Lee, Jr. (Jackie) as joint managing conservators of one of their children and designated her as possessory conservator and Jackie as sole managing conservator of that child.  The order also established that Jackie was the father of another child, born after the parties= divorce, and designated Vickie as the possessory conservator of that child and Jackie as the child=s sole managing conservator.  Vickie contends in four issues that (1) Aeducational neglect@ in itself is not a legally sufficient basis upon which to modify or establish conservatorship; (2) the evidence presented was not factually sufficient to support a finding of Aeducational neglect,@ and the modification of conservatorship was therefore an abuse of discretion by the trial court; (3) the trial court erred by failing to investigate charges of domestic violence against Jackie; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting substantial evidence of religious belief, contrary to the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.  We affirm.


Vickie insists in Issue Nos. 1 and 2 that Aeducational neglect@ in itself is not a legally sufficient basis upon which to modify or establish conservatorship and that the evidence presented was not factually sufficient to support a finding of Aeducational neglect@ so that the modification of conservatorship was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.  These two issues as presented by Vickie are based upon the unstated assumption that the trial court made its determinations as to conservatorship based solely or in part upon the basis of Aeducational neglect.@  With respect to one child, the court found only that there had been a material and substantial change of circumstances as to that child since the rendition of its prior order and that the modification of the order was in the best interest of the child.  With respect to the child for whom paternity was established in the order, the court found that Vickie did not choose to encourage or accept a positive relationship between the child and Jackie and that it was in the best interest of both children for Jackie to be designated managing conservator.  Although the trial court varied standard visitation terms regarding Vickie returning the children to school at the end of her period of possession, finding that she had established a pattern of conduct that neglected the educational welfare of the children, the court made no finding that indicated its findings regarding conservatorship were based on the issue of Aeducational neglect,@ either by itself or in connection with other issues.

While Vickie does not assert specifically in any issue that the trial court abused its discretion in its findings because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court=s findings regarding the best interest of the children, she appears to raise this issue in her argument.  We will therefore consider whether the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court=s findings.  When reviewing a no-evidence point, we must view the evidence in a light that tends to support the finding of the disputed fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.  Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex.2002).  A court may modify the terms and conditions of a joint managing conservatorship if the modification would be in the best interest of the child and if the circumstances of the child or one or both of the conservators have materially and substantially changed since the rendition of the order.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 156.101(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).  

With respect to our review of the trial court=s establishment of Jackie as father and managing conservator of the child not mentioned in the parties= divorce decree, we note that the trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of the child when appointing a parent as a managing conservator.  The judgment of the trial court will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that the court has abused its discretion.  Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.1982). 

An assertion that the evidence is Ainsufficient@ to support a fact finding means that the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered.  Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).  We are required to consider all of the evidence in making this determination.  Maritime Overseas Corporation v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998).


Jackie and Vickie were divorced in 1994, and both were named joint managing conservators of one child.  Robert Leslie Clark, a police officer for the City of Sweetwater, testified that he was dispatched to Jackie=s residence in December 2000.  He said that Vickie=s SUV was in the driveway, that she had the child with her, that it was Jackie=s weekend to have the child, but that Vickie had some reservations about it.  Officer Clark could not remember what the reservations were, which in his mind signified that he felt the child would not be in any kind of life-threatening situation, emotional trauma, or distress if left with the father.  He did say that the child was crying and that he believed Vickie said that the child did not want to stay. 

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Related

Matter of Marriage of Knighton
723 S.W.2d 274 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis
971 S.W.2d 402 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)
Lenz v. Lenz
79 S.W.3d 10 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
Garza v. Alviar
395 S.W.2d 821 (Texas Supreme Court, 1965)
In Interest of Mr
975 S.W.2d 51 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Matter of Marriage of Rutland
729 S.W.2d 923 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Gillespie v. Gillespie
644 S.W.2d 449 (Texas Supreme Court, 1982)

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