In the Interest of K v. a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00292-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF K.V., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-746262-24

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this ultra-accelerated appeal,1 Appellant K.L. (Mother)2 appeals the trial

court’s order terminating her parent–child relationship with her daughter K.V.

(Daughter).3 The trial court found that the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) had proved four conduct-based grounds for termination of

Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in Daughter’s best interest. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L), (N), (b)(2). The trial court awarded

permanent managing conservatorship of Daughter to the Department. Mother timely

appealed.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Mother’s

appeal is “without merit and frivolous.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45,

87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—

1 See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate courts to dispose of appeals from judgments terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal is filed). 2 To protect the child’s identity, we refer to her and her parents by their familial relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 3 Daughter’s parent–child relationship with L.A. (Father) was also terminated, but no appeal was filed on Father’s behalf. Neither Father nor Mother appeared at the termination trial. Father signed and filed an “Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights to the Department of Family and Protective Services.” See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(k).

2 Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief

meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.

We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record

and to file a pro se response, but she has not done so. The Department has declined

to file a responsive brief.

III. DISCUSSION

When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also

consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-

18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate record.

Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without

merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D.,

279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the

3 trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship between Mother and

Daughter.

Mother’s counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not

show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the

appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,

501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly,

Mother’s counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas Supreme

Court unless otherwise relieved. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; see also Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

IV. CONCLUSION

We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the

trial court’s termination order.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: October 16, 2025