In the Interest of J.O. and X.o, Minor Children, C.O., Mother
This text of In the Interest of J.O. and X.o, Minor Children, C.O., Mother (In the Interest of J.O. and X.o, Minor Children, C.O., Mother) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0256 Filed April 8, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF J.O. AND X.O, Minor Children,
C.O., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children
born in 2012 and 2013. AFFIRMED.
Ashley M. Emick of Arends, Lee & Emick, Humboldt, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, and Jonathan Beaty, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Marcy Lundberg, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children,
born in 2012 and 2013. She contends (1) the record lacks clear and convincing
evidence to support termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2013)
and (2) the State did not make reasonable reunification efforts.
I. Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) requires the State to prove the
children were three years of age or younger, were adjudicated in need of
assistance, were removed from the physical custody of the mother for at least six
of the previous twelve months, and could not be returned to the mother’s
custody. On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the State
satisfied its burden of proving these elements.
The mother is the subject of two founded child abuse reports. The first
arose from her failure to take the younger child to regularly scheduled medical
appointments for a rare condition known as congenital adrenal hyperplasia, and
her apparent failure to have an emergency injection on hand to treat the
condition. The second abuse report arose from her decision to leave the toddlers
home alone.
On the issuance of the first report, the children were allowed to remain
with the mother. After the filing of the second report, the juvenile court ordered
the children’s removal from her care and placement in foster care, where they
remained through the termination hearing.
At the hearing, the mother took issue with the contents of the child abuse
reports. As to the first incident, she furnished evidence documenting her
purchase of the emergency medication. However, she did not deny her failure to 3
schedule three consecutive monthly appointments for the younger child. In light
of these significant omissions, a Department of Human Services social worker
expressed concern with the mother’s ability to understand “the severity of [the
child’s] condition and the long-term effects of his condition.”
With respect to the second incident, the mother asserted she left the
children with one of the fathers. Even if true, this father was the subject of a no-
contact order based on his physical abuse of the mother while the children were
in the home. Additionally, according to the department social worker, the second
report was documented by a service provider who visited the mother’s home and
found the older child “in the living room, [with] no adult” and the younger child
“upstairs in his room.”
The mother also presented evidence of her progress with department
goals and expectations. The department social worker acknowledged the mother
made some effort to comply with services but said “[s]he’ll kind of . . . take one
step forward and five back.” We agree with this assessment.
Although the mother attended parenting classes, she failed to complete all
the assignments and appeared not to have internalized the lessons. And, while
she participated in a mental health evaluation scheduled by the department and
took prescription medication to level her mood swings, she only attended one
therapy session to address anger management issues flagged by her own
therapist and had yet to confront deep-seated trauma resulting from childhood
events.
We recognize the mother regularly attended twice-weekly supervised
visits with her children and improved her housing conditions, which at one point, 4
were deplorable. We also acknowledge substance abuse was not an issue.
Finally, contrary to the department’s assertion, the mother’s physician reported
she diligently scheduled and followed through with certain medical appointments.
Nonetheless, her progress on these fronts came late in the proceedings. With
only a six-month statutory window preceding termination, the mother could not
afford to waste any time. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000)
(noting the statutory time frames and need “for the parents to actively and
promptly respond to those services”).
The mother argues, even if the statutory elements were technically
satisfied, she would have benefited from a six-month extension to work towards
reunification with her children. A department social worker testified otherwise.
She said she did not think there was anything the department could offer to make
a difference in the case. In her words, “[w]e have a one- and a two-year-old who
need permanency, who need stability, who need medical needs met. And [the
mother] is not able to provide that in these nine months. I don’t see three extra
months helping.”
We conclude the State proved the children could not be returned to the
mother’s custody.
II. The State is obligated to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493-94. The mother contends the State failed in this
obligation because it refused to place the children with her on a trial basis. To
the contrary, the State left the children in the mother’s care following the filing of
the first child abuse report, only to have the mother again endanger the children
by leaving them unsupervised. The mother herself acknowledged she was less 5
than cooperative for a period of time following the children’s removal. Under
these circumstances, the State did not violate its reasonable efforts mandate by
declining to pursue a trial home placement.1
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two
AFFIRMED.
1 The children’s maternal grandparents filed a “response/joinder in appellant-mother’s petition on appeal,” asserting “the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children.” Although they intervened in the juvenile court action, they appealed no orders and have not raised “a specific personal or legal interest” of their own. See In re N.C., No. 12-0944, 2012 WL 3200862 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012). Additionally, the grandparents lack standing to contest the termination of the mother’s parental rights. Id.; see also In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (concluding “[a] joinder on factual or legally specific issues as to one parent’s parental rights does not challenge the factual and legal reasons associated with and supporting the termination of the ‘joining’ parent.”).
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