in the Interest of J.P., Minor Child

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 18, 2013
Docket02-13-00095-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of J.P., Minor Child (in the Interest of J.P., Minor Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of J.P., Minor Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00095-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.P., MINOR CHILD

------------

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WICHITA COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ------------

I. Introduction

In two issues, Appellant Father appeals the termination of his parental

rights to J.P. We affirm.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. Procedural Background

J.P. was removed from his mother S.M. in 2006. We affirmed the

termination of S.M.‘s parental rights to him but reversed the termination of

Father‘s parental rights to J.P. after concluding that, as to Father, the evidence

was factually insufficient to support the jury‘s best interest finding. In re J.P., No.

02-10-00448-CV, 2012 WL 579481, at *1, *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23,

2012, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh‘g). We remanded the portion of the case

pertaining to Father for a new trial. Id. at *10. On February 26, 2013, the trial

court held the new trial and terminated Father‘s parental rights to J.P. again.

This appeal followed.

III. Best Interest of the Child

In two issues, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court‘s best interest finding.

A. Standards of Review

In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to

erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights,

privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child‘s

right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v. Smith,

685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, ―[w]hen the State seeks to sever

permanently the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first observe

fundamentally fair procedures.‖ In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2012)

(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–92

2 (1982)). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe

involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20–

21.

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012), § 161.206(a)

(West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard because ―[a]

parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‗far more precious

than any property right.‘‖ E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S.

at 758–59, 102 S. Ct. at 1397); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see

In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for

termination and conservatorship). Evidence is clear and convincing if it ―will

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.‖ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West

2008).

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency to support the trial court‘s

best interest finding, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a

factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination of

Father‘s parental rights was in the child‘s best interest. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the finding and judgment. Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We consider

3 undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider

evidence favorable to termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we

disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.

We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance

and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the factfinder‘s province. Id. at 573,

574. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer

to the factfinder‘s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id. at

573.

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to

the factfinder‘s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire

record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that

termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the child‘s best interest.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If,

in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder

could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder

could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its

finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

B. Evidence

The following individuals testified at the February 2013 trial: Child

Protective Services (CPS) adoption specialist Tammy Durham, who was J.P.‘s

CPS caseworker from March 2007 to April 2008; Linda Johnson, J.P.‘s CPS

4 caseworker from April 2008 through the time of the trial; and John Nunn, the

plant manager of the company where Father had worked until November 12,

2012. J.P. testified via video deposition. Father failed to appear, although his

attorney acknowledged that Father knew about the trial.

The trial court took judicial notice of the contents of its file upon DFPS‘s

request and admitted into evidence J.P.‘s mental health, medical, and school

records. It also admitted Father‘s police records and his mental health care

provider records, which included his July 21, 2008 substance abuse assessment

and his August 2008 psychological evaluation.

1. J.P.

J.P., who was born on June 4, 1999, had been in the State‘s care for

almost seven years—almost half of his life—by the time of the second trial. His

mother S.M. was bipolar, and her history of incarceration had led to the neglect

and abandonment of J.P. and her other five children. As J.P. was the oldest,

S.M. left him in charge of his siblings. S.M. and Father never married, and

Father had two older sons by another woman. J.P. reported during a psychiatric

evaluation that both S.M. and Father had abused drugs in the past and that S.M.

had been involved with men who physically mistreated her.

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Related

Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Holick v. Smith
685 S.W.2d 18 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child
180 S.W.3d 570 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
in the Interest of M.C.T., a Child
250 S.W.3d 161 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
In the Interest of W.S.M., a Child
107 S.W.3d 772 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of H.R.M.
209 S.W.3d 105 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
In the Interest of R.R. & S.J.S.
209 S.W.3d 112 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
In the Interest of J.A.J.
243 S.W.3d 611 (Texas Supreme Court, 2007)
In the Interest of E.R.
385 S.W.3d 552 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)

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