In the Interest of Kemon P.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

In the Interest of Kemon P.

DecidedOctober 22, 2014

Docket2014-MO-042

StatusUnpublished

This text of In the Interest of Kemon P. (In the Interest of Kemon P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In the Interest of Kemon P., (S.C. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

In the Interest of Kemon P., a Juvenile Under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001128

Appeal from Greenwood County The Honorable Joseph W. McGowan, III, Family Court

Memorandum Opinion No. 2014-MO-042 Heard October 9, 2014 – Filed October 22, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Carmen V. Ganjehsani, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia, and Solicitor David M. Stumbo, of Greenwood, for the State.

PER CURIAM: In this direct appeal, Appellant argues the mandatory registration requirement of the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act (Act),1 as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm pursuant to

1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2013). Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: In re Ronnie A., 355 S.C. 407, 409, 585 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2003) (finding that sex offender registration for juveniles is non-punitive (citation omitted)); State v. Walls, 348 S.C. 26, 31, 558 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2002) (finding the Act is not penal but is civil in nature, as it is intended to protect the public from sex offenders who may reoffend and to aid law enforcement in solving sex crimes, and determining that sex offender registration does not constitute a criminal penalty); see in re Justin B., 405 S.C. 391, 395, 747 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2013) (holding that the Act's electronic monitoring requirement for juvenile sex offenders is not penal in nature and not violative of the Eighth Amendment).

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

In the Interest of Kemon P., a Juvenile Under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001128

Appeal from Greenwood County The Honorable Joseph W. McGowan, III, Family Court

Memorandum Opinion No. 2014-MO-042 Heard October 9, 2014 – Filed October 22, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Carmen V. Ganjehsani, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia, and Solicitor David M. Stumbo, of Greenwood, for the State.

PER CURIAM: In this direct appeal, Appellant argues the mandatory registration requirement of the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act (Act),1 as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm pursuant to

1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2013). Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: In re Ronnie A., 355 S.C. 407, 409, 585 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2003) (finding that sex offender registration for juveniles is non-punitive (citation omitted)); State v. Walls, 348 S.C. 26, 31, 558 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2002) (finding the Act is not penal but is civil in nature, as it is intended to protect the public from sex offenders who may reoffend and to aid law enforcement in solving sex crimes, and determining that sex offender registration does not constitute a criminal penalty); see in re Justin B., 405 S.C. 391, 395, 747 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2013) (holding that the Act's electronic monitoring requirement for juvenile sex offenders is not penal in nature and not violative of the Eighth Amendment).

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

In the Interest of Kemon P., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-kemon-p-sc-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack