In the Interest of K.J.H., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00045-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00045-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.J.H., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 100th District Court Carson County, Texas Trial Court No. 12346, Honorable Jeremy Fowler, Presiding

February 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

On January 28, 2025, Shean Michael Finch, pro se, appealed “from the final order

and judgment issued by the district court regarding child support enforcement and wage

garnishment.” The trial court signed the order in question over two years earlier, that is,

on January 4, 2023.

Assuming arguendo the finality of the support order, applicable rules of procedure

obligated Finch to perfect his appeal within 30 days of the date the trial court signed the

decree. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. That 30 days could be extended to 90 if Finch timely filed

one or more post-judgment motions or requests encompassed in Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 26.1(a). Yet, both periods were far exceeded here. Thus, it appears we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. The matter was brought to his attention when we afforded

him opportunity to illustrate why jurisdiction exists.

The response Finch tendered does not so illustrate the presence of jurisdiction to

review the January 2023 order. Nor is his interjection of a show cause order signed by

the trial court on January 8, 2025, sufficient to create jurisdiction. The latter is neither a

final order disposing of all parties and claims nor an interlocutory order described in

§ 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. And, our appellate jurisdiction

is limited to appeals from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made immediately

appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).

As for his alternative request that we treat his notice of appeal as an application

for writ of mandamus, see CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 353–54 (Tex. 2011)

(noting the possibility of treating effort at appeal as an application for writ of mandamus),

mandamus proceedings are governed by equitable principles. In re Harbin, No. 07-23-

00437-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5592, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 6, 2024, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op. on reh’g). One such principle mandates diligence; when the

record fails to show that the petitioner acted diligently to protect his rights, mandamus is

unavailable. Id. Nothing in the limited record before us suggests that Finch acted with

diligence in waiting over two years to formally attack the January 4, 2023 order.

Another principle mandates the absence of an adequate legal remedy. In re

Thornton-Johnson, 65 S.W.3d 137, 138 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).

Additionally, the burden lies with the mandamus applicant to illustrate he has none. Id.

Finch says nothing about the absence of legal remedies sufficient to redress his

2 complaints about heeding a show cause order. Thus, he failed to meet that aspect of his

burden as it concerns attempted review of the show cause order.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction and deny his alternative

request for a writ of mandamus.

Per Curiam