IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0125 Filed April 6, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF J.S. AND J.S., Minor children,
R.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Susan L.
Christensen, Judge.
A mother challenges the juvenile court’s adjudication of her daughter and
son as children in need of assistance. AFFIRMED.
Vicki R. Danley, Sidney, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Justin Wyatt of Woods & Wyatt, P.L.L.C., Glenwood, for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination that her ten-year-old
daughter J.G.S. and thirteen-year-old son J.C.S. are children in need of
assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(1) (2015). The court
found the State presented clear and convincing evidence J.G.S. suffered, and
J.C.S. was imminently likely to suffer, harmful effects as a result of mental injury
caused by acts of their mother, Rachel. The mother raises due process, prior
bad acts, and sufficiency challenges to the juvenile court’s rulings. After
reviewing the record anew, we reject the mother’s constitutional and evidentiary
claims and find ample support for the juvenile court’s adjudication and
dispositional orders.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Rachel and Matthew are the divorced parents of J.C.S. and J.G.S.1
Matthew is not the biological father of J.G.S., but adopted her in 2008. After a
modification action in 2014, the district court granted Matthew sole legal custody
and physical care of both children. While the modification action was on appeal,
Rachel set up a first-time meeting between J.G.S. and her biological father,
without notice to the girl’s therapist or Matthew. In January 2015, a troubled
J.G.S. told her therapist she wanted to go live with her biological father.
In February 2015, J.G.S. stayed with Rachel while the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS) investigated an allegation that Matthew physically
1 Rachel also has two younger children who remain in her care and are not involved in this CINA case. 3
abused their daughter. Although the abuse allegation was not confirmed2 and
the DHS safety plan expired on March 13, 2015, J.G.S. refused to return to her
father’s home. Matthew agreed J.G.S. could stay with Rachel through her spring
break and return to his home on March 22, 2015.
But on March 17, 2015, Rachel took J.G.S. to the Montgomery County
Memorial Hospital after the girl became “uncontrollable” and reportedly tried to
jump out of a moving car. An ambulance transported J.G.S. to the University of
Iowa Hospitals and Clinics where she was committed to the adolescent and child
psychiatry unit. This occasion marked the third time J.G.S. had undergone a
mental health commitment; at the time of each commitment, the child had been
in her mother’s care.
During J.G.S.’s hospitalization, Rachel became “verbally aggressive” with
the medical staff and made derogatory comments about them in front of her then
nine-year-old daughter. The girl’s doctors determined Rachel’s interactions with
J.G.S. at the hospital should be supervised. On one occasion, Iowa City police
were asked to escort Rachel out of the hospital. The hospital also enacted their
threat-assessment-team protocol due to the volatility of Rachel’s behavior.
Rachel also pulled her son J.C.S. into the fray. The twelve-year-old boy
was scheduled for a two-hour visit with Rachel in Red Oak on March 31, 2015.
Instead, the boy left a message for his father that he would be missing a week of
school to spend time with his mother. Matthew enlisted the Red Oak police for
2 The DHS did confirm a physical-abuse assessment against the girl’s paternal grandmother, but determined the incident was isolated and unlikely to occur again. The incident involved the grandmother demanding J.G.S. turn over her cell phone and grabbing the girl by the wrist while the girl was sending a text message asking Rachel to come pick her up. 4
help retrieving his son, unaware that J.C.S. was in Iowa City with Rachel and her
boyfriend. During this time, Rachel sent text messages to Matthew telling him
J.C.S. was afraid he would get in trouble with his father for spending time with
her. J.C.S. later denied expressing fear of his father.
On April 5, 2015, Rachel refused to open her door to the Red Oak police
when they arrived to take J.C.S. back to his father. The police eventually
arrested Rachel for violating a custodial order.
On April 16, 2015, Dr. Resmiye Oral, director of the University Hospitals’
child-protection program, sent a letter to the DHS with updated progress notes on
J.G.S. The pediatrician diagnosed the child with oppositional defiant disorder,
anger management problems, and poor mood control. Dr. Oral related the girl’s
difficulties to child abuse. Dr. Oral opined, “This child has been emotionally
abused by her mother leading to mental injury, which presented itself as
behavioral problems that prevented the child from functioning in her optimal
emotional and physical capacity.”
On April 24, 2015, the State filed a petition alleging J.G.S. and J.C.S. were
CINA under section 232.2(6)(c)(1), (6)(c)(2), and (6)(f). On August 7, 2015, the
mother filed a motion to dismiss the State’s petition alleging section
232.2(6)(c)(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the State’s petition
failed to provide her sufficient notice, and the State’s experts suffered from
“conformational bias.” The State amended the petition on August 10, 2015, to
add more-detailed factual allegations and later moved to dismiss paragraph (6)(f)
as a ground for adjudication. The juvenile court held the adjudication hearing
across four days: August 25, October 1, October 9, and October 15, 2015. 5
The State called Dr. Oral to testify regarding her evaluation of J.G.S.
during the girl’s hospitalization. The pediatrician testified J.G.S. was a “highly
burdened child”—an emotional state that came from both parents. Dr. Oral
explained that Rachel engaged in “parental alienation”—which the doctor
described as one parent “brainwashing” a child against the other parent, usually
in the context of a custody battle. The doctor further explained the father and
paternal grandmother probably didn’t understand the “pathophysiology of the
child’s behaviors” when she rebelled against them; “when they don’t understand
parental alienation, they may start feeling this child hates me.” Dr. Oral also
expressed concern about Rachel’s behavior toward her daughter’s medical
providers at University Hospitals. Dr. Oral offered the following observations
about the mother:
[W]e’re talking about an intelligent woman here, the mother, who is a therapist herself, and she would know much better than any lay person to compose herself and display herself as a totally functional individual to providers at a hospital setting; but she didn’t. She was acting like an adolescent in that setting just to win the love or gain the love of her child and to prove to her child that she’s the only person that she can trust and she can’t trust anybody else.
Dr. Oral attributed the behavioral problems displayed by J.G.S. to the emotionally
abusive conduct of the mother. Dr. Oral ultimately determined J.G.S. suffered a
mental injury “caused by parental alienation and corruption of the child by her
mother.”
In its adjudicatory order issued November 11, 2015, the juvenile court took
judicial notice of the appeal decision issued by our court in June 2015 in the
modification action between Rachel and Matthew. Our court affirmed the
placement of physical care with Matthew, noting the following: 6
Neutral witnesses described the child’s severe tantrums in Rachel’s presence and Rachel’s aggravation of the tantrums. They stated the behaviors only occurred around Rachel. These uncontrolled episodes placed the child’s safety at risk. Rachel conceded as much, testifying the child made “herself unsafe and other people around her unsafe as well.”
The juvenile court found Dr. Oral’s testimony was “compelling and
persuasive” and concluded the State proved by clear and convincing evidence
that both children should be adjudicated CINA under section 232.2(6)(c)(1). The
mother filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) on November
26, 2015, asking the court to reconsider its adjudication and re-examine the
evidence. On January 26, 2016, the juvenile court denied the rule 1.904(2)
motion and issued a dispositional order, continuing the CINA adjudication and
placing both children in the care of their father with protective supervision by the
DHS.
The mother challenges the adjudication and dispositional orders.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
We review CINA cases de novo. In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa
2002). While we are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, we give
them weight, especially when witness credibility is at issue. Id. We also review
constitutional claims de novo. In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Iowa 2002).
Because the mother is claiming a statute is unconstitutional, she must “negate
every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld.” See id. We
generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Interest of E.H. III,
578 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1998). To the extent the mother’s claims rest on
statutory interpretation, we review for correction of legal error. Id. 7
III. Analysis of Mother’s Issues
The mother advances five issues in support of her request to dismiss the
CINA cases.3 First, the mother alleges she was denied due process because the
State’s petition failed to provide notice of how her acts or omissions cause
mental injury to her children. She also complains the court “allowed the proof
offered by the State to exceed the scope of the allegations.” Second, she
contends the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory
basis for adjudication. Third, she attacks the constitutionality of section
232.2(6)(c)(1). Fourth, she alleges the court violated Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.404(b) in considering her prior bad acts. And fifth, she alleges the court’s
reliance on testimony from the State’s expert was the product of “tunnel vision”
and denied the mother due process. We will address each issue in turn.
A. Due Process and Notice
Rachel first argues she was denied due process because the CINA
petition did not afford her proper notice of the State’s allegations concerning her
acts or omissions. Both the federal and state constitutions provide no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See U.S.
Const. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. “[F]reedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). A
3 The mother’s petition on appeal also asks us to rule that the child abuse finding against her is unfounded and order it expunged from the central abuse registry under Iowa Code section 235A.18(2). We have previously decided a juvenile court has discretion under that statutory provision to grant parents a hearing concerning expungement of information from the central registry. In re A.J., 821 N.W.2d 280, 284-85 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). Because we affirm the CINA adjudication, we decline to address the expungement issue. 8
parent has due process rights relating to a CINA proceeding. See In re A.M.H.,
516 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa 1994).
The State filed its original petition on April 24, 2015, alleging generally that
J.G.S. and J.C.S. were CINA. On August 7, 2015, the mother moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing, among other things, that the petition failed to specify what
acts she committed that caused or were imminently likely to cause mental injury
to the children. The State amended the petition on August 10, 2015, specifically
referencing Rachel’s “uncontrolled and manipulative behavior toward University
of Iowa hospital staff” where she “had [J.G.S.] placed on a mental health
committal.” The amended petition also alleged Rachel had attempted to “poison”
her daughter’s relationship with Matthew, who had sole custody of the children.
As for J.C.S., the amended petition recounted the incidents in late March and
early April 2015 when the mother failed to return her son to Matthew’s care,
refused the police request to do a welfare check, and locked herself in the house
with the boy.
We believe the amended petition adequately informed the mother of the
factual basis for the State’s allegations that her children were being harmed or
were at imminent risk of harm from her efforts to manipulate them and create an
estrangement from their father. See Interest of Hewitt, 272 N.W.2d 852, 857
(Iowa 1978) (noting “a general statement of the facts relied on to support the
petition must be stated as a minimum”). The mother’s attorney was well
prepared for the adjudication hearing and provided vigorous representation. On
this record, we find no lack of notice resulting in the denial of due process. 9
Rachel also alleges the proceedings were “fundamentally unfair” because
the juvenile court failed to limit the evidence presented at the hearing to matters
alleged in the State’s petition and because her daughter’s troubling behaviors
were explained by previous mental health diagnoses. Rachel does not fully
develop these evidentiary claims. Accordingly, we find neither allegation rises to
the level of a due process violation. See generally A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d at 870
(listing due process rights as including (1) notice of hearing, (2) confrontation and
cross-examination of adverse witnesses, (3) representation by counsel, (4) an
impartial decision maker, and (5) a decision based solely on legal rules and the
evidence presented at the hearing). We conclude the mother received due
process in the juvenile court proceedings.
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence of Mental Injury
The juvenile court based its CINA adjudication on the following provision:
“Child in need of assistance” means an unmarried child: ..... c. Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of any of the following: (1) Mental injury caused by the acts of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(c)(1).
Rachel contends the State fell short of proving her daughter suffered a
mental injury, or her son was imminently likely to suffer a mental injury, or that
Rachel’s behavior was the source of the abuse. Rachel also argues the court
should require proof that she intentionally inflicted injury on her children and
require proof of substantial mental injury. 10
The State counters that if the Iowa legislature had intended to require
proof of a parent’s intentional infliction of substantial mental injury it would have
included those terms in the CINA definition at section 232.2(6)(c)(1). The State
further explains the purpose of the child welfare provisions in chapter 232: “The
statutes focus on the best interests of children and recognize that parents might
not always know what acts or omissions are causing their child harm. Yet, the
fact remains that the act or omission is indeed causing physical or mental harm
to the child.” We agree with the State’s statutory interpretation. Appellate courts
may not add modifying words to a statute under the guise of judicial construction.
See City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 197 (Iowa 2006).
When we apply the record evidence to the actual language of the statute,
we find clear and convincing proof in support of the CINA adjudication. In the
context of section 232.2(6)(c), “harmful effects” relate to “the physical, mental or
social welfare of a child.” In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 2014). A “mental
injury” is defined as a “nonorganic injury to a child’s intellectual or psychological
capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s
ability to function within the child’s normal range of performance and behavior.”
Iowa Code § 232.2(35). We have previously affirmed a CINA adjudication based
on the “mental injury” alternative where the parents placed their children in the
middle of continued hostilities following their divorce, resulting in all three children
attempting to harm themselves due to the emotional distress. In re J.S., No. 14-
1014, 2014 WL 4938012, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014); see also In re
E.R., No. 14-0850, 2014 WL 4937999, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014)
(suggesting “mental injury” alternative would protect children whose parents’ 11
behaviors toward each other and in the presence of the children have created
harm).
Dr. Oral opined that J.G.S. was an “emotionally highly burdened child.”
The pediatrician linked the child’s behavioral problems to Rachel’s manipulation
and pattern of interactions intended to alienate the girl from both medical
providers and her father. The juvenile court found Dr. Oral’s opinions to be
persuasive, and we defer to that credibility finding. See In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d
478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (explaining we are “influenced by the favorable
vantage point” of the juvenile court). In addition, experienced child-protection
worker Dan Dorrance had concerns about the emotional well-being of J.C.S.,
who “was exposed to Rachel being arrested for failure to comply with the
custodial order, was taken out of school for approximately a week, and not
returned to Matt’s care after what should have been a two-hour visit.” The record
showed J.C.S. did not display behavioral problems, but struggled in school and
had “ADHD tendencies.” After reviewing anew the evidence presented by the
State, we find clear and convincing proof that J.G.S. suffered and J.C.S. was
imminently like to suffer harmful effects as a result of mental injury caused by
Rachel’s misguided efforts to win the devotion of the children and alienate them
from Matthew.
C. Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenge to Mental-Injury Statute
Rachel next attacks section 232.2(6)(c)(1) as “unconstitutionally vague”
both on its face and as applied to her, and alternatively as “unconstitutionally
overbroad.” Vagueness challenges are generally directed toward penal statutes,
which “must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is 12
prohibited, and, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement . . . it
must provide an explicit standard for those who apply [them].” See State v.
Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1976). Where the statute under attack is
remedial or civil rather than penal in nature, courts require “a less strict standard
of definiteness.” See Miller v. Iowa Real Estate Comm’n., 274 N.W.2d 288, 292
(Iowa 1979). An overbreadth analysis is confined to alleged denials of First
Amendment rights. State v. Armstrong, 787 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Iowa Ct. App.
2010). Because Rachel does not allege the statute infringes on her First
Amendment rights, we do not find the overbreadth doctrine applies here.
In arguing her vagueness claim to the juvenile court, Rachel posed the
following rhetorical questions:
What sort of mental injury is meant? Temporary acts of anger or sadness because of acts of parent in punishing a child? A serious tantrum when the child fails to get her way? What is the child’s normal range of performance? How is that determined and by whom?
Rachel ultimately argued the statute provided "too much opportunity for selective
enforcement.”
The juvenile court rejected her vagueness claim, as do we. In assessing
whether a statute is void-for-vagueness, we presume constitutionality and give
the provision any reasonable construction to uphold it. State v. Showens, 845
N.W.2d 436, 441 (Iowa 2014). Rachel’s argument fails to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality. The description of a child in need of assistance
in section 232.2(6)(c)(1), coupled with the definition of “mental injury” in section
232.2(35), gives sufficient notice to parents as to the type of harm—caused by
their actions—that will trigger juvenile-court intervention. The definition of mental 13
injury includes the phrase “observable and substantial impairment in the child’s
ability to function.” Those specific standards dispense with the mother’s concern
that a child’s temporary anger or occasional tantrum could be mistaken for a
mental injury. The definition of “mental injury” does not require parents or
professionals to guess at its meaning.
Moreover, we are mindful that it is not only the mother’s rights at issue
here; chapter 232 is premised on best serving the welfare of each child under the
jurisdiction of the court. Iowa Code § 232.1. “An ‘impossible standard of
statutory clarity’ would be inappropriate in cases involving child care and
custody.” In re Clark, 281 S.E.2d 47, 56 (N.C. 1981). A certain amount of
flexibility in the CINA definition is necessary to protect children from a wide range
of abusive conduct. We find the provisions at issue provide sufficient guidance
for juvenile courts to administer them uniformly. Accordingly, we reject Rachel’s
void-for-vagueness argument.
D. Prior Bad Acts Evidence
The rules of evidence generally apply in adjudicatory hearings. Iowa
Code § 232.96(3). Rachel contends the juvenile court erred in relying on
evidence of her “prior bad acts” in contravention of Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.404(b). She contends the juvenile court “seems to find Rachel is a bad
person.” She specifically mentions objecting to three exhibits accepted by the
juvenile court at the CINA hearing: two documents showing a settlement
regarding the suspension of Rachel’s counseling license in Nebraska and the
appellate decision involving the modification of child custody in her dissolution
case. She objected on grounds of relevance, rules 5.401 and 5.402, and that 14
the exhibits were more prejudicial than probative, rule 5.403. Rachel does not
assert she raised a prior-bad-acts objection at the adjudicatory hearing.
The mother’s general relevancy objections did not preserve error on her
appellate argument alleging these documents constituted improper evidence of
her prior bad acts under rule 5.404(b). See State v. Mulvany, 603 N.W.2d 630,
633 (Iowa Ct. App.1999). Moreover, the mother’s invocation of rule 5.404(b) for
the first time in her rule 1.904(2) motion came too late to preserve error. See
Mitchell v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 832 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 2013)
(“[A] party fails to preserve error on new arguments or theories raised for the first
time in a post-trial motion.”).
Even if Rachel had preserved error on her prior-bad-acts argument, the
juvenile court did not emphasize the disputed exhibits in reaching its decision.
The juvenile court did not find J.C.S. and J.G.S. were CINA because their mother
was a “bad person.” Instead, the court properly determined the children needed
DHS supervision and it would be contrary to their welfare to have unsupervised
visitation with their mother at this time.4
E. Due Process and “Tunnel Vision”
Finally, Rachel argues Dr. Oral, the State’s expert—and the juvenile court
in crediting the doctor’s testimony—fell victim to “tunnel vision” and thereby
denied Rachel a fair hearing. Rachel cites a law review article that defines
“tunnel vision” as a phenomenon of the criminal justice system where authorities
4 In the dispositional order, the juvenile court quoted J.G.S.’s counselor as reporting: “Rachel has expressed desire to do what is best for her children, she admits to her over the top actions that led them to where they are today.” We are hopeful that Rachel’s expressed desire will translate into affirmative progress in her relationship with the children. 15
will “focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will ‘build a case’ for
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.”
See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 292 (2006). We find Rachel’s
argument unconvincing in the child-welfare context. Rachel is not a criminal
defendant in this case. Neither the pediatrician, nor the DHS, nor the juvenile
court concerned themselves with building a prosecution against the mother.
Rather, the question was whether her children needed state assistance because
their physical, mental, or social welfare was endangered by the mother’s actions
or omissions. See generally In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 376 (Iowa 2014)
(reiterating that the State bears “a duty to assure that every child within its
borders receives proper care and treatment, and must intercede when parents
fail to provide it”).
Finding no merit to the mother’s challenges, we affirm the juvenile court’s
orders.
AFFIRMED.