in the Interest of K. A. C., K. C., M. C. and E. C., Children

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

§ No. 08-18-00218-CV IN THE INTEREST OF § Appeal from K.A.C., K.C., M.C., AND E.C., § 65th District Court CHILDREN § of El Paso County, Texas § (TC # 2017DCM2545) §

OPINION

S.C. appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to K.A.C., K.C., M.C., and

E.C. 1 We affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Sherry is the mother of the four children who are the subject of this termination case,

Kayla, Kim, Matt, and Edgar. J.L. (“Jack”) is the father of Kayla, who was nearly five years of

age at the time of the final hearing in November 2018. I.M. is the father of three-year-old Kim,

1 To protect the identity of the children, the opinion will refer to S.C. by the fictitious name “Sherry”, to K.A.C. by the fictitious name “Kayla”, to K.C. by the fictitious name “Kim”, to M.C. by the fictitious name Matt, and to E.C. by the fictitious name “Edgar”. See TEX.R.APP.P. 9.8. The opinion will refer to Kayla’s father, J.L., by the fictitious name “Jack”. I.M. is the father of Kim, Matt, and Edgar, and the opinion will refer to him by his initials. Family members and foster parents will be referred to by their initials or fictitious names as indicated in the opinion. two-and-a-half-year-old Matt, and one-and-a-half-year-old Edgar.2 Sherry gave birth to another

child, G.C., during the pendency of this case. G.C. tested positive for both amphetamine and

methamphetamine when she was born in May 2018.3

The Department first became involved with Sherry and the children in April 2017 when

Sherry gave birth to Edgar, and both Sherry and the newborn tested positive for

methamphetamine. Staff at the hospital made a report regarding the positive drug test results to

the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Sherry denied using drugs and claimed

that they had testified positive solely because she had been in a car with someone who smoked

methamphetamine. Before going to the hospital, Sherry had left her other three children with

H.M., the paternal grandmother of Kim and Matt.4 The Department could not place the children

with H.M. because H.M.’s daughter also lived in the home and had a felony record. I.M. was in

jail in New Mexico as a result of a domestic violence incident with Sherry. Sherry left the

hospital against medical advice and the Department caseworker could not locate her. Edgar, who

had been born six weeks premature, remained in the hospital. On April 12, 2017, the

Department filed a petition for protection of the children, for conservatorship, and seeking

termination of Sherry’s parental rights. That same day, the trial court signed an emergency order

removing the children from Sherry’s home and appointing the Department as the temporary sole

managing conservator of the children. When the children were placed in foster care on April 12,

2017, they were dirty and none of them had shoes. Kayla, Kim, and Edgar were placed in one

foster home, and Matt was placed in another foster home with C.C. and A.C. (the “Cooks”).

2 The trial court terminated I.M.’s parental rights to Kim, Matt, and Edgar, but he has not appealed.

3 Sherry’s parental rights to G.C. are not at issue in this appeal. 4 When the case began in April 2017, the Department was unaware that Jack was Kayla’s father. It was not until later in the case that Sherry informed the Department that Jack was Kayla’s father.

-2- Kim and Edgar5 were placed with the Cooks on July 3, 2017, and G.C. was placed with them on

June 1, 2018. The Cooks plan to adopt all four children if given the opportunity. Kayla was

moved out of the first foster home due to behavioral issues and placed with foster parents L.R.

and N.R. (the “Rogers”) where she remained until the final hearing. Kayla’s paternal

grandmother, A.L. (“Angela”), intervened in the case and sought to be named permanent

managing conservator of Kayla.

Following removal of the children, the Department developed a Service Plan for Sherry,

and on June 2, 2017, the trial court made the Service Plan an order of the court. The Service

Plan required Sherry to: (1) complete an OSAR drug and alcohol assessment and follow all

recommendations; (2) complete parenting classes; (3) complete domestic violence classes; and

(4) submit to random drug testing as requested by the Department. The Department requested

that Sherry submit to drug testing at least once a month, but Sherry submitted to testing only two

times during the eighteen months that the case was pending. While Sherry completed the OSAR

assessment, she did not complete outpatient services for drug addiction at Pinnacle. In March

2018, Sherry went to the initial assessment at Pinnacle and attended one session, but she did not

attended any other sessions. As a result, she was unsuccessfully discharged. Sherry made a

second attempt to attend outpatient services at Pinnacle in May 2018, but she was unsuccessfully

discharged again. The evidence showed that Sherry was continuing to use drugs during this time

period because G.C., who was born in late May 2018, tested positive for both amphetamine and

methamphetamine. Pinnacle refused to allow Sherry a third opportunity to complete outpatient

services because of the two prior unsuccessful discharges. In July 2018, the caseworker located

another provider of outpatient drug addiction services, Aliviane, but Sherry failed to attend.

5 Edgar was discharged from the hospital on April 21, 2017 and placed with foster parents, but he was later placed with the Cooks.

-3- Sherry provided the caseworker, Gloria Aguero, with a certificate that she had completed

the parenting classes, but Aguero’s investigation revealed that the provider did not offer

parenting classes and was unfamiliar with the person who purportedly signed the certificate.

Sherry also provided Aguero with a certificate from an online parenting class, but the

Department does not accept certificates from online providers as it requires classroom

participation. While Sherry claimed she had attended domestic violence classes, she did not

provide a certificate of completion or a release so that Aguero could verify Sherry’s attendance

through the provider.

The Department also developed a visitation plan for Sherry, and the trial court ordered

Sherry to consistently attend and participate in scheduled visitations. Although Sherry attended

some visitations with the children, she also missed scheduled visits. On some occasions, she

provided an explanation, but other times she simply did not attend.

The trial court also ordered Sherry to obtain and maintain appropriate housing and allow

the CPS caseworker access to the home, to provide the Department with her contact information,

and to maintain regular and consistent contact with the caseworker. Aguero testified that Sherry

did not consistently maintain contact with her. In March 2018, Sherry had an apartment in

Canutillo, Texas which Aguero visited six times. Aguero described the apartment as clean and

appropriate for the children. At the time of the final hearing in November 2018, Sherry had

moved and Aguero did not have an address for her. Aguero testified that Sherry had moved

several times during the pendency of the case and she sometimes gave Aguero addresses which

did not exist. Sherry did not attend the final hearing which took place in September and

November of 2018.

The Department sought termination based on the predicate termination grounds set forth

-4- in subsections D, E, N, O, P, and R of Section 161.001(b)(1). See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P), and (R). The trial court found that the Department had

proven by clear and convincing evidence that Sherry had: (1) engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the child, pursuant to § 161.00l(b)(l)(E); (2) failed to comply with the

provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for Sherry to obtain

the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine

months as a result of the children’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or

neglect of the child, pursuant to § 161.001(b)(l)(O), and (3) used a controlled substance in a

manner that endangered the health or safety of the children, and (1) failed to complete a court-

ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (2) after completion of a court-ordered substance

abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled substance, pursuant § 161.001(b)(l)(P).

The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Sherry’s parental

rights was in the children’s best interest. The court appointed the Department as the permanent

managing conservator of Kim, Matt, and Edgar, but it appointed Kayla’s paternal grandmother as

her permanent managing conservator.

PREDICATE TERMINATION GROUNDS

In Issues One through Three, Sherry challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that her parental rights should be terminated

based on subsections E, O, and P of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Parental

rights may be involuntarily terminated through proceedings brought under Section 161.001 of

the Texas Family Code. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001. Under this provision, the

-5- petitioner must (1) establish one or more of the statutory acts or omissions enumerated as

grounds for termination, and (2) prove that termination is in the best interest of the children. See

id. Both elements must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the best

interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Texas Department of Human Services v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In the Interest of A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 138

(Tex.App.--El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Only one predicate finding under Section

161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that

termination is in the child’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

However, when a parent’s rights have been terminated based on multiple predication grounds,

including subsections D or E, we must address any sufficiency challenges directed at subsections

D and/or E, even if the evidence is sufficient to support termination on other predicate grounds.

See In re N.G., No. 18-0508, 2019 WL 2147263 (Tex. May 17, 2019).

Standards of Review

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination case, we consider

all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, “to determine whether a

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”

In the Interest of J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005), quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,

266 (Tex. 2002); see In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009). We give deference to the

fact finder’s conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that

finding, and presume the fact finder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long

as a reasonable fact finder could do so. In the Interest of J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We

disregard any evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved, or found to have

-6- been incredible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

In a factual sufficiency review, the inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a fact

finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the challenge findings. See In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could

reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. A court of

appeals should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not

have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If the disputed evidence that a

reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact

finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is

factually insufficient. Id.

Endangering Conduct -- Section 161.001(b)(1)(E)

In her first issue, Sherry contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support termination of her parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The trial court found

by clear and convincing evidence that Sherry engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the

children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the physical or emotional well-

being of the children. The term “conduct,” as used in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), includes both

the parent’s actions and failures to act. In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex.App.--San

Antonio 2000, pet. denied). Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability

endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. See A.S. v. Texas Department of

Family and Protective Services, 394 S.W.3d 703, 712 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.); In re

M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).

-7- Under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the

endangerment of the child’s physical and emotional well-being was the direct result of the

parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,

125 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Termination under this subsection must be based on

more than a single act or omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious

course of conduct by the parent. Id. When determining whether a parent has engaged in an

endangering course of conduct, a fact finder may consider the parent’s actions and inactions that

occurred both before and after the child was born. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex.

2009); In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2015, no pet.); In re S.M., 389

S.W.3d 483, 491-92 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.). The conduct need not occur in the

child’s presence, and it may occur both before and after the child has been removed by the

Department. Walker v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 312 S.W.3d 608, 617

(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Scienter is not required for an appellant’s

own acts under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), although it is required when a parent places her child

with others who engage in endangering acts. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 236 (Tex.App.--

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Evidence of illegal drug use by a parent and its effect on a parent’s life and his ability to

parent may establish an endangering course of conduct under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See In

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; In the Interest of K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex.App.--El

Paso 2018, no pet.); Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617. A mother’s use of illegal drugs during

pregnancy may constitute conduct that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a

child. Cervantes-Peterson v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 221 S.W.3d

244, 253 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 807

-8- (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Further, evidence that the parent continued

to use illegal drugs even though the parent knew her parental rights were in jeopardy is conduct

showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, which by its nature, endangers

a child’s well-being. See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2011,

pet. denied); Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 253-54.

The Department became involved with the children and Sherry in April 2017 when

Edgar was born with methamphetamine in his system. Sherry also tested positive for

methamphetamine in the hospital. While Sherry claimed she was exposed to methamphetamine

smoke while sitting in a car with a stranger shortly before the birth of Edgar, she did not offer

any explanation for G.C.’s positive test for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The trial court

was not required to believe Sherry’s innocent-bystander explanation given that Sherry failed to

submit to random drug testing during the case or complete outpatient services for drug addiction,

and another child, G.C., was born with methamphetamine in her system just fifteen months after

the case began. Further, Kayla’s father Jack testified that he suspected Sherry was using

methamphetamine while she was pregnant with Kayla. His suspicions were based on Sherry’s

admission to him that she had used methamphetamine in the past. Sherry’s continued use of

illegal drugs during her pregnancies with Edgar and G.C. in 2017 and 2018 is conduct that

endangered the physical and emotional well-being of both unborn children. See Cervantes-

Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 253-54 (mother’s continued use of cocaine over four pregnancies

supported finding that she had engaged in an endangering course of conduct); In re W.A.B., 979

S.W.2d at 806 (use of drugs during pregnancy is conduct that endangers the physical and

emotional well-being of the unborn child). Further, any impairment Sherry experienced while

using illegal drugs would have rendered her incapable of parenting her children. See In re

-9- A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Despite being

ordered by the trial court to comply with the Service Plan, Sherry did not take steps to address

her drug use during the pendency of the case. The trial court could reasonably conclude from the

evidence that Sherry would continue to use illegal drugs and endanger the children’s well-being

in the future. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346.

Having considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we

conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Sherry

engaged in a course of conduct endangering to the children’s physical and emotional well-being

under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d

at 286-87; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426. Accordingly, we find that the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.

In conducting the factual sufficiency review, we have considered all of the evidence but

have not viewed it through the prism of “in the light most favorable to the finding.” The

evidence presented permits a reasonable fact finder to form a firm believe or conviction that

Sherry engaged in an endangering course of conduct. Accordingly, we find the evidence

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). Issue One

is overruled. Having found the evidence sufficient to support termination under Section

161.001(b)(1)(E), it is unnecessary to address Issues Two and Three.

BEST INTEREST

In Issue Four, Sherry argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the best interest finding made under Section 161.001(b)(2) of the Family Code. A

determination of best interest necessitates a focus on the child, not the parent. See In the Interest

of B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2015, no pet.); In the Interest of R.F., 115

- 10 - S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.). There is a strong presumption that it is in the

child’s best interest to preserve the parent-child relationship. In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d at 927.

Several factors must be considered in our analysis of the best interest issue: the child’s desires;

the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future; the emotional and physical

danger to the child now and in the future; the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking

custody; the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the child’s best interest;

the plans for the child by those individuals or the agency seeking custody; the stability of the

home or proposed placement; the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing

parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976)(“the Holley factors”). The Department is not

required to prove all of these factors as a condition precedent to parental-rights termination. See

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002); In re X.R.L., 461 S.W.3d 633, 639-40 (Tex.App.--

Texarkana 2015, no pet.). In assessing the best interest finding, we also must bear in mind that

permanence is of paramount importance in considering a child’s present and future needs. In re

B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d at 927.

We begin by examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the best interest

finding. The first factor is the desires of the children. At the time of trial, Kayla was almost five

years of age, Kim was three-years-old, Matt was two-and-a-half-years-old, and Edgar was one-

and-a-half-years-old. All of the children were under the age of five at the time of trial, and there

is nothing to indicate that any of them expressed his or her desires. Evidence that a child is well-

cared for by the foster family, is bonded to the foster family, and has spent minimal time in the

presence of a parent is relevant to the best interest determination under the desires of the child

factor. See In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d 645, 653 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2017, no pet.); In re U.P., 105

- 11 - S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The children are bonded

to their mother, but they are also strongly bonded to their foster parents. Although Sherry missed

several visits with the children, the evidence showed that the children looked forward to their

visits with her. This factor is neutral.

The next two factors are the children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the

future, and the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future. The need for

permanence is a paramount consideration for a child’s present and future physical and emotional

needs. In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 653; In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230. Kayla exhibited

aggressive behavior when she first went into the foster care setting, and she was diagnosed with

intermittent explosive disorder by a psychiatrist, but a licensed professional counselor, Lizette

Munoz, diagnosed her with adjustment disorder. Kayla made significant progress while living

with the Rogers. Munoz recommended that Kayla continue to receive individual counseling and

also participate in family counseling. Kim does not have any special needs, but she is receiving

counseling therapy every two weeks, and the plan is for the counseling to continue. Matt takes

medication for asthma, and both Matt and Edgar take medication for allergies. During the

pendency of the case, Edgar received Early Childhood Intervention (ECI) services including

speech and physical therapy. He completed physical therapy but will continue to receive speech

therapy. The evidence does not support a conclusion that Sherry is able to provide a stable home

for the children or meet their needs. Further, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that

Sherry engaged in conduct endangering to the children’s physical and emotional well-being. A

fact finder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the

future if the child is returned to the parent. In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 653; In re D.L.N., 958

S.W.2d 934, 934 (Tex.App.--Waco 1997, pet. denied). Based on the evidence, the trial court

- 12 - could have determined that the second and third factors weigh in support of the best interest

finding.

The fourth factor is the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody. In

reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect

or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children. D.O. v. Texas

Department of Human Services, 851 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, no writ),

disapproved of on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002). The evidence

supports a conclusion that Sherry has poor parenting skills and she did not complete the classes

which could have improved these skills. This factor weighs in favor of the best interest finding.

The fifth factor examines the programs available to assist those individuals to promote

the child’s best interest. The Department developed a Service Plan for Sherry, but she failed to

complete the majority of the requirements. Perhaps most significantly, she did not complete

outpatient services for drug use and addiction. She also failed to complete the parenting and

domestic violence classes. This factor supports the best interest finding.

We will consider the sixth and seventh factors together. The sixth factor examines the

plans for the child by those individuals or the agency seeking custody. The seventh factor is the

stability of the home or proposed placement. The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the

Department’s plans for the children and determine whether the plans and expectations of each

party are realistic or weak and ill-defined. D.O., 851 S.W.2d at 356. Sherry did not appear for

the final hearing in September 2018 or the continuation of that hearing in November 2018, and

there is no evidence of her plan for the children. The Department recommended that Kayla be

placed with her paternal grandmother, Angela, and that Angela be named her permanent

managing conservator. It also recommended that Jack be named possessory conservator. There

- 13 - is evidence that Kayla is attached to her grandmother and is bonded with Jack. Further, Angela

had the ability to continue to provide for Kayla’s therapeutic needs.

The Department’s plan for Kim, Matt, and Edgar is for them to be adopted by the Cooks.

Kim, Matt, and Edgar are doing well and are bonded with their foster parents who plan to adopt

them. The trial court could have determined that the Department’s plans for all four children are

realistic and the proposed placements will provide them with stable homes. The sixth and

seventh factors weigh in favor of the best interest finding.

The eighth factor is the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing

parent-child relationship is not a proper one. Sherry endangered the children through her

continued drug use over the course of at least two pregnancies. Based on this evidence, the trial

court could have found that the existing parent-child relationship between Sherry and the

children is not a proper one. This factor supports the best interest finding.

Finally, the ninth factor is whether there is any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Sherry’s brief does not address this factor.

Sherry argues that the evidence showed the children are strongly bonded to her, she acted

appropriately during her visits, and she had obtained an apartment which was appropriate for the

children. While Sherry did have an apartment at one time, she had moved at the time of the final

hearing and Sherry did not provide the caseworker with her new address. We agree with Sherry

that the evidence shows the children are bonded to her. Although a child’s love of a parent is an

important consideration in determining the best interest of the children, it cannot override or

outweigh evidence of danger to the child. In re T.L.E., No. 14-18-01057-CV, 2019 WL

2181184, at *8 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2019, no pet. h.). Sherry asserts that

the Department failed to prove that the children faced an immediate danger to their physical

- 14 - health or safety if they were returned to her. The Department is not required to prove immediate

physical danger to the children in order to show that termination is in the children’s best interest.

We found in our review of Issue One that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that

Sherry, by continuing to use methamphetamine over multiple pregnancies, engaged in a course

of conduct that endangered the emotional and physical health of the children. Given Sherry’s

failure to address her issues with drug use, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Sherry

would continue to use illegal drugs and endanger the children’s well-being in the future. See In

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. After considering the evidence related to the Holley factors, the

trial court could have reached a firm conviction that termination of Sherry’s parental rights is in

the best interest of Kayla, Kim, Matt, and Edgar. Issue Four is overruled. The order terminating

Sherry’s parental rights to the children is affirmed.

June 4, 2019 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

- 15 -