in the Interest of K.C., a Child

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 3, 2017
Docket10-16-00321-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of K.C., a Child (in the Interest of K.C., a Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of K.C., a Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00321-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.C., A CHILD

From the 66th District Court Hill County, Texas Trial Court No. 52259

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court signed an order terminating the parental rights of B.W., the father

of eight-year-old K.C., after a bench trial.1 The trial court found that B.W. had violated

Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O), and (Q) and that termination was in

the child’s best interest. In his sole issue, B.W. contends that the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to establish that terminating his parental rights was in the child’s

best interest. We will affirm.

In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under section

161.001, the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence two elements:

1The underlying suit involved three children, K.C. and two-year-old twins. The parental rights of F.C., the mother of the children, and M.S., the father of the twins, were also terminated, but neither has appealed. (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1) of section 161.001,

termed a predicate violation; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2016); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763,

766 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied). The factfinder must find that both elements are

established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not relieve

the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370

(Tex. 1976); Swate, 72 S.W.3d at 766. “Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as “that

measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief

or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re G.M., 596

S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).

Both legal and factual sufficiency reviews in termination cases must take into

consideration whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm

belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the petitioner bears the burden

of proof. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002) (discussing legal sufficiency

review); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (discussing factual sufficiency review).

In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

In re K.C. Page 2 In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to

evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id.

[T]he inquiry must be “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” A court of appeals should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted); see C.H., 89 S.W.2d at 25.

The following evidence was presented at trial. B.W. was charged by indictment of

the second-degree-felony offense of burglary of a habitation. The offense occurred on

May 21, 2013. The indictment further charged B.W. as a habitual offender. The jury found

B.W. guilty and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment. B.W.’s sentence was

imposed on May 1, 2014. The trial court admitted into evidence a certified copy of the

judgment of conviction. The trial court also admitted into evidence a certified copy of

this Court’s memorandum opinion, issued on October 29, 2015, affirming the judgment

of conviction.

Department of Family and Protective Services conservatorship worker Camie

Staas testified that in November 2014, the Department received a referral, alleging that

the children were being neglectfully supervised by their mother. The referral alleged that

F.C. was arrested for criminal trespassing. She had taken the children to a vacant home

with no electricity and was in the bathroom smoking marijuana with another person.

In re K.C. Page 3 One of the twins was found crying nonstop, he had a cough, and his diaper appeared that

it needed to be changed.

Staas stated that she spoke with F.C. in December 2014. According to Staas, F.C.

stated that

she was on probation for a falsified report to a police officer and that she was there cleaning the residence and that the landlord shut the electricity off on her, telling her she had to leave within 15 minutes and that she did know that the gentleman . . . who[m] she was with was arrested for possession of marijuana.

Staas also spoke with M.S. during the investigation. M.S. was in the Hill County Jail

because he had violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamines.

Neither F.C. nor M.S. was aware of the other’s drug use, and, according to Staas, neither

F.C. nor M.S. was in a position to provide a safe home for the children.

Staas testified that the Department determined that there was reason to believe

that F.C. was neglectfully supervising the children due to her testing positive for

methamphetamines and marijuana and her providing unstable living conditions. The

Department also determined that there was reason to believe that M.S. was neglectfully

supervising the children because he had been found to be using methamphetamines and

was providing unstable living conditions. Staas further said that neither F.C. nor M.S.

ever did anything that indicated that they were in a position to have the children returned

to them.

Staas stated that she never spoke with B.W. during her investigation. F.C. was

claiming that M.S. was the father of all three children, and Staas did not become aware

that B.W. was K.C.’s father until sometime in January 2015. Staas did not attempt to

In re K.C. Page 4 contact B.W. at that point because the case had been turned over to another caseworker.

There were no reports against B.W. or any indication that B.W. was a problem regarding

the children at that time.

Department of Family and Protective Services conservatorship specialist Maya

Carter testified that the Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship

of the children on February 19, 2015. Carter believed that she sent her first of two letters

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Related

Williams v. Williams
150 S.W.3d 436 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
D.O. v. Texas Department of Human Services
851 S.W.2d 351 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
In the Interest of G. M.
596 S.W.2d 846 (Texas Supreme Court, 1980)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Dupree v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
907 S.W.2d 81 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Swate v. Swate
72 S.W.3d 763 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
In the Interest of S.H.A.
728 S.W.2d 73 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Ray v. Burns
832 S.W.2d 431 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
in the Interest of R.W.
129 S.W.3d 732 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
in the Interest of J.D., a Child
436 S.W.3d 105 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2014)
In the Interest of D.M.
58 S.W.3d 801 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)

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