COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00441-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.P.M., A CHILD
----------
FROM THE 324TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant F.M. (Father) and Appellee G.P.M (Mother) entered into an
agreed decree of divorce in December 2001. The decree appointed Father and
Mother joint managing conservators of their child, J.P.M., but gave Mother the
exclusive right to designate J.P.M.’s primary residence. In January 2011, Father
filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking appointment as the
person with the exclusive right to establish J.P.M.’s primary residence. Trial was
to the bench, which denied Father’s petition. In a single issue, Father argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition to modify
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. conservatorship because “there is practically no evidence, and the evidence is
certainly insufficient, to support a denial of the requested modification.” We will
affirm.
Mother initially contends that Father waived his argument for appellate
review because his attorney agreed to both the form and substance of the order
denying the petition to modify. For a judgment to be considered an agreed or
consent judgment such that no appeal can be taken, either the body of the
judgment itself or the record must indicate that the parties came to some
agreement as to the case’s disposition; simple approval of the form and
substance of the judgment does not suffice. DeClaris Assocs. v. McCoy
Workplace Solutions, L.P., 331 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Leeper v. Woodrick, No. 02-04-00371-CV, 2005 WL
1475614, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Father did not waive his right to appeal because the parties did not come to any
agreement regarding the disposition of the petition to modify. The case was—
and continues to be—contested.
We review the trial court’s modification of managing conservatorship for an
abuse of discretion. In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see In re A.B.H., 266 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (applying standard). A trial court
abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to
guiding principles. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); Low v. Henry, 221
2 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent
grounds of error in modification cases, but they are relevant factors in deciding
whether the trial court abused its discretion. T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 872.
The family code authorizes a trial court to modify an order that provides for
the terms and conditions of conservatorship if (1) modification would be in the
best interest of the child and (2) the child is at least twelve years old and has
expressed to the court in chambers, as provided by section 153.009, the name of
the person who is the child’s preference to have the exclusive right to designate
the primary residence of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(2) (West
Supp. 2011); see also id. § 153.009 (West 2008). In this case, the trial court did
not file any separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, but it did state in the
final order that it “finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child to
modify primary possession of the child.” Also, the trial court met with J.P.M. and
later stated in a letter to the parties that it “realize[s] that [J.P.M.] wants to live
with his father.” Therefore, like Mother and Father, we will focus our analysis on
the best-interest prong.2
2 To the extent that the trial court’s statement in the final order that modification is not in J.P.M.’s best interest is a finding of fact, it is reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). To the extent that the statement is not a finding of fact, a complete reporter’s record was filed, and Father may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied best-interest finding. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003); Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
3 A court’s primary consideration when determining issues of
conservatorship shall always be the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 153.002 (West 2008). Courts may use a nonexhaustive list of factors to
determine the child’s best interest. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976); T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 873. Those factors include:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (citations omitted). Other factors to consider in
modification suits include the child’s stability and the need to prevent constant
litigation in child custody cases. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).
Here, Father testified that he filed the petition to modify because J.P.M.
had pleaded with him to do so on several occasions. Father opined that it was in
J.P.M.’s best interest to grant the petition to modify because Father is “clearly a
4 better parent” than Mother. According to Father, he has a technical degree in
mechanical engineering; he can better help J.P.M. (whose grades had recently
suffered) with his homework; and he has “more knowledge of what it[’]s like to be
a fifteen year old being raised in American culture.” Although Father currently
leaves for work five days a week at 6:00 a.m., he explained that if J.P.M. lived
with him, he could adjust his schedule so that he leaves for work a little after 8:00
a.m. and returns in time to meet J.P.M. Father described Mother, who is
originally from Colombia, as an “average mother”; he declined to describe her as
a “bad mother.” Father acknowledged that Mother lives only about 500 feet from
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00441-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.P.M., A CHILD
----------
FROM THE 324TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant F.M. (Father) and Appellee G.P.M (Mother) entered into an
agreed decree of divorce in December 2001. The decree appointed Father and
Mother joint managing conservators of their child, J.P.M., but gave Mother the
exclusive right to designate J.P.M.’s primary residence. In January 2011, Father
filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking appointment as the
person with the exclusive right to establish J.P.M.’s primary residence. Trial was
to the bench, which denied Father’s petition. In a single issue, Father argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition to modify
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. conservatorship because “there is practically no evidence, and the evidence is
certainly insufficient, to support a denial of the requested modification.” We will
affirm.
Mother initially contends that Father waived his argument for appellate
review because his attorney agreed to both the form and substance of the order
denying the petition to modify. For a judgment to be considered an agreed or
consent judgment such that no appeal can be taken, either the body of the
judgment itself or the record must indicate that the parties came to some
agreement as to the case’s disposition; simple approval of the form and
substance of the judgment does not suffice. DeClaris Assocs. v. McCoy
Workplace Solutions, L.P., 331 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Leeper v. Woodrick, No. 02-04-00371-CV, 2005 WL
1475614, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Father did not waive his right to appeal because the parties did not come to any
agreement regarding the disposition of the petition to modify. The case was—
and continues to be—contested.
We review the trial court’s modification of managing conservatorship for an
abuse of discretion. In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see In re A.B.H., 266 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (applying standard). A trial court
abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to
guiding principles. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); Low v. Henry, 221
2 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent
grounds of error in modification cases, but they are relevant factors in deciding
whether the trial court abused its discretion. T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 872.
The family code authorizes a trial court to modify an order that provides for
the terms and conditions of conservatorship if (1) modification would be in the
best interest of the child and (2) the child is at least twelve years old and has
expressed to the court in chambers, as provided by section 153.009, the name of
the person who is the child’s preference to have the exclusive right to designate
the primary residence of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(2) (West
Supp. 2011); see also id. § 153.009 (West 2008). In this case, the trial court did
not file any separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, but it did state in the
final order that it “finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child to
modify primary possession of the child.” Also, the trial court met with J.P.M. and
later stated in a letter to the parties that it “realize[s] that [J.P.M.] wants to live
with his father.” Therefore, like Mother and Father, we will focus our analysis on
the best-interest prong.2
2 To the extent that the trial court’s statement in the final order that modification is not in J.P.M.’s best interest is a finding of fact, it is reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). To the extent that the statement is not a finding of fact, a complete reporter’s record was filed, and Father may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied best-interest finding. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003); Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
3 A court’s primary consideration when determining issues of
conservatorship shall always be the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 153.002 (West 2008). Courts may use a nonexhaustive list of factors to
determine the child’s best interest. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976); T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 873. Those factors include:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (citations omitted). Other factors to consider in
modification suits include the child’s stability and the need to prevent constant
litigation in child custody cases. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).
Here, Father testified that he filed the petition to modify because J.P.M.
had pleaded with him to do so on several occasions. Father opined that it was in
J.P.M.’s best interest to grant the petition to modify because Father is “clearly a
4 better parent” than Mother. According to Father, he has a technical degree in
mechanical engineering; he can better help J.P.M. (whose grades had recently
suffered) with his homework; and he has “more knowledge of what it[’]s like to be
a fifteen year old being raised in American culture.” Although Father currently
leaves for work five days a week at 6:00 a.m., he explained that if J.P.M. lived
with him, he could adjust his schedule so that he leaves for work a little after 8:00
a.m. and returns in time to meet J.P.M. Father described Mother, who is
originally from Colombia, as an “average mother”; he declined to describe her as
a “bad mother.” Father acknowledged that Mother lives only about 500 feet from
his residence, that he goes to the gym after work three to four times a week for
over an hour, that he had taken J.P.M. out of school three times without
permission and once for an office Christmas party, that he could not name any of
J.P.M.’s teachers, and that he had bought J.P.M. a dirt bike and a .22 rifle, which
Father kept locked away.
Mother opined that it is in J.P.M.’s best interest to live with her. She
testified that she is around children all day because she works as a teacher for
“Child Care Associate”; that she has worked in a “Head Start” program for ten
years; that she has taken English lessons on and off and has no difficulty reading
English; that she is a United States citizen; and that she permits J.P.M. to visit
Father even when J.P.M. is not scheduled to do so. Mother explained that she
set up tutoring for J.P.M., that she told J.P.M.’s teachers to contact her with any
concerns they have about J.P.M.’s schoolwork, that she registered J.P.M. for
5 soccer, and that she helped J.P.M. sign up for band. Mother expressed concern
that J.P.M. was too young to learn how to ride a dirt bike or to use a gun, and she
testified that Father had a temper, used bad language around J.P.M., was a “very
aggressive” person, and had once left a gun on a night table at his house when
J.P.M. was there.
Having reviewed the short record, we conclude that the trial court had
sufficient evidence upon which to determine that it would not be in J.P.M.’s best
interest to modify the conservatorship such that Father would have the exclusive
right to designate J.P.M.’s primary residence. Accordingly, we hold the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s petition to modify
conservatorship. See, e.g., In re R.T.H., 175 S.W.3d 519, 521–22 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that conflicting evidence in modification
proceeding supported trial court’s implied finding that denial of petition to modify
was in child’s best interest and that trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying petition). We overrule Father’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s
order.
BILL MEIER JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: June 28, 2012