In the Interest of K.J., a Child v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 14, 2024
Docket07-23-00442-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of K.J., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of K.J., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of K.J., a Child v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00442-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.J., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2022-FM-2278, Honorable Kelley Tesch, Presiding

May 14, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, L.J., (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental

rights to her son, K.J.1 Through a single issue, Mother contends the evidence was

insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that termination was in K.J.’s best interest.

After reviewing the record, we affirm.

1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to the child by initials and to the parents of

the child as “Mother” and “Father.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). K.J.’s father filed an affidavit of relinquishment of his parental rights prompting an order of termination of his parental rights to K.J. He did not appeal. Background

In November 2023, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to K.J.,

finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had violated three statutory grounds

warranting termination and that ending these rights was in K.J.’s best interest. TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O).2 The sequence of events leading to this decision

began a year earlier when the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) filed

a petition to remove K.J. from Mother’s care.3 K.J. had been taken to a hospital following

a two-hour seizure caused by ingesting methamphetamine.4 Hospital records described

K.J.’s condition as having “a high probability of imminent or life[-]threatening

deterioration.” He was placed under the care of F.B., his Mother’s maternal aunt.

Mother was subject to a family plan, which required her compliance with a number

of steps related to verifying her ability to adequately care for K.J. She violated several of

these requirements, including the following:

• Maintaining a Drug-Free Lifestyle and Submitting to Drug Testing: The plan mandated a complete drug and alcohol assessment, maintaining a drug-free lifestyle, and submiting to random drug tests. The evidence showed Mother used methamphetamine sporadically

2 The trial court determined Mother had “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain

in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotion well-being of the child;” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child;” id. at (E) and “failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for a parent to obtain return of the child.” Id. at (O). 3 K.J. was a little more than one and one-half years old at the time.

4 Hospital records indicate he was suffering from methamphetamine poisoning and treated for

seizures. He tested positive for methamphetamine.

2 during the pendency of the case, missed three drug tests,5 and tested positive in four others.

• Weekly Visits with K.J.: The plan required Mother to visit K.J. for one hour each week. However, after Mother moved from Lubbock to Big Spring, Texas, she opted to interact with her son over FaceTime. She made this choice despite the Department’s offer to provide transportation to facilitate in-person visits.

• Stable Employment and Income Verification: Mother was required to maintain steady employment, provide pay stubs, and share her employer’s contact information. She reported working as an online assistant and provided a letter verifying her employment. However, the Department’s designated permanency specialist was unable to verify this employment or contact the employer; Mother failed to provide proof of wages.

• Stable Housing: Mother was required to maintain stable, drug-free housing. However, she changed her residence four times, including two instances in which she was evicted from apartments. She reported she was living with her grandmother on other occasions, though the caseworker was unable to verify this claim.6

By contrast, testimony from the caseworker reveals that K.J. has formed a strong

bond with F.B., his mother’s maternal aunt, and is adapting well to his new life in her care.

The caseworker described F.B.’s residence as “very appropriate,” noting it as very clean

and safe, with F.B.’s two adult sons also living there. F.B. is actively pursuing long-term

adoptive placement and is in the process of obtaining a license as an adoptive home.

Given the mother’s consistent drug use, unstable housing, and lack of contact, the

caseworker recommended terminating the mother’s parental rights to facilitate K.J.’s

5 The court’s order and Mother’s service plan stated that the failure to appear for a scheduled drug

test would be treated as a “positive” test and a failure to follow the trial court’s order and service plan. 6 The caseworker attempted monthly visits with Mother but was unable to meet at her home for four

months.

3 adoption. She emphasized that this termination would eliminate a major obstacle to

securing a stable and permanent home for K.J. with F.B.

On appeal, Mother does not challenge any statutory ground relied on by the trial

court in ordering the termination of her parental rights. Instead, she asserts that

termination of her parental rights was not in K.J.’s best interest.

Analysis

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and section 161.001 of

the Texas Family Code require application of a heightened evidentiary standard of clear

and convincing evidence in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In

re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002).

The applicable standards for reviewing the evidence are discussed in our opinion in In re

A.M., No. 07-21-00052-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5447 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 8,

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). As factfinder, the district court was the exclusive judge of

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony. In re H.E.B., No. 07-

17-00351-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 885, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 31, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). To assess the trial court’s best-interest determination, we may

consider the factors announced in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

In this case, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that K.J.,

while in his mother’s care, suffered a life-threatening crisis by ingesting

methamphetamine. When the Department removed K.J. from Mother’s care, she was

required to maintain a drug-free lifestyle, undergo random drug testing, secure stable

housing, and maintain stable employment as conditions for his return. However, she

failed to meet these conditions: she missed scheduled drug tests, tested positive on 4 multiple occasions, and admitted to sporadic methamphetamine use during the

proceedings. Additionally, Mother changed her residence four times and was unable to

provide verifiable evidence of employment or stable living conditions, undermining her

ability to provide a secure environment for K.J. Moreover, after her move to another

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Related

In the Interest of E.N.C., J.A.C., S.A.L., N.A.G. and C.G.L.
384 S.W.3d 796 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of K.C.
219 S.W.3d 924 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)

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In the Interest of K.J., a Child v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-kj-a-child-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2024.