2023 IL App (1st) 230843-U THIRD DIVISION October 18, 2023 No. 1-23-0843
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF J.L. and E.W., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Minors-Respondents-Appellees ) ) (PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 20 JA 2014 & 2015 ) JENNIFER B., ) Honorable ) Demetrios Kottaras, Mother-Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE R. VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s findings, following an adjudication hearing, that the minors were abused and neglected over the mother’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. 1-23-0843
¶2 At an adjudication hearing, the circuit court found that Jennifer B. abused and neglected
her two minor children, J.L. and E.W. At the disposition hearing, the court found that Jennifer was
unable to care for the children, and adjudged them wards of the court. On appeal, Jennifer
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the court’s findings of abuse and neglect. She
does not challenge the disposition order. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Jennifer is the biological mother of J.L., born on October 24, 2017, and E.W., born on May
20, 2020. E.W. had a twin sister, K.W., who was found dead at three months old on the morning
of August 24, 2020, while under the care of Jennifer, with whom she co-slept. Vomit was found
around K.W.’s mouth, and the medical examiner could not rule out asphyxiation as K.W.’s cause
of death. That same day, J.L. and E.W. entered into protective custody.
¶5 On August 26, 2020, the State filed petitions for adjudications of wardship for J.L. and
E.W. J.L.’s petition alleged that he was neglected based on an environment injurious to his welfare,
abused based on physical abuse, and abused based on substantial risk of physical injury. The
factual allegations in support of the petition alleged as follows:
“Natural mother has three prior indicated reports for inadequate supervision, inadequate
shelter and substantial risk of physical injury/environment injurious. Putative father has one
prior indicated report for substantial risk of physical injury/environment injurious. On or about
March 17, 2020, putative father pulled this minor off of a bicycle and slammed him onto a
floor. Natural mother has a history of multiple past psychiatric hospitalizations and a long
standing diagnosis of bipolar disorder with medication non-compliance. Natural mother and
putative father have a history of domestic violence. Natural mother has been non-compliant
with DCFS attempts to engage her in mental health treatment. This minor’s sibling’s putative
2 1-23-0843
father reports that he and natural mother argue daily and that she is physically violent towards
him. Natural mother reports not being able to control her anger and that, when this minor and
this minor’s sibling cry, she ‘ties them down.’ This minor’s other infant sibling was found
deceased on or about August 24, 2020 after co-sleeping with natural mother. Putative father
is currently incarcerated. Paternity has not been established.”
¶6 E.W.’s petition alleged that he was neglected based on an environment injurious to his
welfare, and abused based on substantial risk of physical injury. The factual allegations in support
of his petition alleged as follows:
“Natural mother has three prior indicated reports for inadequate supervision, inadequate
shelter and substantial risk of physical injury/environment injurious. Natural mother has a
history of multiple past psychiatric hospitalizations and a long standing diagnosis of bipolar
disorder with medication non-compliance. Natural mother and this minor’s sibling’s
putative father have a history of domestic violence. Natural mother has been non-compliant
with DCFS attempts to engage her in mental health treatment. This minor’s putative father
reports that he and natural mother argue daily and that she is physically violent towards
him. Natural mother reports not being able to control her anger and that, when this minor
and this minor’s sibling cry, she ‘ties them down.’ This minor’s other infant sibling was
found deceased on or about August 24, 2020 after co-sleeping with natural mother.
Paternity has not been established.”
¶7 That same day, the circuit court granted the State’s motions for temporary custody for both
minors.
¶8 On December 6, 2022 and January 24, 2023, the circuit court held adjudicatory hearings
on these petitions. The State called three witnesses: Adrienne Hudson, a Department of Children
3 1-23-0843
& Family Services (DCFS) intact worker; Nathalie Castro, a DCFS child protection specialist; and
Halema Townsend, a DCFS child protection investigator.
¶9 Hudson testified that she was assigned to the family in July 2020 after Jennifer gave birth
to the twins. Hudson understood that Jennifer was referred due to the risk Jennifer posed to the
twins, as she had a history of mental illness and habitual marijuana use. Hudson met with Jennifer
at her home on July 7, 2020, and recommended parenting classes, a mental health assessment,
daycare services for the kids, and a zero-to-three evaluation for the twins. A couple days later,
Hudson returned to Jennifer’s home with two portable cribs with bassinet attachments. She
explained to Jennifer that she could not co-sleep with the twins and that both portable cribs had to
remain in the bedroom with her. Jennifer agreed to this arrangement.
¶ 10 On August 11, 2020, Hudson met again with Jennifer at her home. Hudson testified that
Jennifer explained to her that she and her paramour had recently broken up due to an argument
they had regarding Jennifer’s disciplining of J.L. According to Hudson, Jennifer informed her that
she had hit J.L. but Hudson could not remember whether Jennifer indicated where she had hit J.L.,
or in what manner. Hudson cautioned Jennifer against using corporal punishment, and said she
would arrange a referral for parenting classes.
¶ 11 The State called Castro next. Castro testified that she was the child protection specialist
whom DCFS assigned to Jennifer after the death of K.W. Castro spoke with Jennifer over the
phone to implement a safety plan for the children. This included medical assessments for the other
children in Jennifer’s home (J.L. and E.W.). As part of the plan, Jennifer was permitted only
supervised contact with the minors. According to Castro, the implementation of a safety plan is
part of DCFS’s routine whenever there is the death of a child in a home, and there are other
4 1-23-0843
surviving children in the home. The goal of the plan is to ensure that the surviving children do not
have marks, bruises, or other signs of abuse or neglect. Jennifer agreed to the plan.
¶ 12 The State’s final witness, Townsend, testified that she took J.L. and E.W. into protective
custody on August 24, 2020, just hours after K.W.’s death. At that time, Townsend was a child
protection investigator assigned to determine whether K.W.’s death was the result of neglect. That
same day, Townsend had an in-person conversation with Jennifer. Jennifer had three prior
indicated reports for substantial risk of physical injury, injurious environment, inadequate
supervision, and inadequate shelter. According to Townsend, Jennifer told her that K.W. was
acting “fussy” prior to Jennifer putting her down to sleep in an adult bed with her. Jennifer
indicated she smoked marijuana three times a day to stimulate her appetite and control her anger
issues, and that she had smoked marijuana prior to going to sleep that night with K.W. Townsend
further averred that Jennifer self-reported her diagnoses of bipolar disorder, PTSD, ADHD, and
anxiety. Jennifer denied being on any psychotropic medications at that time.
¶ 13 Townsend testified that she had another in-person conversation with Jennifer on August
26, 2020. Jennifer told Townsend that when she was struggling with anger management issues and
the kids cried excessively, she would “tie them down.” Jennifer did not explain what she meant by
“tie them down.” Townsend also explained that the reason she took custody of the two minors on
August 24 was because there were a “lot of risks that could not be mitigated.” These included
Jennifer’s own admission that she was abusing illegal drugs at that time, and that she needed them
to function daily. Townsend stated that Jennifer displayed a “blatant disregard” regarding safe
sleep practices that were discussed with her previously. According to Townsend, Jennifer self-
reported that, although her relationship with her paramour was not physically violent, the police
had been called to the house on multiple occasions for domestic disputes.
5 1-23-0843
¶ 14 The State also introduced two exhibits into evidence. The first exhibit consisted of K.W.’s
medical records. These detailed the night that K.W. died. In summary, the records show the
following. Jennifer fed K.W. shortly after midnight on August 24, 2020, and put her to sleep
between her legs and the wall adjacent to the bed. Jennifer woke up later that night, and noticed
that K.W. was not breathing and had vomit around her mouth. She called 911. The police arrived
and administered CPR because K.W. was pulseless. At 3:34 a.m. on August 24, 2020, K.W. arrived
in the emergency room in full cardiac arrest. She was pronounced dead at 3:59 a.m. K.W.’s birth
records, contained with the first exhibit, showed that she was first given to her maternal aunt. The
records also reflected that Jennifer had psychiatric problems, including “maternal bipolar
disorder”, as well as a history of cigarette and marijuana use during pregnancy.
¶ 15 The State’s second exhibit included the medical examiner’s postmortem examination of
K.W. The medical examiner found K.W. to be well-developed and well-nourished. The medical
examiner could not determine the cause of death. However, he could not exclude asphyxiation as
the cause of death because it does not leave anatomic findings, and Jennifer had a history of
keeping K.W. in an unsafe sleeping environment.
¶ 16 Jennifer testified on her own behalf. She explained that she had a plan with her sister for
the sister to care for the twins after they were born because she “knew DCFS would come in” as a
result of her testing positive for marijuana at that time. She stated that she did, however, plan to
raise them with the help of DCFS. After a short time under the care of Jennifer’s sister and father,
Jennifer took physical custody. By the time of K.W.’s death, the twins and J.L. had been with
Jennifer for a couple of months.
¶ 17 Jennifer’s version of events of the night of K.W.’s death are as follows. She put the twins
down to sleep. As K.W. was drifting to sleep, E.W. started crying. When she checked on E.W.,
6 1-23-0843
she observed that his “facial expression wasn’t normal.” She then turned to K.W. to notice that her
facial expression also was not normal, and she was unresponsive. Jennifer ran out of the house and
told her cousin to call the police. Jennifer fell on the ground with K.W. in her arms as the police
began to arrive.
¶ 18 Jennifer testified that she never hit J.L. – rather, she would only “tap” him on his hand or
his butt. She would also have him stand in the corner for timeouts. Concerning the allegations that
she tied the twins down, she stated that she would use the straps of the rocker to tie them down in
the rocker itself. During cross-examination, however, Jennifer acknowledged that she did not tell
Townsend that she tied the twins down in the rocker – only that she had tied them down. She also
did not specify that it was only the twins she tied down, but rather “them” in general. She stated
that when she was upset or frustrated, “of course [she] will have to put them down.” Jennifer also
admitted to smoking marijuana three to four times a day during her pregnancy with the twins.
¶ 19 On April 17, 2023, the circuit court entered adjudication orders. As to J.L., the court found
that he was neglected based on being in an injurious environment. It also found that he was abused
based both on a substantial risk of injury and excessive corporal punishment. As to E.W., the court
found that he was neglected based on being in an injurious environment, and abused based on a
substantial risk of physical injury. The court also entered disposition orders finding that Jennifer
was unable to care for both minors, and adjudged them wards of the court, granting a DCFS
guardianship administrator the right to place the minors. This appeal of the adjudication orders
follows.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Jennifer challenges the circuit court’s findings that she abused and neglected
J.L. and E.W., arguing that the court incorrectly interpreted the evidence that the State adduced in
7 1-23-0843
support of its claims. She does not challenge the circuit court's dispositional finding that she was
unable to care for her children.
¶ 22 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022))
establishes the procedures and criteria for determining whether to remove a minor from his parent’s
custody and whether to make that minor a ward of the court. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 462
(2004). This determination involves a two-step process. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. First,
the court holds an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor is abused, neglected, or
dependent. Id. ¶ 19; 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 2022). If the court determines that the minor is
abused, neglected, or dependent, it holds a dispositional hearing to determine whether it is in the
best interest of the minor and the public for the minor to become a ward of the court. In re A.P.,
2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21; 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2022). Here, we consider only the adjudicatory
findings complained of, as Jennifer does not challenge the disposition order.
¶ 23 “A proceeding for adjudication of wardship ‘represents a significant intrusion into the
sanctity of the family which should not be undertaken lightly.’ ” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441,
463 (quoting In re Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396-97 (1985)). The State must prove its
allegations of neglect and abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875,
¶ 17. In other words, the State must prove that the allegations of neglect and abuse are more
probably true than not. Id. “ ‘A reviewing court will reverse the juvenile court’s determination
‘only if the factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court abused
its discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.’ ” In re A.S., 2020 IL App (1st)
200560, ¶ 22 (quoting In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 785, 795 (2006)). “A finding is against
the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re Arthur
H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 464. “Because a trial court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
8 1-23-0843
witnesses and weigh the evidence, a reviewing court will not overturn the trial court’s findings
merely because the reviewing court may have reached a different decision.” In re April C. 326 Ill.
App. 3d 245, 257 (2001) (citing In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 994 (1998)). “Ultimately,
there is a ‘strong and compelling presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial court’ in
child custody cases.” In re William H., 407 Ill. App. 3d 858, 866 (2011) (quoting Connor v.
Velinda C., 356 Ill. App. 3d 315, 324 (2005)). In turn, we address the court’s findings of neglect
and abuse.
¶ 24 Neglect Findings
¶ 25 We begin with Jennifer’s challenge to the circuit court’s findings that she neglected J.L.
and E.W. “Neglect” is the “failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand and
includes both willful and unintentional disregard of parental duties.” In re Christopher S., 364 Ill.
App. 3d 76, 88 (2006). However, the term does not contain a “fixed and measured” meaning, so it
takes its content from the specific circumstances of each case. Id. Therefore, cases involving
adjudication of neglect are sui generis, and each case must be decided on the basis of its own
unique circumstances. Id. Additionally, Illinois law defines a neglected minor as any person under
the age of 18 whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West
2022). Our courts recognize that “injurious environment” is “an amorphous concept that cannot
be defined with particularity, but has been interpreted to include the breach of a parent’s duty to
ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for h[er] children.” In re Kamisha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 785, 793
(2006). Finally, and importantly, the State need not, and indeed should not, wait for an injury to
occur when there are other indicia, such as a parent’s history of neglect or abuse, before stepping
in to protect a child at risk. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468.
9 1-23-0843
¶ 26 Here, the State produced evidence to show that Jennifer smoked marijuana multiple times
per day during her pregnancy with E.W., and continued to do so while E.W. and J.L. were under
her care. She claimed that she smoked marijuana to manage her anger. On multiple occasions, the
police were called to her home pursuant to reports of domestic violence between Jennifer and her
paramour. One of their arguments stemmed from his disagreement with how Jennifer disciplined
J.L. Moreover, although DCFS provided Jennifer with cribs for the twins and warned her that she
must not co-sleep with them, she nonetheless co-slept with the twins. One of the twins died in her
care after she co-slept with her. Despite her self-reported history of anger management issues,
anxiety, bipolar disorder, ADHD, and PTSD, she avoided attending a mental health assessment
and parenting classes. Jennifer did not rebut any of this evidence.
¶ 27 Based on the foregoing, we agree that Jennifer breached her duty to ensure a safe and
nurturing shelter for J.L. and E.W., thereby placing them in an injurious environment.
Accordingly, we cannot find that the circuit court’s findings were against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
¶ 28 Abuse Findings
¶ 29 We turn now to Jennifer’s contention that the circuit court erred in finding that she abused
J.L. and E.W. Under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Act, an abused minor includes a child whose parent
or other person responsible for his welfare “creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such
minor by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement,
impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” 705 ILCS 405/2-
3(2)(ii) (West 2022). The same facts that support a court’s finding of neglect due to an injurious
environment can also support a finding of abuse due to a substantial risk of injury. In re Tamesha
T., 2014 IL App (1st) 132986, ¶ 44. We find that they do so in this case.
10 1-23-0843
¶ 30 In addition to the evidence we recited above in our finding that Jennifer neglected J.L. and
E.W., which alone can support also a finding of abuse, we note here the ways in which Jennifer’s
physical actions created a substantial risk of injury. With respect to J.L., Jennifer testified that she
had lightly hit J.L. This testimony was inconsistent with Hudson’s, in which Hudson stated that
her conversation with Jennifer revealed Jennifer and her paramour had an argument over Jennifer’s
disciplining of J.L. It is not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court judge to infer that this meant
physical discipline, as Hudson then cautioned Jennifer against corporal punishment, and stated she
would provide Jennifer with a referral to parenting classes. It is the role of the circuit court to
conduct credibility findings: “[t]he trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the parties and witnesses and, therefore, it is in the best position to determine the
credibility and weight of the witnesses’ testimony.” In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (2001). As
a result, “the trial court is afforded broad discretion when determining the existence of abuse. In
re R.M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 541, 551 (1999). Here, the circuit court conducted a hearing in which it
had the opportunity to listen to all witness testimony and examine exhibits. Upon doing so, it found
that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that J.L. was abused physically. As there
is nothing to suggest here that the circuit court’s determination was against the manifest weight of
the evidence, we affirm its finding.
¶ 31 Finally, it is clear from the evidence that Jennifer admitted that she would “tie” her children
“down” when she was angry. We note here Jennifer’s word choice: she stated that she would “tie”
the children “down”. One would expect a different word choice—such as “buckle”—a common
word that refers to a normal restraint used to secure children for their safety in cars and other
portable carriages. It is also worth noting that Jennifer explained she would tie the children after
she became angry, upset, or frustrated. Her motive for the restraint—anger—is entirely
11 1-23-0843
distinguishable from the motive a parent who buckles a seatbelt on a child would have: safety.
Tying down babies and a two-year old can certainly also impair emotional health. We defer to the
circuit court in its findings after weighing both sides’ evidence.
¶ 32 In sum, we cannot find that the circuit court’s abuse findings were against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 33 Excessive Corporal Punishment Finding
¶ 34 As to J.L. only, the circuit court also found that Jennifer employed excessive corporal
punishment. The circuit court’s determination that punishing a two-year old by forcing him to
stand in a corner and tying him down is excessive given the child’s age is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. However, because we already found that Jennifer created a substantial risk
of physical injury, we need not address excessive corporal punishment. That is, since excessive
corporal punishment is just one example of abuse listed under section 2-3(2) of the Act (705 ILCS
405/2-3(2) (West 2022)), and we already found that Jennifer fulfilled another enumerated example
of abuse under section 2-3(2) by creating a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-
3(2)(ii), we need not address corporal punishment. In other words, we have found that Jennifer
neglected and abused J.L. regardless of whether she excessively corporally punished him because
J.L. was in an injurious environment and also exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury.
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s adjudicatory findings that Jennifer abused
and neglected both J.L. and E.W.
¶ 37 Affirmed.